STUDIES IN THE VĀKYAPADĪYA VOL. I

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

Critical Text of Cantos I and II
[with English Translation, Summary of Ideas and Notes]

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PRINTED EDITIONS AND MANUSCRIPTS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TEXT.

1. Pandit Charudeva Sastri's edition of Canto I (Lahore—1934)

2. Benares edition of the Vākyapadīya, (Benares 1887)

3. Manuscript No. 10924 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Canto—I, and portions of Bhartṛhari's own commentary on Canto I of the Vākyapadīya.

4. Manuscript No. 8918 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Cantos I and II.

5. Manuscript No. 2392—C. O. belonging to the University Manuscripts Library and containing Canto II.

Dedicated

to

the memory

of

my father the late

SHRI N. SANKARA PILLAI

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PREFACE

This volume contains a critically edited text of Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya with an English translation, introduction, notes, etc.

The translation was at first prepared as part of my Ph.D. thesis which the University of London accepted in 1951.

My work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was supervised by the late Prof. J. R. Firth, Professor of General Linguistics and Head of the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Prof. J. Brough, then Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, S.O.A.S., University of London and now Professor of Sanskrit in the Cambridge University. Professor Firth's famous Wednesday lectures on Linguistics, my individual discussions with him, and my Thursday sessions with Professor Brough have been of immense value to me in my study of the Vākyapadīya. I am grateful to them. I must especially express my gratitude to the late Prof. Firth and to Mrs. Whitley, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics of the S.O.A.S for their kindness in letting me, a member of the Research staff of the department, undertake research work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Mahopādhyāya K. Harihara Sastri, B.A., Assistant Research Officer in the Oriental Research Institute & Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, helped me with the collation of the Vākyapadīya manuscripts in the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum, and I thank him.

Shri E. Easwaran Namboodiri, M.A., Lecturer in Sanskrit University of Kerala, willingly undertook, to prepare the indices and errata included in this publication. I am very thankful to him.

I am indebted to the Kerala University for having been able to make use of the Vākyapadīya manuscripts in the collections of the ORI and MSS. Library.

I also thank Messrs Motilal Banarsidass for kindly undertaking to publish this work.

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K. RAGHAVAN PILLAI

INTRODUCTION

General

The Vākyapadīya ranks among the principal authoritative works in Sanskrit Grammar. If the Aṣṭādhyāyī gives a study of the structure of the Sanskrit language with the rules governing its functioning, the Vārttika of Kātyāyana largely explains the sūtras of Pāṇini, sometimes taking positions different from those taken by the Sūtrakāra and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali besides extensively studying the topics in the Aṣṭādhyāyi and defending Pāṇini against the Vārttikakāra, also incidentally introduces subjects in linguistic philosophy, one can say with certainty that it is in the Vākyapadīya that a first full-fledged statement and discussion of a philosophy of Grammar is given.

There are rudiments of the doctrine of Śabdabrahman in Sanskrit texts right from the Vedas downwards. We find the supreme Word principle (Śabdabrahman) described under various names in the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. It is identified with mind, matter and Prajāpati and is described in terms like Vāk and Prajāpati. As the other self of Prajāpati speech functioned as the source of all Universe. In the Ṛgveda it is conceived as the 'active power of Brahman'; it is identified with him and is personified as a 'productive principle'. The four regions of the world are described as taking their being from the seas of water descending from Speech in streams and the universe as getting life from the imperishable flood which flows from it. In the Yajurveda we find Vāk considered as 'the Supreme wifely Śakti of Prajāpati named as Vācaspati. Coming to the Brāhmaṇas, the primeval waters are considered to have been created out of Vāk by Prajāpati[5]. Again Vāk is

1. RV X—125
2. RV 1-84; Śatapathabrāhmaṇa VI. 1.9 Pañcaviṁśa VI. 1.3, X.2.1 XX.14.2
3. Kāṭhaka XII.5 and 27.1
4. Vyāsasaṁhitā IX-1.
5. Śatapatha VI.1.9.

described as Prajāpati's 'other self' in the matter of creating the Universe[6]. Vāk was the 'nivid' of the twelve syllables which emanated from Prajāpati while he was performing sacrifice and it was through Vāk that Prajāpati created all beings.[7]

Sarasvatī is mentioned in some of the later Maṇḍalas of the Ṛgveda in a few Brāhmaṇas and in some of the Purāṇas, and as a speech principle is identified with Vāk and conceived as the creative principle associated with Prajāpati. She is described as carrying out the function of creating the shape of the body (possibly of Indra) by bringing together the marrow, flesh, etc., in their proper places. She also creates the internal organs, and even generates the vyāna vāyu (life-breath) which pervades the body from head to foot She stimulates and sustains the growth of the foetus in the womb[8].

In the Upaniṣads we find the identification of Vāk and Prajñā (intelligence) and also the world phenomena. Thus all speech is held together by Om just as all leaves are held together by one leaf stalk and Om is the world-all ?

Although thus we find the beginnings of the concept of a supreme Word-principle in the early scriptural texts, the first complete postulation and discussion of Śabdabrahman according to the Sanskrit Grammarian is, as stated above, given in Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. In the first Canto of the work called Brahmakāṇḍa are given the basic ideas concerning the concept of Śabdabrahman. In the second called Vākyakāṇḍa the discussions are largely on the nature of words and sentences. We find in this canto the fundamental idea of the integral nature of the sentence and its meaning discussed. The third canto is the largest; in it, grammatical topics mostly concerning words are discussed. This canto is called Prakīrṇa and also Padakāṇḍa. I discuss later, whether this is a part of the Vākyapadīya.

Bhartṛhari-biographical

Bhartṛhari, the grammarian was famous when I-tsing, the Chinese pilgrim visited India. I-tsing recorded that a

6. Pañcaviṃśa VI.1.3, x. 211, xx. 14.2
7. Aitareya X-1.
8. Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa II.6.4

grammarian by that name who was a contemporary of Jayāditya, one of the authors of the Kāśikāvṛtti on the Aṣṭādhyāyī died in A.D. 650. I-tsing also recorded that Bhartṛhari was of Buddhist persuasion. We have also I-tsing's evidence to hold the view that Bhartṛhari wavered between the ascetic life and secular life several times. I-tsing also approximately gave a somewhat accurate size of cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya.

There is the question whether Bhartṛhari, the author of the Sṛṅgāra—the Vairāgya—and the Nīti-Śatakas is the same person as the author of the Vākyapadīya. The difference in the style would appear to disprove any identification although there is nothing making it utterly impossible that a poet writes a treatise on grammar in one style and adopts a different style, when he composes a work like the Sṛṅgāraśataka.

Tradition has identified Bhartṛhari with Bhaṭṭi; it has also sometimes treated Bhaṭṭi as the half-brother of Bhartṛhari. No doubt the strong phonetic nearness between Bhartṛ and Bhaṭṭi, and the fact that there is a well known grammatical work under each name led to the identification which, however, needs further proof for confirmation.

Works

The following are mainly considered to be the works of Bhartṛhari, the grammarian :—

1. Vākyapadīya (3 Cantos)
2. Vṛtti on the 1st and 2nd Cantos of the Vākyapadīya. Commentators like Vṛṣabhadeva call the Vṛtti, Vivaraṇa.
3. A gloss (ṭīkā) on the 1st three pādas of the Mahābhāṣya. This is called Tripādī.

Other works like a commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī and a commentary on the Brahmasūtra seem to be mere conjectures at the moment (See Charudeva Sastri's Sanskrit Introduction to Vākyapadīya : 1935).

Editions of the Vākyapadīya

The first modern edition of the text was brought out in Benares in 1887, when Cantos I and II with what was des-

cribed as Puṇyarāja's commentary were edited by Pt. Gangadhara Sastri Manavalli and published as Nos. 11, 19 and 24 of Benares Sanskrit Series under the general supervision of R.T.H. Griffiths and G. Thibau. The third Canto of the text with Helārāja's commentary named Prakīrṇakaprakāśa was also published as No. 95 in the Benares Sanskrit Series in 1905. This was edited by Pt. Ramachandra Sastri Koti Bhaskara, Pandit of the Banares Hindu College. It is now clear that the commentary on Canto I described as Puṇyarāja's by Pt. Gangadhara Sastri Manavalli was not a work of Puṇyarāja; it was an abridgement of Bhartṛhari's own Vṛtti on Canto I of the Vākyapadīya. This Vṛtti was later published first by Pt. Charudeva Sastri and later by Prof. K. A Subramonia Iyer.

In 1935 Pandit Charudeva Sastri published the Ist canto of the Vākyapadīya with the commentary (Vṛtti) by Bhartṛharı himself. This publication of Bhartṛhari's commentary by Pandit Sastri was legitimately a significant event. He also used several manuscripts in his edition of the 1st canto and it was therefore a distinct improvement on the Benares editions in which admittedly only a small number of manuscripts were used.

In 1935 a part of the third Canto of the Vākyapadīya was published as No. C XVI in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. Sri K. Sambasiva Sastri, the then Curator of the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Trivandrum edited the work. The publication also included the Prakīrṇakaprakāśa—a commentry by Helārāja. With a part II edited and publisheo in 1942, by L. A. Ravi Varma the publication of the 3rd Canto with Prakīrṇakaprakāśa was completea in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series.

Canto I was again published by Pandit Suryanarayana Sukla with his own gloss in the Kasi Sanskrit Series (Chawkhamba) in 1937. In more recent times, more than one edition with or without translation of a part or other of the Vākyapadīya have appeared.

Prof. K. A. Subramonia Iyer's edition of Canto I with Vṛtti with a translation in English appeared in 1965 as No. 26 in the Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series, Poona.

In 1966, Prof. Subramonia Iyer again published the 1st Canto of the Vākyapadīya with the Vṛtti of Bhartṛhari and the

commentary named Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva. This was published as No. 32 under the Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona.

Also a text of the Vākyapadīya Canto I and Vṛtti in Roman script with a French translation was published in 1964 by M Biardeau (Bhartṛhari—Vākyapadīya, Brahmakāṇḍa, avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha, Traduction, Introduction et notes. Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne, Fascicule 24, Paris, De Boccard, 1964). It may be noted that the author does not consider the Vṛtti as Bhartṛhari's. Harivṛṣabha, according to her, is different from Bhartṛhari.

Vākyapadīya, Canto III, Part I with Helārāja's commentary was published as No. 21 in the Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona in 1963. The editor was K. A. Subramonia Iyer.

The Name Vākyapadīya

The first Canto of the Vākyapadīya is called the Brahmakāṇḍa, the second is called the Vākyakāṇḍa and the third is called the Padakāṇḍa. In the first Canto is given the concept of Śabdabrahman and the general philosophy of sphoṭa and śruti. If we may say so, the first Canto largely gives the outlines of the metaphysics of Linguistic Philosophy, whereas in the second the linguistic topics are discussed in a linguistic background. Not that metaphysics are completely eschewed, but that they are given their proper place. In the third Canto problems connected with words are discussed.

The Problem of Canto III

But there is a problem concerning Canto III. Helārāja, the commentator on the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadīya thinks that the name Vākyapadīya refers only to Cantos I and II (commentary on VP. III.154). He names his commentary on the 3rd Canto Prakīrṇakaprakāśa. Indeed in some Lexicons the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadīya is called Prakīrṇaka. Vardhamāna, the author of the Gaṇaratnamahodadhi also thinks that Vākyapadīya and Prakīrṇaka are separate

works by Bhartṛhari. He says that Bhartṛhari was the author of Vākyapadīya and Prakīrṇaka and author of a commentary called Tripādī on Mahābhāṣya.

The question deserves careful consideration. A few stanzas which occur at the end of Canto II of the Vākyapadīya are of special importance in this discussion. In these verses a history of what happened to Sanskrit Grammar when Patañjali's work was corrupted is given. We are also told that the author's guru wrote the work, namely Vākyapadīya, meaning only, in accordance with the well known humility of Hindu authors that the author wrote the work with the blessings of his teacher. The significant thing about this last section of Canto II of the Vākyapadīya is that it gives a strong indication that the particular work ended there. If the Vākyapadīya originally had a third canto as it now has it is difficult to see why the last few verses of Canto II should occur there instead of at the end of Canto III. It seems thus that Helārāja's position that Prakirṇakāṇḍa was a separate work by the same author was not without foundation. It may also be remembered that Bhartṛhari's own vṛtti exists only on the 1st and 2nd Cantos; that Puṇyarāja is known to have commented only on Cantos I and II; and that I-tsing mentions the approximate size of Cantos I and II together. Further Helārāja's commentary on the 3rd Canto alone is available as far as our present knowledge goes. All this may lead to the conclusion that Canto I and II alone formed the Vākyapadīya. It is, however, not forgotten here that most of the available manuscripts (but not all) describe the Prakīrṇaka as the third canto of the Vākyapadīya. But how old is this tradition ? and did it possibly supplant a more authentic earlier one which was represented by the colophon in some manuscripts which read इति भगवद्भर्तृहरिकृते वाक्यपदीये द्वितीयं काण्डम् । समाप्ता वाक्यपदीयकारिका इति ।

Suppose the position is that the Vākyapadīya contained originally only two cantos. Then how does the name Vākyapadīya fit in ? The answer is not difficult. The two cantos discuss together a system of linguistics in which the two meaning-conveying units in speech namely, the sentence and the word (vākya and pada) are discussed. Of these the vākya alone is complete and the pada is derived from it. There is also nothing inappropriate if we call the Ist Canto, the Vākya-

kāṇḍa, since in it are discussed the vākya—vākya sphoṭa being the most complete utterance. In the second canto, topics concerning the word, the noun, the verb, the nipāta, the karmapravacanīya, etc., are discussed. The discussion of topics concerning padas or words takes the best part of the space in that kāṇḍa justifying its designation as Padakāṇḍa.

Commentators on the Vakyapadīya

1. Bhartṛhari himself—He commented on Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya. The work is called Vṛtti.
2. Puṇyarāja—He wrote a commentary on the first and second Cantos of the Vākyapadīya. But only his commentary on the 2nd Canto is available. What was included in the Benares edition of Vākyapadīya (1887) and described as Puṇyarāja's commentary by the editor Pt. Manavalli was, as found by several scholars later and by me in my examination of the Vṛtti manuscript in the Trivandrum Manuscripts Library, really an abridgement of Bhartṛhari's own Vṛtti on Canto I. Puṇyarāja according to scanty information given at the end of commentary on Canto II was a Kashmiri and was also known as Rājānaka Suravarma and learned the 2nd Canto of Vākyapadīya from a Śaśāṅkaśiṣya. What does Śaśāṅkaśiṣya mean ?—a disciple of Chandragomin the Grammarian ? —or does it mean a disciple of Śaśāṅkadhara, namely Sahadeva who wrote a commentary on Vāmana's Alaṅkāra ? This latter view is held by Pt. Charudeva Sastri. We have to accept our uncertainty about Puṇyarāja and his date, except to suggest a date between 11th and 12th Century.
3. HELĀRĀJA—He wrote a commentary on the 3rd Canto of the Vākyapadīya. This commentary is called Prakīrṇakaprakāśa. He belonged to the family of Lakṣmaṇa who was Minister of King Muktāpīda of Kashmir. He was the son of Bhūtirāja. Helārāja may have lived in the second half of the 10th Century A. D. according to Pt. Charudeva Sastri and others.
4. VṚṢABHADEVA—the author of a commentary by name Paddhati on Bhartṛhari's Kārikās and Vṛtti together. The

Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva is now available only in the Vṛtti on Kaṇḍa I of the Vākyapadīya.

Nothing much is known about Vṛṣabhadeva except what he says in the introductory verses of his commentary that he was the son of Devayaśas, an employee of King Viṣṇugupta. We do not have enough material to identify this Viṣṇugupta among the known Viṣṇuguptas of Indian History. Vṛṣabhadeva's date, consequently has to be left undecided for the time being at least.

About the Present Work

In the years 1948-1951, I worked in the Department of Phonetics and Linguistics of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. I also then undertook a study of the Vākyapadīya as my work for the Ph.D. degree of the London University. My thesis contained a study of Cantos I and II, a translation into English of the same and notes. I had used for the purpose of the translation the text published in the Benares Edition of 1887. This contained also what was described by the editor as the commentary of Puṇyarāja on Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya. However, it has been subsequently proved that what the editor of the Benares Edition considered as the commentary of Puṇyarāja on Canto I was only a condensation of Bhartṛhari's own Vṛtti on Canto I.

When I planned later to publish a text of Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya with a translation and notes, the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the Benares text of 1887 was felt. Of course, Pandit Charudeva Sastri's edition of Canto I, published with Bhartṛhari's Vṛtti and extracts from Vṛṣabhadeva's Paddhati was available; and it was a very good edition for Canto I. But there was no good reliable text for Canto II. And even in the preparation of his text for Canto I, Pt. Charudeva Sastri had not according to his own statement in his introduction, made use of the manuscripts of the work which belonged to the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Trivandrum, because they were not made available to him. And these manuscripts contained good readings of the text with the Vṛtti of Bhartṛhari himself for Canto I, as well as the text of Canto II. I therefore felt that I could present a better text for the two Cantos making use of the hitherto-unused Trivandrum manuscripts.

In preparing the text of Cantos I and II included in this publication I have used the following printed and manuscript materials :

Printed Editions and Manuscripts Used In the preparation of the edition

1. Pandit Charudeva Sastri's edition of Canto I (Lahore—1935)
2. Benares edition of Vākyapadīya (Benares 1887)
3. Manuscript No. 10924 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Canto I, and portions of Bhartṛhari's own commentary on Canto I of the Vākyapadīya.
4. Manuscript No. 8918 of the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum containing Cantos I and II of the Vākyapadīya.
5. Manuscript No. 2392—C.O. belonging to the University Manuscripts Library and containing Canto II.

Since the text of Cantos I and II contained in this publication went to press (although the actual publicati on has been delayed for several reasons) before Prof. K. A. Subramonia Iyer's edition of Canto I with Bhartṛhari's Vṛtti and Vṛṣabhadeva's Paddhati was published in 1966, I have not been able to use this latter publication in fixing the text. However, it may be noted that both the Vṛtti, and the Paddhati which he included in his 1966 publication had earlier appeared, the former fully and the latter in extracts in Pt. Charudeva Sastri's publication (1935), and the Vṛtti alone in the form of an English translation in Prof. Subramonia Iyer's own publication [of Canto I + Vṛtti (translation)—Poona], and in the form of a French translation by M. Biardeau.

Prof Subramonia Iyer has omitted eight verses, (verses 108 to 115 both inclusive) in Canto I from his 1966 Poona edition, as he considered that they did not belong to the

Vākyapadīya. I do not express any opinion on this; they, however, form part of the text adopted by me as they are found in all printed editions (except Prof. Subramonia Iyer's Poona editions) and inferably in all manuscripts examined by earlier editors and in the Trivandrum Manuscripts which I examined.

I have noted in the footnotes in the text such changes in the numbering of the kārikās as have been necessitated.

I have also given notes where I felt that such were necessary to justify sound readings adopted in preference to others.

About the Translation

The translation prepared for my thesis based on the text of the Benares edition of 1887 had necessarily to be altered in places where a different text had to be adopted. Also, minor verbal changes had been occasionally made from the text of the translation as given in my thesis for the sake of clarity. The bracketted portions in the body of the translation of kārikās have been supplied in order to supply syntactical completeness of the sentences, or for greater clarity. The portion outside the brackets in the translation of each kārikā is by and large a literal rendering of the Sanskrit text. Very often introductory observations have also been given at the start of the translation for the sake of showing continuity of argument and logic.

A running summary of the ideas in the two Cantos

The Vākyapadīya is a difficult text. I have therefore thought it necessary to give a continuous statement of the ideas discussed in the two cantos of the text. This is given separately after the introduction. It is not claimed that every idea stated in the two cantos is given in this continuous statement. Where, for example, there are several examples given to illustrate a point, I may have dropped all but one or some examples. Sometimes where the author gives several variant views in one theme, I may have omitted a minor view. But it is claimed that the salient doctrines are discussed methodically from the beginning of Canto I to the end of Canto II giving in brackets the numbers of the kārikās of the text in which the particular ideas are expounded. Where the 1st Canto ends and

the 2nd starts is clearly marked in the summary. Hence the canto number is not always marked in the bracketted indication.

The notes on the Sanskrit text are given as foot-notes on each page of the text itself.

Notes on the Translation are given at the end (PP. 147-189).

It is my hope that this publication will be useful to scholars, for the reason, among others, that it contains a more correct text than hitherto published of Canto II and the first ever translation of the same Canto to be publisned. It is also hoped that the detailed notes at the end, the summary of ideas in the introduction, and the introductory sentences in the body of the translation will lead to an increased understanding of this important text in Sanskrit grammatical philosophy.

Trivandrum,
29.5.1971 *K. RAGHAVAN PILLAI*

CANTOS I and II—A SURVEY OF THE MAIN IDEAS

The Supreme Word principle or the Śabdabrahman is the source, the sustenance and the end of all manifestation (I—1-4). The Vedas reflect this Brahman. They are also the means of knowing It. We learn from the Vedas a multiplicity of spiritual disciplines; but all these disciplines subserve action. Various kinds of codes have also been formulated based on the Vedas. The Vedas, however, have not been interpreted in identical terms by all teachers. Some have given a monistic interpretation, while others have seen a dualistic import in the teachings of the Vedas. The true significance of the Veda is contained in the syllable 'Om'—The Oṁkāra.

Grammar is the most important of the disciplines which have arisen from the Vedas (I—11) Grammar leads one to the realisation of Brahman in the form of the Supreme Word We know the truth about things through words, and we know the truth about words through grammar. Grammar helps us purify our speech and mind. He who has a firm footing in this science and is capable of studying the Veda realises Brahman. The Supreme Word forms the essence of this Brahman. This Supreme Word is devoid of all distinctions; and such distinct entities like the ṚK, the Sāman and so on have their distinct forms as apparent parts of that Word-principle (I, 11-22).

In Grammar the nature of words, meanings and the relationship between them and their different kinds are studied. The validity of a form is determined depending on whether or not it is recognised by the scripture, namely grammar (23-27).

Words fall into two categories; namely those which are created and those which are not. But both these can be described as eternal The created word is only a manifestation of the Supreme Word-principle, about the eternal nature of which there is no question. The scripture prescribes this rule about the eternity of words (28-29).

Why should one rely on scripture to decide validity ? Scripture is superior to logic or inference in choosing between right and wrong. There are many areas where inference fails

and scripture has to take over. Scripture is the record of the direct perception of those qualified for it, and direct perception is superior to inference. Therefore a study of words is started based on scripture of impersonal origin and the codes of rules based on it (30-42).

Words are of two kinds—one, the cause of all words, and another, the kind of words used to convey a meaning. Some consider that there is an intrinsic difference between them; according to others, the second type is only a manifested form of the first. The Supreme Word principle and the spoken word are in a relationship similar to that between the fire which is inherent in the firewood, and that which is made manifest through rubbing fire-sticks together. The nāda or the uttered sound is only the sphoṭa or the Word-principle in manifest form. But the manifested word has characteristics of its own, which are not of the sphoṭa (44-49).

A word consists of its phonetic-part and its meaning-part. The speaker's mind first chooses the phonetic element and then employs it to convey a meaning. The listener also first takes in the phonetic element and then passes on to the meaning part (50-53). A word has to be first heard, before it can convey a meaning (55-57).

Besides an object which a word conveys, as its meaning a word can also convey its own form as its import. For example, the form of a word alone is meant most of the time when it is employed in grammatical sūtras (58-69).

Are different occurrences of a word different instances of the same word, or have we to consider them as different words altogether ? (70) There are both views held on the subject.

There are two schools of thought—those of the Monists and of the Pluralists—among the philosophers of speech. According to the first, the sentence alone is the reality—the single unit. The words and the syllables only appear to be complete entities. According to the latter, the syllable has a reality of its own; the word is a sumtotal of the syllables and the sentence is only the words added together. In the view of the Monists, the differences of diction and the like which belong to the category of the produced sounds are superimposed on the indivisible Word-principle named sphoṭa, and are wrongly conceived to belong to the latter (71-77).

In the school of thought which holds that a word-principle is manifested as individual words through speech sounds there are three views as to how it is manifested. There are also different conceptions as to the method in which words are manifested by the uttered sounds, the way such uttered words are received, the sequence in which the uttered sounds operate in conveying a meaning and so on. But in the theory that speech sounds reveal an ultimate and indivisible Word-principle, the qualities which are peculiar to the speech sounds, and the process necessary for the speech sounds to reveal the speech principle should not be considered as belonging to the latter. Different views are held on the raw material such as the breath which is converted into the speech sounds which, in their turn reveal the word principle. (78-117).

Speech occupies a key place in the scheme of things. It is crucial in the process of comprehension and action. Consciousness is comprehended only as associated with speech. Speech is man's self and Mokṣa or liberation is realising identity with Speech or Śabdabrahman. He who knows the secret of the functioning of words and attains the achievement of faultless speech enjoys Brahman (118-131).

The Vedas are of impersonal origin and they do not perish even when all records of human wisdom perish. The wisdom enshrined in the Vedas is eternal and is not vitiated by the faults which are natural to human wisdom. Logic is not free from these faults. Reasoning becomes a sure guide if and when it is based on scripture. Employment of correct words is a must for spiritual elevation. Grammar leads one to the ability for it. A man devoid of culture employs corrupt speech. It is granted that incorrect forms can sometimes convey meaning. But they do not do it directly. An incorrect form which is uttered brings to mind the correct form of which it is a corruption and thus conveys the meaning of that correct form (132-156) **(Enumeration of the ideas of Canto I concluded).**

The second Canto of the Vākyapadīya starts with a definition of what a sentence is according to the different schools of thought (II, 1-2). According to the Monists among the Linguisticians or the Śabdabrahmavādins, a sentence is an integral unit incapable of any fundamental division. Any

division of the sentence into words, and syllables is only a pragmatic one for grammatical purposes and the like (7-12). What is said of the sentences is also true of the words at their level; that is, they are not basically divisible into the syllables, although one feels they are for pragmatic purposes.

What exactly does this idea of the indivisibility of the sentence, the word etc. mean ? For one thing, it is a fundamental metaphysical necessity of the Śabdabrahmavādins to hold that Śabda or speech of which the Universe is a manifestation is in reality an immutable entity of which we can speak of manifestations, production, mutation and the like only in a very empirical sense.

On the level of studying speech as an instrument in conveying meanings the monistic doctrine means that a speech unit, whether it is a sentence or a word functions as a single unit as a meaning-conveying instrument. A total unit conveys a total meaning.

The Monists naturally do not accept the idea that larger speech units are built up from smaller units, and that meaning itself is conveyed through parts, and not as one unit in a flash. The Abhihitānvaya view of the Mīmāṁsakas and the Anvitābhidhāna view of the Naiyāyikas are both denied by the Monistic Grammarians. According to the Monists the division of speech units being merely a pragmatic necessity, grammatical rules based on such analysis are also merely pragmatic and once they serve their purposes, they can be discarded (7-117).

The Monistic school, and the Pluralistic schools hold different views on the status of a word and its meaning in the scheme of the sentence and its meaning. To the Monists the word is only a convenient and conventional fiction created for the sake of pragmatic analysis. To the Pluralists, however, words are real, and the sentence is only built up from words. From either point of view, however, a discussion of word-meaning is necessary, although in one, it is only of pragmatic relevance, while in the other, it is basic. Twelve views on what constitutes the meaning of a word are stated (119-143).

The meaning of the sentence in the Akhaṇḍa School (Monists) is again discussed. The meaning of the sentence comes as a flash of insight (pratibhā). In it individual word-

meanings appear as parts; but the whole is simply not a sum-total of the parts. This pratibhā or flash of insight is not a mere piece of knowledge; it is wisdom which guides man to right conduct (itikartavyatā). This flash of insight is derived from six sources, namely nature, action, practice, meditation, invisible causes, gift of the wise (144-152).

What does a word signify as its meaning ? And what does it not signify ? A word signifies an object like a cow and this object has qualities, but a word like gauḥ does not denote the qualities of the cow which it denotes. A knowledge of the qualities incidentally follows when the word denotes the object which has such qualities. There are however, some exceptions to this. For example, may be mentioned, a word which means some kind of oil. There the meaning of the word is not merely the generic entity, but also the qualities of the oil. But generally a word functions whether the non-permanent attributes of the individual like colour are present or not. What then does the word exactly denote ? What is never seen in separation from the object is the answer. This, of course, is the jāti, or the universal or genus (153-163).

What role do the root and suffix play in conveying the meaning of a word ? Does the suffix express gender, number etc. or does it only illuminate these notions inherent elsewhere ? There are both views on the subject. There is also the view that the aggregate of root and suffix convey the meaning of an object with its qualities like number, gender etc. In fact, there is quite a body of notions on the topics of root, suffix, root-suffix relationship and the relationship between the meaning of word, roots and suffix. In the same way too the prefix, how it modifies the meaning of the root, at what stage the modification takes place etc. are also discussed in the text.

What are conjunctions ? and what are their functions ? What is the type of organic relationship between a conjunction like ca and the things the aggregation of which it indicates ? (163-176). The part of speech karmapravacanīya is also discussed.

With the discussion of the role of the part of speech named karmapravacanīya (197-204) the discussion of the five grammatical classes, namely nouns, verbs, prefixes, particles and karmapravacanīyas is closed. It may however be stated that

such a discussion of the different grammatical classes of words, though understandable and permissible under the point of view of the Pluralists, is only a purely pragmatic possibility and necessity for the Monistic Grammanian. To him, parts or avayavas in a sentence, namely, words are no more real than parts or avayavas in a word, namely, syllables. One may of course argue that if the aggregate is meaningful then parts also should be meaningful. As far as roots, suffixes etc. which are parts of words are concerned, they are meaningful only in a technical sense; that is, they are not meaningful as complete units in the comprehension of a meaning. Copulative compounds, vṛttis etc. which, one may argue, should necessarily convey the meanings of the parts, really do not present any difficulty in the monistic scheme of the Grammarians. Grammatical technique which is necessarily analytical has to deal with parts of sentences and words, but this is only a pragmatic consideration necessary for grammar, and the grammatical procesess. It is not really relevant to the indivisible unity which it seeks to reveal (205-250).

As stated earlier, the monistic grammarian, can discuss such questions as the primary, secondary and incidental meanings of words just as the Pluralists can do. The difference is that, for him, the whole thing is tentative, and on the assumption that there are parts and meaning of parts in a sentence and its meaning without taking these positions as ultimately real. The question is asked: When we say that the same word conveys a principal meaning, and a secondary meaning, what is the real philosophical position ? Is it that the same word conveys different meanings or that, with each meaning, there is a change in the identity of the word ? Both views are held by thinkers. It may be stated here that the same philosophical discussion occurs when synonyms and their meanings are discussed. This discussion has its bearing in a study of hymns repeated in ritual. When a hymn is repeatedly chanted in a sacrifice does it mean that with each repetition, a different hymn comes into being; or can the same hymn be considered to be repeated ? There are both views held.

Just as there is a classification of meaning as primary and secondary, as in the well known example, 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣah, where 'Gaṅgā' means the shore of the Ganges, in the same way

there can be the concept of an incidental meaning connected with a primary meaning. A word may be employed with the speaker's intention to convey a certain meaning. But it may incidentally convey some other meaning also. This latter is an incidental meaning.

The relationship between verbal expression and signification of meaning need special study. Sometimes the meaning conveyed in a context may be the one for which there is no verbal expression. This is so, in such an example as the expression 'ardhahrasvam' (half of a short vowel) where the expression actually means half of a mātrā and the word mātrā is not used.

When a word can convey different meanings, what factors help decide the exact import of the word in a particular context ? Several factors can do this function. Such are the syntactical connection of words in the sentence, situation-context, the meaning of another word, propriety, place and time. There is also a slightly different list given in some texts. Constant association of two things, their dissociation, company, hostility, the meaning of another word, situation-context, evidence from another sentence, and the proximity of another word are the factors enlisted in this. It is idle to think that the form of a word alone is adequate to convey the required meaning in a particular context. (251-323).

The ultimate source of all word-meaning, primary, secondary or incidental is the sentence; it is derived and abstracted from the sentence.

Even a single-word-utterance may be treated as a sentence, if it has a verb implied in it. For example, when the word vṛkṣaḥ is mentioned it implies the verb tiṣṭhati and forms a sentence vṛkṣastiṣṭhati (there stands a tree). To this idea the Mīmāṁsaka objects, and brings forth his śrutārthāpatti view. According to this view, the heard word leads to the inference of the suitable unheard word, and the meanings of the two words thus juxtaposed in the intellect add up to convey the meaning of the sentence. This view is not accepted by the Grammarian (324-344).

It was stated that the meaning of the word is abstracted and derived from the sentence. For this the interpretation of the sentence is necessary. There are rules governing such

interpretation; from such rules is evolved a certain concept of the relationship between sentences also. For example, what is the relationship between a sentence, which lays down a general rule and another which states an exception to it. The exception is really part of the import of the sentence dealing with the general rule, although there is no verbal statement of it there. What the sentence dealing with the exception actually does is to make explicit statement of the exception. The rule and the exception thus constitute one single statement (345-351).

In this context too may be discussed the integral status of proper names like Devadatta, which, like any other word, function as total units in conveying their meanings. In other words, the meaning which the name Devadatta conveys cannot be considered to be conveyed either by 'deva' or 'datta', the parts thereof. Datta and Deva only appear to be parts of Devadatta, and are considered as parts of Devadatta, since they are produced simultaneously with the latter. For purposes of grammatical study the word Devadatta may be and is considered a combination of deva and datta. But the same thing cannot be said, let us add, about, say, jye and ṣṭhā which, one may wrongly say, form part of the word Jyeṣṭha.

Proper names which are clan-names do not require accessory factors to convey their meanings. The permanance of word-meaning relationship is true of proper names and their meanings also, although it may appear to be less true there. This rule of the permanent nature of the indicator-indicated relationship between word and meaning holds good for technical terms like vṛddhi in grammar.

Proper names in every day usage function through their forms aided by other factors. The long technical terms in grammar also function along the same lines; and the presence of causal factors is brought out by inference.

In grammar, both proper names in every day usage and coined technical terms which are called saṁjñas are employed. Sometimes the same technical term is used as a coined one and as an every day one. For example, the word saṁkhyā. Sometimes a term with a non-technical sense when uttered will extend its application to become a coined one (a technical one). For example, the word sambuddhi in the statement dūrātsambuddhau (352-370).

The integral nature of utterances and the integral way in which they convey meaning have been discussed as the key doctrine of the Grammarian Philosopher. Now the question is asked: When the subject of a sentence is a group, who can be considered as doing the action ?—the group or the individual ? Where a group is described as eating, the eating is naturally performed by individuals. The result of satisfying hunger is also achieved individually. But some verbs like 'dṛś' (to see) appearing in a sentence with a plural subject function collectively. Sometimes there is both individual and collective reference. For example take a statement like Śūdras should not enter the house. Here Śūdras, individually and collectively are prohibited from entering the house. In the same way the change of *n* into *ṇ* takes place in spite of the intervention of aṭ, ku, pu and ā collectively or individually, since all that is meant in the context is intervention—See Pāṇini aṭkupvāṅnumvyavāye'pi. (371-388).

The status of the component sentence in a compound sentence is like that of words in a sentence. There are different views on this. Some consider that the component sentences accomplish their meanings individually. In this view, the compound sentence is a collection of clauses each having a different form. But this view is not acceptable to the Grammarian. He conceives the relationship between the compound sentence and component sentences on the pattern of the relationship between a sentence and the words in it. The component clauses are recognised only after the compound sentence is totally uttered and comprehended; the meaning of the component sentence is a subsequent abstraction following the comprehension of the meaning of the compound sentence. (389-390).

It is a crucial idea of the Monistic Grammarian that a meaningful utterance whether it is a word, a sentence, or a compound sentence is an integral unit of speech and also functions integrally in conveying its meaning. The notion that the meaning of the aggregate of an utterance culminates in the meanings of the so-called parts is only another version of this idea (391-398).

What is the essential condition for a speech-unit to convey its meaning ?This question needs discussion. This condition is that the speech unit should be actually employed to convey the

meaning. Purposeful utterance should precede the conveying of meaning. A word may have several meanings; and several words may convey one meaning. In this situation order is brought about by the fact of purposeful utterance. That is, a word conveys that meaning which is the intention of the speaker (399-402).

Some hold the view that when Vedic hymns are uttered in sacrifices, they do not have a factual meaning because utterance is not directed towards conveying any meaning; utterance is for the sake of utterance. But when hymns are taught, then the very phonetic form of the hymn becomes its meaning since the teacher intends that form to be understood by the student. But these hymns are considered to be meaningful by others since they are purposefully employed. Among those who hold this view there are those who consider that each repetition is a separate occurrence of the hymn and others who hold that it is the same hymn which is repeated. According to these latter the speaker does not have to aim a word at a particular meaning. He has only to utter the word, because a word has the capacity to convey its meaning. What situation-context and other factors do is not to reveal the meanings of totally different words in different contexts, but of apparently different words (403-407).

The relationship between the meanings of the words in a sentence and the meaning of the sentence itself according to the Monistic school of the Grammarians and the opposing Pada-schools (particularly the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas) may again be stated. According to the Grammarian philosopher, words present a specific meaning of the sentence. These words themselves are not meaningful in the sense that the sumtotal of the meanings of the words will constitute the meaning of the sentence. An analogy is given. Nobody can say that the meaning of a word is the sumtotal of the meanings of the letters in it. Letters obviously have no meanings of their own. But words have individual meanings, one will argue. True, they have meanings : but the meaning of the sentence is a unitary concept which is not a sumtotal of individual word-meanings.

Word-meanings, however, play a more important role in the scheme of the meaning of the sentence as worked out by the Mīmāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas. According to the Anvitā-

bhidhāna view held by the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas, the meaning of the sentence is built up gradually by the association of the words; and the meaning of the sentence remains accomplished in the meanings of the words.

In defence of the Monistic position that word-meanings are not recognised in the meaning of the sentence one may bring forward the analogy of the sense-organs. Each organ of sense has a separate object on which it acts; and it acts independent of other sense-organs But all these sense-organs need the body through which alone they can function. In the same way words may independently denote objects, but their meaningfulness as expression of reality is derived from the sentence which alone completely expresses reality. Reality is expressible only in the form 'it exists' which means that a word, in order to express a reality has to be compounded with a verb form, namely 'exists'. This means that a word has to be part of a sentence in order to convey a meaningful meaning, if one may say so. If the verb is mentioned as expressing an action to be conveyed. nouns are required to effect the action. The verb is more important than nouns and so it is mentioned first. However, this discussion of the meaning of a sentence as a system of relations is only valid from the point of view of the speaker. The ultimate truth is that it is an integral entity in which relationship is only a subsidiary reality (408-430; 437-441).

Reality is understood only through speech (language) and it is understood only in the form in which it is presented by speech (word or language). But language cannot describe the intrinsic nature of things, although we know things only in the form in which words describe them (431-437).

The position of the Sanskrit Grammarian Philosopher, then, is that a sentence is not a sumtotal of the words which appear to make it up. It is an integral unit in which words only appear as parts. The meaning of the sentence, in the same way is not the sumtotal of the meanings of the words. It is an integral entity presented by the meanings of the words. The Grammarian here makes a distinction between word-meaning which only mentions an object, and the meaning of the sentence which is primarily an action, effected by men through objects.

In the context of these ideas a discussion becomes necessary on the status of those types of sentences which appear to convey more than one meaning; or those which have more verbs than one and therefore militate against the notion of an integral unity. How is unity sustained in the face of the obvious multi-point nature of such sentences ? For example consider a sentence which has several finite verbs in it. Does this mean that the meaning of such a sentence is a multiple quantity since there can be a separate proposition around each finite verb in it, particularly so, in the context of Kātyāyana's definition of the sentence as having one finite verb. The answer to the question poised here is in the negative. In such cases too, the sentence with more than one finite verb is an integral entity with an integral meaning. Again there may be a sentence like mrgaḥ paśyata yāti (Look, there goes a deer). Here, a finite verb is linked to another finite verb. Here too the integral nature of the setence or its meaning is not affected by this fact. If a sentence is to be complete, there must be expectancy on the level of meaning and no expectancy on the word level. Even when a sentence implies something and there is nothing in it verbally stated about the things implied, even then the sentence is complete (438-446).

The verb constitutes the essential and minimal content of a sentence. So a study of the verb in a sentence will constitute a study of the sentence in its essential aspect. There can be one or more verbs in a sentence as stated earlier. When there are more verbs than one, in a proposition, the proposition can be re-stated with the comparative status of verbs changed, without effecting any change in the meaning of the proposition. For example, the sentence "Recite while moving about" can be re-stated as 'Move about while reciting'. What is a principal verb in one sentence becomes a subsidiary verb in another; but both sentences have the same import. This position really substantiates the doctrine of the Grammarians that the status or meanings of words in a sentence do not ultimately determine the meaning of the sentence itself. In the same way, a certain verb may be used in a sentence, and the action conveyed by it may be specifically different from what it says. The verb lends itself to these different meanings. Verbs con-

vey their meanings only in general and unspecified forms. For example, the sentence 'Kings will perform Aśvamedha sacrifice, does not convey the idea of any particular form of a sacrifice, nor the difference between the sacrifices performed by one king and another. Then again take the sacrificial injunction 'He should offer to Prajāpati seventeen he-goats all of the same colour.' The verb used in the sentence is ālabheta. This verb which is singular lends itself for use with each one of the 17 he-goats, as if there were seventeen sentences with one he-goat as the object in each. Other examples of this kind may also be noted. All this means that a sentence will take one form when it is uttered, but in the stage of comprehension it may assume a different form. The verbal content of the sentence and the so-called individual word-components do not play the ultimate part in the scheme of the meaning of the sentence and the form of the meaning itself.

A verb may sometimes function in relation to a group-object taking the whole as one unit; or function in terms of the individuals of the group. Similarly a nominal form may be mentioned only once; but more than one verb may be employed. Then the verb gets itself connected with each meaning of the synonym as if it were used as a separate word. For example, take the sentence akṣāḥ bhakṣyantām bhojyantām dīvyantām, (Let the dice be eaten, broken or thrown). Here the word akṣāḥ is available as subject for each of the verb. The concept is that the form akṣāḥ is employed as if it were a combination of three forms akṣaḥ, akṣaḥ, akṣaḥ. One utterance combines three possibilities. In fact, words are found to follow two rules when they convey their meanings. These are described as the rules of sequence and simultaneity. In the example akṣāḥ etc. given above, the component forms akṣaḥ, akṣaḥ, akṣaḥ are connected to their verbal forms one after another.

On sentences, for which, due to the power of synonyms different meanings can be given, the Monist and the Pluralist differ in their approach. According to the Monist the same sentence functions in conveying different meanings through the exercise of different aspects or powers of it; the Pluralists, however, contend that the statements contained in a common form of the sentence are really different ones. One may remember here the same approach adopted by the two schools

when words with more than one meanings were discussed (447-475).

The last few stanzas of the second canto of the Vākyapadīya are devoted to a brief discussion of the fortunes of Sanskrit Grammar. The Saṁgraha text of Vyāḍi, the grammarian, was condensed so much by writers that it became obscure in course of time. Then Patañjali wrote his Mahābhāṣya and brought back clarity and depth to the study of Sanskrit Grammar. However, Grammar could not avoid attack from votaries of dry logic like Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa. This led in course of time to the decline of grammar until it survived only in South Indian versions. The South Indian text was procured and the science cultivated by Chandra and other Grammarians who were followers of the School of Patañjali. Bhartṛhari says that his teacher wrote this work Vākyapadīya in Sanskrit grammar. According to the commentator Puṇyarāja, the statement that his teacher composed the work only means that Bhartṛhari wrote the work with the blessings of the teacher. (See Introduction on this discussion)

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वाक्यपदीयम्

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

प्रथमकाण्डम्

CANTO I

१. अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

1. That beginningless and endless One, the imperishable Brahman of which the essential nature is the Word, which manifests itself into objects and from which is the creation of the Universe.[1]

२. एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं[1] शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥

2. which though described in the Vedas as one is divided on the basis of its powers, and although it is not different from its powers appears to be different,

३. अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।
जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥

3. the indestructible powers of which functioning through the powers of Time become the six transformations, namely, birth and the rest—the sources of all (these) manifold objects,[2]

४. एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चेयमनेकथा ।
भोक्तृभोक्तव्यभेदेन भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥

4. to which, Single One, the cause of all, belongs this manifold existence, under the forms of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the enjoyment,

५. प्राप्त्युपायोऽनुकारश्च तस्य वेदो महर्षिभिः ।
एकोऽप्यनेकवर्त्मेव समाम्नातः पृथक्पृथक् ॥

5. of that (Brahman) the Veda is both the means of realisation and the reflection and it has been handed down by the great Seers as if it consisted of many paths, although it (really) is One.[3]

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१. न्नशक्ति—क.

६. भेदानां बहुमार्गत्वं कर्मण्येकत्र चाङ्गता ।
शब्दानां यतशक्तित्वं तस्य शाखासु वर्तते ॥

6. In the branches of the Veda are set out various paths, all at the service of one action (namely, ritual) and there (again) words are found to have a fixed capacity.

७. स्मृतयो बहुरूपाश्च दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनाः ।
तमेवाश्रित्य लिङ्गेभ्यो वेदविद्भिः प्रकल्पिताः[२] ॥

7. Codes of various kinds with objectives tangible and intangible have been formulated on the basis of it (i.e. the Veda) from its evidence by sages who are erudite in its meaning.

८. तस्यार्थवादरूपाणि निश्रिताः स्वविकल्पजाः ।
एकत्विनां द्वैतिनां च प्रवादाः बहुधा मताः[३] ॥

8. There are various controversies between the Monists and the Dualists arising from their own options regarding its explanatory sentences.

९. सत्या विशुद्धिस्तत्रोक्ता विद्यैवैकपदागमा ।
युक्ता प्रणवरूपेण सर्ववादाविरोधिना ॥

9. That true and pure knowledge alone proclaimed by that one word (namely Om) is stated there (in the Veda) under the form of the word Om—a knowledge which is not contradictory to any school of thought.

१०. विधातुस्तस्य लोकानामङ्गोपाङ्गनिबन्धनाः ।
विद्याभेदाः प्रतायन्ते ज्ञानसंस्कारहेतवः ॥

10. Different disciplines which are sources of knowledge and culture are developed as based on the divisions and the subdivisions of the Veda which (under the form of the Om) is the creator of the Universe.

११. आसन्नं ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसामुत्तमं तपः ।
प्रथमं छन्दसामङ्गमाहुर्व्याकरणं बुधाः ॥

11. The wise say that grammar, nearest to that Brahman and

२. प्रकाशिताः—ख.
३. गता—घ.

the foremost spiritual training is the most important (of such) subsidiary texts of the Veda.[4]

१२. प्राप्तरूपविभागाया यो वाचः परमो रसः ।
यत्तत्पुण्यतमं ज्योतिस्तस्य मार्गोऽयमाञ्जसः ॥

12. It is a direct path towards that holiest of lights, that supreme essence of the kind of speech which has assumed distinctions of form.[5]

१३. अर्थप्रवृत्तितत्त्वानां शब्दा एव निबन्धनम् ।
तत्त्वावबोधः शब्दानां नास्ति व्याकरणादृते ॥

13. Words are the sole guide to the truths about the behaviour of objects;[6] and there is no understanding of the truth about words without grammar.

१४. तद्द्वारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् ।
पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ॥

14. A gateway to liberation, a cure to the blemishes of speech, purifier of all (other) disciplines, it shines as being applied to them.[7]

१५. यथार्थजातयः सर्वाः शब्दाकृतिनिबन्धनाः ।
तथैव लोके विद्यानां एषा विद्या परायणम् ॥

15. Just as all thing-classes depend upon word-classes similarly, in this world, this (grammar) is the basis of all disciplines.[8]

१६. इदमाद्यं पदस्थानं सिद्धिसोपानपर्वणाम् ।
इयं सा मोक्षमाणानामजिह्मा राजपद्धतिः ॥

16. It is the first rung on the ladder towards liberation; it is the straight Royal Road for those desirous of (reaching) that goal.

१७. अत्रातीतविपर्यासः केवलामनुपश्यति ।
छन्दस्यच्छन्दसां योनिमात्मा छन्दोमयींतनुम् ॥

17. The soul which has passed beyond errors in it (ie, in grammar) and is capable of studying the Veda observes that (Brahman) which is the source of the Vedas and the

very soul of which is constituted by the Veda (ie. in the form of the Om.)

१८. प्रत्यस्तमितभेदाया[४] यद्वाचो रूपमुत्तमम् ।
यद[५]स्मिन्नेव तमसि ज्योतिः शुद्धं विवर्तते ॥

18. That pure light which is the supreme essence of speech free of (any kind of) form, which appears to take several forms in this darkness (of manifestation),

१९. वैकृतं समतिक्रान्ता मूर्तिव्यापारदर्शनम् ।
व्यतीत्यालोकतमसी प्रकाशं यमुपासते ॥

19. —which is worshipped by those who have transcended the (manifested) speech showing form and action, and who have passed beyond (the duality of) light and darkness,

२०. यत्र वाचो निमित्तानि चिह्नानीवाक्षरस्मृतेः ।
शब्दपूर्वेण योगेन भासन्ते प्रतिबिम्बवत् ॥

20. —in which the symbols of speech, pointers as it were to the 'one-letter scripture' (Om) shine forth like reflections in association with that (ie. Om) which is antecedent to all (manifested) speech,

२१. अथर्वणामङ्गिरसां साम्नामृग्यजुषस्य च ।
यस्मिन्नुच्चावचा वर्णाः पृथक्स्थितिपरिग्रहाः ॥

21. —and in which the various sorts of the letter-sounds of the Atharvan, the Sāman, the Ṛk and the Yajus exist with distinct identities.

२२. यदेकं प्रक्रियाभेदैर्बहुधा प्रविभज्यते ।
तद्व्याकरणमागम्य परं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते ॥

22. —which, though one, is divided on the basis of the various explanations (of it);—that Supreme Brahman is attained by having recourse to grammar.

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४. मितरूपायाः—घ.

५. दम्निन्नेव—ख.

२३. नित्याः शब्दार्थसम्बन्धास्तत्राम्नाताः महर्षिभिः ।
सूत्राणां सानुतन्त्राणां भाष्याणां च प्रणेतृभिः ॥

23. Words, meanings, and their relations are described in it as timeless by the sages, who are the authors of the Sūtras, the Vārttikas and the Bhāṣyas.

२४. अपोद्धारपदार्था ये ये चार्थाः स्थितलक्षणाः ।
अन्वाख्येयाश्च ये शब्दा ये चापि प्रतिपादकाः ॥

२५. कार्यकारणभावेन योग्यभावेन च स्थिताः ।
धर्मे ये प्रत्यये चाङ्गं सम्बन्धाः साध्वसाधुषु ॥

२६. ते लिङ्गैश्च स्वशब्दैश्च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्नुप[६]वर्णिताः ।
स्मृत्यर्थमनुगम्यन्ते केचिदेव यथागमम् ॥

24. 25, 26. In this science are described for the sake of the code rules, word-meanings which are analytically (ie, etymologically) derived or fixed as such (by conventions, etc), words which are indicative or descriptive, and (word-meaning) relations which are either of the nature of cause and effect or of (inseparable) identity. These which form accessories to conduct and understanding are described through their own names, or through characteristic features and as covering the valid and the invalid ones; some of these are also used (in non-scriptural contexts) according to rules.

२७. शिष्टेभ्य आगमात्सिद्धाः साधवो धर्मसाधनम् ।
अर्थप्रत्यायनाभेदे विपरीतास्त्वसाधवः ॥

27. Even if it is found that there is no difference (between two forms) in the matter of expressing the meaning, only those which are derived from the scripture (ie, grammar) are valid as instruments for right conduct for the wise; the opposite ones are invalid.

२८. नित्यत्वे कृतकत्वे वा तेषामादिर्न विद्यते ।
प्राणिनामिव सा चैषा व्यवस्था नित्यतोच्यते ॥

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६. न्नूपदर्शिताः—ख.

28. Like living beings, words also have no (traceable) beginning whether they are eternal or created. This rule (about words) is called their eternity.[9]

२९. नानर्थिकामिमां कश्चिद् व्यवस्थां कर्तुमर्हति ।
तस्मान्नि[७]बध्यते नित्या[८] साधुत्वविषया स्मृतिः ॥

29. No one dare make this rule meaningless. Therefore, the the eternal code of rules about validity has been composed.

३०. न चागमादृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते ।
ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम्[९] ॥

30. (Scripture is essential, not reasoning alone) :—Right conduct is not established by reasoning dissociated from scripture. Even the knowledge which the sages possess has the scripture for its reference.

३१. धर्मस्य चाव्यवच्छिन्नाः पन्थानो ये व्यवस्थिताः ।
न ताँल्लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात्कश्चित्तर्केण बाधते ॥

31. No one can refute by reasoning or by argument of empirical obviousness those unbroken and traditional paths of right conduct.

३२. अवस्थादेशकालानां भेदाद्भिन्नासु शक्तिषु ।
भावानामनुमानेन [१०]प्रसिद्धिरतिदुर्लभा ॥

32. Rarely are the natures of substances known from inference, since their properties vary with variations in (their) state, place or time.

३३. [११]निर्ज्ञातशक्तेर्द्रव्यस्य तां तामर्थक्रियां प्रति ।
विशिष्टद्रव्यसम्बन्धे सा शक्तिः प्रतिबध्यते ॥

33. The power which a substance is well-known as possessing

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७. स्मान्निबद्धा शिष्टैस्सा साधु—घ.

८. शिष्टैः—क.

९. महेतुकम्—ख.

१०. प्रतीतिरपिदु—ग.

११. विज्ञातश—घ.

towards a particular activity is obstructed when it comes into association with another specific object.

३४. यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥

34. Even a conclusion inferred after great consideration by clever logicians is decided to be otherwise by others more qualified.

३५. परेषामसमाख्येयमभ्यासादेव जायते ।
मणिरूप्यादि[१२]विज्ञानं तद्विदां नानुमानिकम्[१३] ॥

35. Such a knowledge as discriminates between different diamonds, different coins, etc.,—a knowledge which cannot be described to others—arises in those who possess it, only from practice; it is not inferential.

३६. प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च व्यतिक्रम्य व्यवस्थिताः ।
[१४]पितृरक्षः पिशाचानां कर्मजा[१५] एव सिद्धयः ॥

36. The supernatural powers which demons, departed souls and ogres possess, which transcend the perceptual and the inferential, are indeed the results of their actions (in previous births).

३७. आविर्भूतप्रकाशानामनु[१६]पप्लुतचेतसाम् ।
अतीतानागतज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षान्न विशिष्यते ॥

37. The knowledge of the past and the future, which is possessed by sages, enlightened, and undisturbed in mind, does not differ (in certainty) from direct perception.

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१२. दिषुज्ञानं—ग.

१३. नितम्—ग, घ.

१४. रक्षः पितृपिशाचानां—ग.

१५. मन्ता—ख.

१६. मनुपद्रुतचे—ख.

३८. अतीन्द्रियानसंवेद्यान् पश्यन्त्यार्षेण चक्षुषा ।
ये भावान् वचनं तेषां नानुमानेन बाध्यते ॥

38. The words of those who perceive the super-sensual and non-cognisable objects with the eye of a sage are not refuted by inferential reasoning.

३९. ये यस्य स्वमिव ज्ञानं दर्शनं नातिशङ्कते ।
स्थितं प्रत्यक्षपक्षे तं कथमन्यो निवर्तयेत् ॥

39. When a man does not doubt the perceptual knowledge (of a reliable person) as if it were his own, how can another one (given to reasoning) make him who (thus) stands on the side of perception, turn back ?

४०. इदं पुण्यमिदं पापमित्येतस्मिन् पदद्वये ।
आचण्डालं मनुष्याणां [१७]समं शास्त्रप्रयोजनम् ॥

40. The scriptural truth is of equal use to all humanity down to the Caṇḍālas in their judgements 'this is virtue' and 'this is sin.'

४१. चैतन्य[१८]मिव यश्चायमविच्छेदेन वर्तते ।
आगमस्तमुपासीनो हेतु[१९]वादैर्न बाध्यते ॥

41. He who has got the Vedic knowledge which shines unbroken like consciousness is not influenced by the inferential arguments (of the logicians).

४२. हस्तस्पर्शादि[२०]वान्धेन विषमे [२१]पथि धावता ।
अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः ॥

42. Like a (blind) man running along on an uneven path obtaining his knowledge (of the path) only from feeling from his hand, he, who relies on inference (for his knowledge) will speedily fall.

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१७. अल्पं—क, ग.

१८. न्यविषयश्चायं—घ.

१९. तुवार्धैर्न—घ.

२०. दिबाधेन—ख.

२१. मेप्यभिधावता—ख.

४३. तस्मादकृतकं शास्त्रं स्मृतिं[22] च सनिबन्धनाम् ।
आश्रित्यारभ्यते शिष्टैः[23] शब्दानामनुशासनम् ॥

43. Therefore, basing themselves on the scripture of impersonal origin and the tradition of the precept-books with their binding precepts, the investigation of words is undertaken by the wise.

४४. द्वावुपादानशब्देषु शब्दौ शब्दविदो विदुः ।
एको निमित्तं शब्दानामपरोऽर्थे प्रयुज्यते ॥

44. Grammarians consider that there are two 'word-entities' (ie, two elements) in functional words; one (ie, the sphoṭa) is the cause of the (production) of words and the other (the speech-sound) is used in connection with meanings.

४५. [२]आत्मभेदस्तयोः केचिदस्तीत्याहुः पुराणगाः ।
बुद्धिभेदादभिन्नस्य भेदमेके प्रचक्षते ॥

45. Some, among the teachers of old considered that there was a difference in essence between these two. Others (on the other hand) speak of the same undivided entity being thought various, through a difference in conceiving it.

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२२. वा—ख.

२३. साधुत्वविषया स्मृतिः—घ.

24. Charudeva Sastri's Benares edition (क) gives the following verse in the commentary under stanza 44.

अविभक्तो विभक्तेभ्यो जायतेऽर्थस्य वाचकः ।
शब्दस्तत्रार्थरूपात्मा सम्भेदमुपगच्छति ॥

Sastri adds the following note on it. "This stanza is seen interpollated in all manuscrpts except क-5. The commentary would indicate that the karika was by another author and has been given in the text by the author of the Vākyapadiya to show a particular view held by another author."

४६. [२५]अरणिस्थं यथा ज्योतिः प्रकाशान्तरकारणम् ॥
तद्वच्छब्दोऽपि बुद्धिस्थः श्रुतीनां कारणं पृथक् ॥

46. Just as the light which is in the fire-stick acts as the cause for further lights, similarly the Word which is in the mind is the cause of speech-sounds.

४७. वितर्कितः पुरा बुद्ध्या क्वचिदर्थे निवेशितः ।
करणेभ्यो विवृत्तेन ध्वनिना सोऽनुगृह्यते ॥

47. The Word is examined in the mind, is then fixed to a specific meaning and then through the instrumentality of the speech-sounds producted through (their) causes.[12]

४८. नादस्य क्रमजन्मत्वान्न[२६] पूर्वो न[२७] परश्च सः ।
अक्रमः क्रमरूपेग भेदवानिव जायते ॥

48. The Word is neither a 'previous' nor 'a subsequent', because it is the speech-sounds which are produced in sequence. But the non-sequential is revealed as sequential as if it were divided.

४९. प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोय[२८]क्रियावशात् ।
तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्फोटनादयोः ॥

49. Just as a reflection formed elsewhere (ie, in water) appears, due to the activities of the water, to partake of the movements of the water, similar is the relationship between the Word and the speech-sound.

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25. This karika is numbered 47 in 'ka'—an obvious mistake. Being numbered correctly as 46 in the text as given in the present edition, the numbering of karikas from this point on wards differs from 'ka'. This agrees with the Benares edition.

२६. मजात—ख, घ.

२७. नापरश्च—ख.

२८. तोये क्रि—ग.

Bhartṛhari's commentary contained in the Trivandrum manuscript ("ga") does not go beyond karika 50. The text alone is given after it.

५०. आत्मरूपं यथा ज्ञाने ज्ञेयरूपं च दृश्यते ।
अर्थरूपं तथा शब्दे स्वरूपं च प्रकाशते ॥

50. Just as in (perceptual) knowledge, there can be seen both itself (ie, the act of perceiving) and the object of knowledge (the thing perceived), so in the word there appears the meaning-element and the formal element.

५१. आण्ड[२९]भावमिवापन्नो यः क्रतुः शब्दसंज्ञकः ।
वृत्तिस्तस्य क्रियारूपा[३०] भागशो भजते क्रमम् ॥

51. The inner principle called 'speech' which exists egg-like, evolving into speech-activity, assumes sequence through its parts.

५२. यथैकबुद्धिविषया मूर्तिराक्रियते पटे ।
मूर्त्यन्तरस्य त्रितयमेवं शब्देऽपि दृश्यते ॥

52. Just as a shape which is (a copy) of another shape, after it has become the object of a unified perception (having been first received by the senses as a complex-pattern of parts), is then painted (in stages) on the canvas, so likewise three stages (three aspects) are seen in the comprehension of speech.[13]

५३. यथा प्रयोक्तुः प्राग्बुद्धिः शब्देष्वेव प्रवर्तते ।
व्यवसायो गृहीतॄणामेवं तेष्वेव जायते ॥

53. Just as the mind of the speaker first dwells on the words (and not their parts when he wants to convey their meaning) similarly, the activity of the hearers first arises out of the words (and not their parts) in their attempt to understand their sense.

५४. अर्थोपसर्जनीभूतानभिधेयेषु केषुचित् ।
चरितार्थान् परार्थत्वान्न लोकः प्रतिपद्यते ॥

54. When certain meanings are conveyed the forms (which convey them), having (thus) become accessories to

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२९. अण्डभा—ख.

३०. याभूता—ग.

(such) meanings, and having their purpose (thus) fulfilled, they are not perceived (as accessories to action), because they are (uttered) for the sake of another (namely, meaning).

५५. ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा ।
तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ॥

55. Just as light has two powers, namely the power of being perceived and the power of causing the perception of objects, similarly all words have these two distinct powers.

५६. विषयत्वमनापन्नैः शब्दैर्नार्थः प्रकाश्यते ।
न सत्तयैव तेऽर्थानां अगृहीताः प्रकाशकाः ॥

56. Meaning is not understood from words which (themselves) have not become objects (of the sense of hearing). Without being (thus) received, they do not express meaning by their mere existence.

५७. अतोऽनिर्ज्ञातरूपत्वात्किमाहेत्यभिधीयते ।
नेन्द्रियाणां प्रकाश्येऽर्थे स्वरूपं गृह्यते तथा ॥

57. Therefore when the form of the (uttered) word is not clear, the question 'what did you say' is asked (of the speaker),. But the nature of the sense-faculties is not similarly grasped when an object has to be revealed by them.[14]

५८. भेदेनाव[३२]गृहीतौ द्वौ शब्दधर्मावपोद्धृतौ ।
भेदकार्येषु हेतुत्वं अविरोधेन गच्छतः ॥

58. These two aspects of the word, analysed and comprehended separately, act without mutual opposition as causes of different effects.

५९. वृद्धयादयो यथा शब्दाः स्वरूपोपनिबन्धनाः ।
आदैच्प्रत्यायितैः शब्दैः सम्बन्धं यान्ति संज्ञिभिः ॥

59. Just as the words 'vṛddhi' and the like besides expressing their own form are also related to the sounds named by them, namely, those symbolised by 'ādaic' (ie, 'ā', 'ai' and 'au') etc,

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३१. ग्रहणत्वं च—घ.

३२. नानुगृहीतौ—घ.

६०. अग्निशब्दस्तथैवायमग्निशब्दनिबन्धनः ।
अग्निश्रुत्यैति सम्बन्धमग्निशब्दाभिधेयया ॥

60. so this word 'agni' ('fire') besides being related to the word 'agni' (meaning fire) is also related to that referred to by the word 'agni' namely the form '*agni*'.

६१. यो य उच्चार्यते शब्दो नियतं[३३] न स कार्यभाक् ।
अन्यप्रत्यायने शक्तिः न तस्य प्रतिबध्यते ॥

61. A word which is uttered (in everyday use) is never linked with grammatical operations. (But) its capacity to convey that other form (that is, its own form as the meaning) is not obstructed.

६२. उच्चरन्परतन्त्रत्वाद्गुणः कार्यैर्न युज्यते ।
तस्मात्तदर्थैः कार्याणां सम्बन्धः परिकल्प्यते ॥

62. The word which is pronounced (in ordinary speech) being secondary, since it is for the sake of the other (namely, the thing-meant) is not linked with grammatical operations; and hence we adopt the convention that the grammatical operations are attached to words which symbolise themselves.

६३. सामान्यमाश्रितं यद्यदुपमानोपमेययोः ।
तस्य तस्योपमानेषु धर्मोऽन्यो व्यतिरिच्यते ॥

63. Whatever common attributes there exist in the object with which anything is compared and the thing which is compared to it, some attributes other than them also exist in the object to which the comparison is made.[15]

६४. गुणःप्रकर्षहेतुर्यः स्वातन्त्र्येणोपदिश्यते ।
तस्याश्रिताद्गुणादेव प्रकृष्टत्वं प्रतीयते ॥

64. Whatever quality which is the cause of the excellence (of an object) is (itself) mentioned in the form of an object, its (own) excellence is caused by the qualities residing in it.[16]

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३३. यतः स न कार्य—घ.

६५. तस्याभिधेयभावेन यः शब्दः समवस्थितः ।
तस्याप्युच्चारणे रूपमन्यत्तस्माद्विविच्यते ॥

65. When a word (like 'agni' in the Sūtra 'agnerḍhak'), which has its own form as its meaning is pronounced (for conveying its form), then (from that word) is discriminated another word (namely, the word 'agni' which has 'fire' as its meaning).

६६. प्राक्संज्ञिनाभिसम्बन्धात्संज्ञा रूपपदार्थिका ।
षष्ठ्याश्च प्रथमायाश्च निमित्तत्वाय कल्प्यते ॥

66. Before being connected to the thing it means a name is capable of genitive and nominative constructions, because it has its own form as its meaning.

६७. तत्रार्थवत्त्वात्प्रथमा संज्ञाशब्दाद्विधीयते ।
अस्येति व्यतिरेकश्च तदर्थादेव जायते ॥

67. The nominative is prescribed to a name because it is meaningful with its form (as its meaning), and it is from the same meaning that the genitive construction in the form 'of it' arises.

६८. स्वं रूपमिति कैश्चित्तु व्यक्तिस्संज्ञोपदिश्यते ।
जातेः कार्याणि संसृष्टा [३४]जातिस्तु प्रतिपद्यते ॥

68. Some consider that in the Sūtra 'svam rūpam' a name as a particular is meant; the universal attached to the particular undergoes grammatical operation.

६९. संज्ञिनां व्यक्तिमिच्छन्ति सूत्रे[३५] ग्राह्यामथापरे ।
जातिप्रत्यायिता व्यक्तिः प्रदेशेषूपतिष्ठते ॥

69. Others think that what is meant by the Sūtra is a particular instance of the named (and that it is the class which is the name) and that in any given instance one finds only a particular, the understanding of which is brought about by the universal.[17]

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३४. व्यक्तिस्तु—ग.
३५. सूत्रग्राह्या—घ.

७०. कार्यत्वे नित्यतायां तु केचिदेकत्ववादिनः ।
कार्यत्वे नित्यतायां तु केचिन्नानात्ववादिनः ॥

70. Both among those who uphold the eternity theory of words, and those who hold that words are created, there ar some who uphold its sameness (in all instance of its occurrence). Again among the upholders of the doctrine of eternity and of the doctrine that words are created there are those who uphold the plurality of words (i.e., that every occurence of apparently the same word, is really the occurence of a different word).

७१. पदभेदेऽपि वर्णानामेकत्वं न निवर्तते ।
वाक्येषु पदमेकञ्च भिन्नेष्वप्युप[३६]लभ्यते ॥

71. (The doctrine of an opponent school is stated regarding the comparitive reality of letters, words and sentences):- Even when the word is a different one, the identity of the letters is not impaired; and (in the same way) in different sentences the same word is observed.

७२. न वर्णव्यतिरेकेण पदमन्यच्च विद्यते ।
वाक्यं वर्णपदाभ्यां च व्यतिरिक्तं न कञ्चन ॥

72. Therefore the word does not exist as more than its letters; nor is there a sentence existing as more than the letters and the words.

७३. पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा इव[३७] ।
वाक्यात्पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥

73. (The grammarian's doctrine is given :—)
Just as there are no parts in letters (similarly) there are no letters in the word. Nor is there any reality in abstracting the word from the sentence.

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३६. द्यते—घ.

३७. वा न च—क, ग, घ.

७४. भिन्नं दर्शनमाश्रित्य व्यवहारोऽनुगम्यते ।
तत्र यन्मुख्यमेकेषां तत्रान्येषां विपर्ययः ॥

74. People follow customary usage (and talk of 'words' and 'letters') though basing their theories on different views and on this (question) what is considered as primary by one school is taken in an opposite way by others.

७५. स्फोटस्याभिन्नकालस्य ध्वनिकालानुपातिनः ।
ग्रहणोपाधिभेदेन वृत्तिभेदं प्रचक्षते ॥

75. People talk of difference of diction (as belonging to the utterance) of the Word, which itself is of undivided time, but (appears to) follow the time-pattern of the speech-sounds (uttered), in accordance with the differences in the causes of its being perceived.

७६. स्वभावभेदान्नित्यत्वे ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतादिषु ।
प्राकृतस्य ध्वनेः कालः शब्दस्येत्युपचर्यते[३८] ॥

76. With regard to the short, long and prolated vowels, since a speech-unit (here, a vowel) is (essentially) timeless, and (therefore) fundamentally different (from the speech-sound which reveals it), it is the time of the primary-sound which is metaphorically considered as belonging to the speech-unit.

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38. In interpreting the verse "svabhāva etc etc" Bhartṛhari in his commentary as given by Charudeva Sastri (ka) quotes a verse from Samgrahakāra with the introduction evam hi Samgrahkārah paṭhati. The verse reads as follows :

शब्दस्य ग्रहणे हेतु प्राकृतो ध्वनिरिष्यते ।
स्थितिभेदे निमित्तत्वं वैकृतः प्रतिपद्यते ॥

The commentary given in the Benares edition does not give this verse. But the Benares version of the text gives this as part of the text with the difference that स्थितिभेदे in the third line is changed into वृत्तिभेदे In the light of the

७७. शब्दस्यूर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदं तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥

77. It is however after the word has been revealed (by the primary sound) that the modified sounds are presented to the mind as distinctions of diction (and hence a fortiori) the self of the Word is not divided into parts by them.[18]

७८. इन्द्रियस्यैव संस्कारः शब्दस्यैवोभयस्य वा ।
क्रियते ध्वनिभिर्वादास्त्रयोऽभिव्यक्तिवादिनाम्[३९] ॥

78. There are three views among those who hold the theory that words are manifested.[19] (1) the sounds act upon the sense-faculty; or (2) they act upon the word or (3) they act upon both.

७९. इन्द्रियस्यैव संस्कारः समाधानाञ्जनादिभिः ।
विषयस्य तु संस्कारस्तद्गन्धप्रतिपत्तये ॥

79. (The first theory) would be analogous to the theory of sight—perception which held that) only the sense—faculty (of sight) is acted upon, namely, by attention and application of ointment;[20] (The second theory would be analogous to a theory of smell-perception which held that) only the thing (for instance, the earth) is acted upon in order that its smell might be received.

८०. चक्षुषः प्राप्यकारित्वे तेजसा तु द्वयोरपि ।
विषयेन्द्रिययोरिष्टः संस्कारः सः क्रमो ध्वनेः ॥

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evidence of Bhartṛhari's own commentary, I have not included the verse in the text. Since, however, the idea given in the stanza is integral to the philosophy, I give below a translation :

"The cause through which the letter is perceived is defined as the primary speech sound while the modified speech sound is the cause of the difference in diction."

३९. वादिनः—ग.

80. (According to the third theory) where however, the eye effects the reception of a cognition, it is clear that both the object and the sense-faculty are acted upon by the light; and speech-sounds operate in the same form.

८१. स्फोटरूपाविभागेन ध्वनेर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
कैश्चिद्ध्वनिरसंवेद्यः स्वतन्त्रोऽन्यैः प्रकल्पितः ॥

81. Certain theorists maintain that reception of the sound takes place without any separation of it from the form of the Word (sphoṭa); others hold that the sound is not perceptible. According to yet others it is an independent manifesting agent.

८२. यथानुवाकः श्लोको वा सोढत्वमुपगच्छति ।
आवृत्त्या न तु स ग्रन्थः प्रत्यावृत्ति[४०] निरूप्यते ॥

82. Just as a chapter or a single verse is apprehended as a unit by means of saying over its component parts in order, but of course the book is not defined at each component parts,

८३. प्रत्ययैरनुपाख्येयैर्ग्रहणानुगुणैस्तथा ।
ध्वनिप्रकाशिते शब्दे स्वरूपमवधार्यते ॥

83. —so likewise the form of a word is apprehended (as a unity) when the word is revealed by the sound through the agency of causal factors which are appropriate to the cognition (of the word), but which are not themselves (as such) apprehended (ie, the hearer is not aware of the separate sense-data).

८४ नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।
आवृत्तपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ॥

84. Simultaneously with the last sound, the word is apprehended by the mind in which the seed has been sown by the (physical) sounds, and in which ripening (of the speech) has been brought about by the telling over (of the sounds).

४०. वृत्त्या—ख.
वृत्तिर्—घ.

८५. असतश्चान्तराले याञ्छब्दानस्तीति मन्यते ।
प्रतिपत्तुरशक्तिः सा ग्रहणोपाय एव सः ॥

85. As far as the non-existent forms, which (a hearer) considers as existing in the interval (before the complete word has been pronounced), are concerned, this is merely incapacity on the part of the hearer; they are in fact, only means to the apprehension (of the complete word).

८६. भेदानुकारो ज्ञानस्य वाचश्चोपप्लवो ध्रुवः ।
क्रमोपसृष्टरूपा[४१] वाग् ज्ञानं ज्ञेयव्यपाश्रयम् ॥

86. There is the semblance of distinctions in cognition; (similarly) the attributing of distinctions on words is always seen. The word appears to be produced in stages and cognition seems to be dependent on the cognised.

८७. यथाद्यसंख्याग्रहणमुपायः प्रतिपत्तये ।
संख्यान्तराणां भेदेऽपि तथा शब्दान्तरश्रुतिः ॥

87. Just as earlier numbers (in a series) should be apprehended for the apprehension of subsequent ones, although the latter are different from the former, so is the apprehension of parts in a unit of speech (an aid to the apprehension of the whole).

८८. प्रत्येकं व्यञ्जका भिन्ना [४२]वर्णवाक्यपदेषु ये ।
तेषामत्यन्तभेदेऽपि सङ्कीर्णा इव शक्तयः ॥

88. When in reality revealing units in the syllable, word and sentence function independently of each other, they appear to function in combination, although they are entirely different.[21]

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४१. रूपायाः—ख.

In interpreting this karika (86) Bhartṛhari in his commentary quotes the following stanza.

ज्ञेयेन न विना ज्ञानं व्यवहारे ऽवतिष्ठते :
नालब्धक्रमया वाचा कश्चिदर्थोऽभिधीयते ॥

" In this world there can be no knowledge without the known. A word which is not revealed in sequence never conveys a meaning."

४२. वर्णा वा—ख.

८९. यथैव दर्शनैः पूर्वं दूरात्सन्तमसेऽपि वा ।
अन्यथाकृत्य विषयमन्यथैवाध्यवस्यति ॥

89. Just as on looking from a distance or in the dark, one at first misunderstands an object, and (later on) understands it otherwise (ie, in its true nature),

९०. व्यज्यमाने तथा वाक्ये वाक्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुभिः ।
भागावग्रहरूपेण पूर्वं बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते ॥

90. —similarly during the manifestation of the sentence by its causes (namely, the smaller units like letters and words), the mind first functions as comprehending the component units (as real units).

९१. यथानुपूर्वीनियमो विकारे क्षीरबीजयोः ।
तथैव प्रतिपत्तृणां नियतो बुद्धिषु क्रमः ॥

91. Just as there is a (fixed) sequence (in the stages) of the transformation of milk (into curds) and the seed (into the tree), similarly there is a fixed sequence in the series of the hearer's perceptions (of the intervening words, phrases, etc).

९२. भागवत्स्वपि तेष्वेव[४३] रूपभेदो ध्वनेः क्रमात् ।
निर्भागेष्वभ्युपायो वा भागभेदप्रकल्पनम् ॥

92. And when they (ie, sentences, words, etc.) are made up of real parts (granting the Mīmāmsaka's position),[22] the difference in form (between two speech units for instance, two words, 'nadī' and 'dīna') is really due to the (difference in the) sequence of their sounds. And where words, etc., are considered as not made up of (real) parts (by the Akhaṇḍavādins), the fancying of parts is a means (to the realisation of the total unit).

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42. This reading does not make sense since the reference in the the karika is to sounds (dhvanis) that reveal the sphoṭa in the syllable, the word and the sentence; and not to the varṇa or the syllable. Nevertheless the reading is given here.

४३. ष्वेवं—ख.

९३. अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता ।
कैश्चिद् व्यक्तय एवास्या ध्वनित्वेन प्रकल्पिताः[४४] ॥

93. It is considered by some that the Word is a universal suggested by a number of individuals (namely, speech-sounds),[23] these individual speech-sounds (according to them) constitute the sound-pattern of the Word.

९४. अविकारस्य शब्दस्य निमित्तैः विकृतो ध्वनिः ।
उपलब्धौ निमित्तत्वमुपयाति प्रकाशवत् ॥

94. Just as light (reveals objects), the speech-sounds produced by (their) causes become the cause of the immutable Word.

९५. न चानित्येष्वभिव्यक्तिर्नियमेन व्यवस्थिता ।
आश्रयैरपि नित्यानां जातीनां व्यतिरिच्यते ॥

95. (If the Word is revealed like this, does it not mean that it is not eternal ? The answer is in the negative):— Being revealed is not established as invariably pertaining to non-eternal things. Universals which are eternal are also considered to be revealed by those (ie, the particulars) in which they inhere.

९६. देशादिभिश्च सम्बन्धो दृष्टः कायवतामिह ।
देशभेदविकल्पेऽपि न भेदो ध्वनिशब्दयोः ॥

96. In life (only) concrete objects are found to have relation to place and the like (for instance, time). And even accepting the alternative (that difference in place, etc. applies also to those that are not concrete objects), there is no (such) difference between the speech-sound and the Word (it reveals).[24]

९७. ग्रहणग्राहकयोः सिद्धा योग्यता नियता यथा ।[४५]
व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेन[४६] तथैव स्फोटनादयोः ॥

97. Just as there exists an invariable competence of the revealed and the revealer between a perceiving sense-organ and the thing it perceives, so does it exist between the Word and the speech-sounds.

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४४. तामपि—क, ग, घ.

Both Punyaraja's & Bhartṛhari's commentaries support the reading accepted.

४५. नियता योग्यता यथा—है.

४६. ञ्जकभावेऽपि—ग, घ.

९८. सदृशग्रहणानां च गन्धादीनां प्रकाशकम् ।
निमित्तं नियतं लोके प्रतिद्रव्यमवस्थितम् ॥

98. And it is seen (in our experience) that, in the case of (various) smells and the like which are perceived by the same sense-organ, there is a separate causal factor for each substance.

९९. प्रकाशकानां भेदांश्च प्रकाश्योऽर्थोऽनुवर्तते ।
तैलोदकादिभेदे तत् प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिबिम्बके ॥

99. (The point that the attributes of the speech-sounds revealing the Word are transferred to the Word is again stated) :—
The object revealed partakes of the attributes of the reflecting medium. This is obvious in the different kinds of reflections (of an object) produced in oil, water and the like.

१००. विरुद्धपरिमाणेषु वज्रादर्शतलादिषु ।
पर्वतादिसरूपाणां भावानां नास्ति सम्भवः ॥

100. And surely, concrete objects of the type of mountains cannot have existence (except as their reflections) in stones, a mirror-surface and the like of incompatible size.

१०१. तस्मादभिन्नकालेषु वर्णवाक्यपदादिषु ।
वृत्तिकालः स्वकालश्च नादभेदाद्विभज्यते ॥

101. Therefore the period of the speechsounds and of (their secondary variations in the form of) diction is assigned to the syllable, word and sentence which are (themselves) without time-distinctions.

१०२. यः संयोग[४७]विभागाभ्यां करणैरुपजन्यते ।
स स्फोटः शब्दजाः शब्दा ध्वनयोऽन्यैरुदाहृताः ॥

102. (The definitions of the sphoṭa and dhvani by another school are given) :—
The sphoṭa is that which is produced by the union and

४७. गवियोगाभ्यां—घ.

disunion of the speech-organs (like the vocal chords). And dhvanis are sounds born of this sphoṭa.

१०३. अल्पे महति वा शब्दे स्फोटकालो न भिद्यते ।
परस्तु शब्दसन्तानः प्रचयापचयात्मकः ॥

103. (The nature of the primary and modified speech-sounds is again stated from the author's point of view) :—
Whether the speech-sound is short or long, the measure of the Word does not change. The subsequent sound (ie, the modified speech-sound) which arises out of the primary speech-sounds is expanded or contracted in its form.

१०४. दूरात्प्रभेव दीपस्य ध्वनिमात्रं तु [४८]लक्ष्यते ।
घण्टादीनां च शब्देषु व्यक्तो भेदः स दृश्यते ॥

104. (The view-point of another school is stated) :—
Like light from a lamp, merely the speech sound (undifferentiated as primary and modified) is *heard* from a distance. But in the sound of a bell and the like the distinction is clearly noticed.

१०५. द्रव्याभिघातात्प्रचितौ भिन्नौ दीर्घप्लुतावपि ।
कम्पे तूपरते जाता नादा वृत्तेर्विशेषकाः ॥

105. (The discussion of the doctrine held by the Grammarians is taken up again) :—
The long and prolated sounds which are different (from the short sound) are produced by the striking of the organs of speech. And the sounds which modify diction arise after the cessation of the movements (of the organs).[25]

१०६. [४९]अनवस्थितकम्पेऽपि करणे [५०]ध्वनयोऽपरे ।
स्फोटादेवोपजायन्ते ज्वाला ज्वालान्तरादिव ॥

106. (The view of another school) :—
Even before the vibrations of the speech-organs (which produce the word) have subsided, other sounds, are formed from the word(sphoṭa)itself, as one flame from another.

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४८. लभ्यते—क.

49. Karika 106 is not seen in manuscript gha. Bhartṛhari has his commentary on this, however. The Benares edition also gives the karika.

५०. नयः परे—घ.

१०७. वायोरणूनां ज्ञानस्य शब्दत्वा[५१]-पत्तिरिष्यते ।
कैश्चिद्दर्शनभेदोऽहि प्रवादेष्वनवस्थितः[५२] ॥

107. (Now regarding what constitutes the substance of speech): It is held by some (ie, by three schools respectively), that air, the atoms or consciousness become speech. There is an endless number of variant views in this matter.

१०८. लब्धक्रियः प्रयत्नेन वक्तुरिच्छानुवर्त्तिना ।
स्थानेष्वभिहतो वायुः शब्दत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

108. (These views are expounded) :—
The air which is stirred by the speaker's effort following his desire to speak strikes the speech centres and produces speech.

१०९. तस्य कारणसामर्थ्याद्वेगप्रचयधर्मणः[५३] ।
सन्निपाताद्विभज्यन्ते सारवत्योऽपि मूर्त्तयः ॥

109. Even powerful objects are broken by air which possesses the attributes of speed and accumulation, blowing with the capacity to cause (such breaking).

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५१. ब्दार्थापत्तिरि—घ.

52. After this the Trivandrum manuscript (ga) gives the karika "''अजस्रवृत्ति etc." given as 116 in the text given here. The text in the said Trivandrum manuscript omits 9 karikas namely the followsing.

वायोरणूनां..... विभजन्नात्मनो

The manuscript gives the karika "अजस्रवृत्ति etc." as follows.

अजस्रवृत्तिर्यश्शब्दः सूक्ष्मत्वेनोपलभ्यते ।
व्यञ्जनाद्वायुरिव स निमित्तात्प्रचीयते ॥

Note the reading प्रचीयते in thelast line. In the verse as given in Charudeva Sastri and the Benares editon the reading is प्रतीयते

५३. धर्मिणः—ख.

११०ष अणवः सर्वशक्तित्वाद्भेदसंसर्गवृत्तयः ।
छायातपतमःशब्दभावेन परिणामिनः ॥

110. (Regarding the atom-theory) :—
The atoms, which unite and separate, transform themselves into shadows, light, and darkness and also into speech on account of their possessing all (possible) capacities (ie, the capacity to be transformed into all things).

१११ष स्वशक्तौ व्यज्यमानायां प्रयत्नेन समीरिताः ।
अभ्राणीव प्रचीयन्ते शब्दाख्याः परमाणवः ॥

111. When their capacity is being revealed these atoms which are called speech, prompted by the effort (of the speaker) collect together like clouds (in the sky).

११२ष [५४]अथायमान्तरो ज्ञाता सूक्ष्मे वागात्मनि स्थितः ।
व्यक्तये स्वस्य रूपस्य शब्दत्वेन विवर्तते ॥

112. Finally, regarding the consciousness-theory) :—
Again, the inner knower who exists in the subtle quintessential speech transforms himself into (audible) speech for the purpose of revealing his nature.

११३ष स मनोभावमापद्य तेजसा पाकमागतः ।
वायुमाविशति प्राणमथासौ समुदीर्यते ॥

113. It (i.e., consciousness) taking the form of the mind and ripening in the fire (of the stomach) enters the life-breath, and it is then uttered.

११४ष अन्तःकरणतत्त्वस्य वायुराश्रयतां गतः ।
तद्धर्मेण समाविष्टस्तेजसैव विवर्तते ॥

114. The breath which has become the substratum of the mental principle is suffused with the mind's attributes and manifested (after it passes) through the fire (of the stomach).

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५४. अभेदमान्तरं ज्ञानं सूक्ष्मवागात्मना स्थितम्—ख.

११५. विभजन्[५५] स्वात्मनो ग्रन्थीन् श्रुतिरूपः पृथग्विधैः।
प्राणो वर्णानभिव्यज्य वर्णेष्वेवोपलीयते ॥

115. Breaking up its inherent knots (ie, its continuous current) the breath reveals the syllables through different and distinct speech-sounds and merges into those syllables themselves.[26]

११६. अजस्रवृत्तिर्यः शब्दः सूक्ष्मत्वान्नोपलभ्यते।
व्यञ्जनाद्वायुरिव स स्वनिमित्तात्प्रतीयते ॥

116. (Yet another view about sound both of speech and of other kinds is given) :—
Sound though it is ever-existing is not experienced because it is too subtle.[27] It is realised through the appropriate causal factors just as air is through fanning.

११७. तस्य प्राणे च या शक्तिर्या च बुद्धौ व्यवस्थिता।
विवर्तमाना स्थानेषु सैषा भेदं प्रपद्यते ॥

117. (The view of yet another school) :—
The powers of speech resident in the breath and in the mind undergo transformation (into speech) at the centres of speech-production and assume the distinctions (of revealed speech).

११८. शब्देष्वेवाश्रिता शक्तिर्विश्वस्यास्य निबन्धनी।
[५६]यन्नेत्रः प्रतिभात्मायं भेदरूपः प्रतीयते[५७] ॥

118. The power which is based on words controls this universe. This universe which has a single Intelligence as its soul is perceived as manifold through the word as the eye.

११९. [५८]षड्जादिभेदः शब्देन व्याख्यातो रूप्यते यतः।
तस्मादर्थविधाः सर्वाः शब्दमात्रासु[५९] निश्रिताः ॥

119. Since, it is seen that distinctions between two things, for

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५५. भज्य स्वा—ख.
५६. न्नेत्रप्रतिभात्मा—घ.
५७. प्रतायते—घ.
५८. शब्दष्षड्जादिरूपेण व्या—ग.
५९. शब्दमात्राः सुनिश्चिताः—ख.

This karika षड्जादिभेद etc. is omitted in manuscript घ. The karika is given in all other printed books and manuscripts.

instance, between a ṣaḍja[38] and another musical note become clear when explained in words, therefore all manner of things are determined as being only (understood through) words.

१२०. शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः ।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममेतद्विश्वं [६०] व्यवर्तत ॥

120. Those who are versed in the Vedas know that this Universe is the transformation of speech. It was out of the Vedas that this universe was first evolved.

१२१. इतिकर्तव्यता लोके सर्वा शब्दव्यपाश्रया ।
यां पूर्वाहितसंस्कारो [६१] बालोऽपि प्रतिपद्यते ॥

121. In this world the knowledge of the proper action (in a

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६०. विवर्तते—ग.
प्रवर्तते—घ.

61. Manuscript ग. does not complete the karika and breaks off with the obviously wrong reading यालेके (for बालोऽपि). After karika 120 the manuscript घ. gives as text four karikas which occur in Vṛṣabhadeva's ṭika under karika शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयं etc in Charudeva Sastri's edition (क) These karikas are the following :—

१. विभज्य बहुधात्मानं स छन्दस्य प्रजापतिः ।
छन्दोमयीभिर्मात्राभिः बहुधैव विवेश तत् ॥
२. साध्वी वाग्भूयसो येषु पुरुषेसु व्यवस्थिता ।
अधिकं वर्तते तेषु पुण्यं रूपं प्रजापतेः ॥
३. प्राजापत्यं महत्तेजस्तत्पात्रैरिव संवृतम् ।
शरीरभेदे विदुषां स्वां योनिमुपधावति ॥
४. यदेतन्मण्डलं भास्वद् धाम चित्रस्य राधसः ।
तद्भावमभिसम्भूय विद्यायां प्रविलीयते ॥

The karikas as given in the ṭika have slightly different readings from the manuscript version. The differences are noted below :—

karika 1. line 2. तम् instead of तत् karika 2.
साध्वीवाश्रयसी येष पुरुषेषु

context) entirely depends on speech. Even a boy has this knowledge of the proper action, having in him the accumulated experience of the past.[28]

१२२. आद्यः करणविन्यासः प्राणस्योर्ध्वं समीरणम् ।
स्थानानामभिघातश्च न विना शब्दभावनात् ॥

122. That first movement of the organs (of speech), the upward sending of the breath and its contact with the centres—these would not be possible but for verbal imagination (in the child).

१२३. न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते[६२] ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते[६३] ॥

123. In this world no comprehension is possible except as accompanied by speech. All knowledge shines as permeated by speech.

१२४. वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥

124. If it is denied that the permanent stuff of knowledge is speech, then that light (namely knowledge) will not shine (in the form of a recollection). It is speech (ie, words) which makes recollection possible.

१२५. सा सर्वविद्या[६४] शिल्पानां कलानां चोपबन्धिनी ।
तद्वशादभि[६५] निष्पत्तौ सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते ॥

125. It is speech which binds all branches of knowledge of arts and crafts. Everything when it is produced is classified through it.

१२६ष सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते ।
तन्मात्रामप्यतिक्रान्तं[६६] चैतन्यं सर्व[६७] जातिषु ॥

126. This speech exists within and outside all living beings.

६२. ब्दानुगमनाद्विना—घ.
६३. वर्तते—ग.
६४. विद्या शिल्पानां—ख.
६५. ष्पन्नं—क, ग, घ.
६६. क्रान्ते—ख.
क्रान्तचैतन्यं —घ.
६७. जन्तुषु—ख. वस्तुषु—क

Consciousness can exist in all creatures only after it is preceded by speech.

१२७. अर्थक्रियासु वाक् सर्वान् समीहयति देहिनः ।
तदुत्क्रान्तो विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ॥

127. It is speech which prompts all mankind to activity. When it is gone, man, dumb, looks like a log of wood or a piece of stone.

१२८. प्रविभागे यथा कर्ता तया कार्ये प्रवर्तते ।
अविभागे[६८] तथा सैव कार्यत्वेनावतिष्ठते ॥

128. It is when the distinctions (such as subject versus object) obtain, (ie, in the state of wakefulness,) that the agent functions in connection with an object. But when such distinctions do not obtain (ie, in the state of sleep) speech itself remains in the form of an object.[30]

१२९. स्वमात्रा परमात्रा वा श्रुत्या प्रक्रम्यते यथा ।
तथैव रूढतामेति तथा ह्यर्थो[६९] विधीयते ॥

129. Whether things are (identified with) the self, or with the Supreme, they become established in the form in which they are introduced by words. It is words which establish things.[31]

१३०. अत्यन्तमतथाभूते निमित्ते श्रुत्युपाश्रयात् ।
दृश्यतेऽलातचक्रादौ वस्त्वाकारनिरूपणा ॥

130. Even when the cause for verbal expression (ie, an object),

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Karika 127 which follows is not given in the text in क. It is given in the commentary by Bhartṛhari. ख and some other texts give the karika in the commentary. ग. does not give the karika.

६८. प्रविभागे—ग. Obviously a wrong reading.

६९. र्थोऽभिधीयते—ग, घ.

Charudeva Sastri (क) rightly notes that the Vivaranagrantha shows that the reading अर्थो विधीयते is the author's reading. The Vivaranagrantha, in fact, says 'तया ह्यर्थो विधीयते.'

is entirely non-existent, description of the form of such a thing through words is found, as in the case of a circle made by a fire-brand.[32]

१३१. अपि प्रयोक्तुरात्मानं शब्दमन्तरवस्थितम् ।
प्राहुर्महान्तमृषभं येन सायुज्यमिष्यते ॥

131. Further, speech which exists within the speaker as his self is said to be the great Bull, identity with which is desired.[33]

१३२. तस्माद्यः शब्दसंस्कारः सा सिद्धिः परमात्मनः ।
तस्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वज्ञस्तद्ब्रह्मामृतमिष्यते ॥

132. Therefore, attainment of faultless speech is the attainment of Brahman. He who knows the secret of its functioning enjoys the immortal Brahman.

१३३. न जात्वकर्तृकं क[७०]श्चिदागमं प्रतिपद्यते ।
बीजं सर्वागमापाये त्रय्येवातो व्यवस्थिता ॥

133. No one knows a collection of precepts which is of impersonal origin. When all such collections of precepts perish, the three Vedas alone exist as the root (of such collections).

१३४. [७१]अस्तं यातेषु वादेषु कर्तृष्वन्येष्व[७२]सत्स्वपि ।
श्रुतिस्मृत्यु[७३]दितं धर्मं लोको न व्यतिवर्तते ॥

134. Even when different schools (of Āgamas) perish and there are no new authors, mankind does not transgress the duties prescribed by the scriptures and the books of precepts.

१३५. ज्ञाने स्वाभाविके नार्थः [७४]शास्त्रैः कश्चन विद्यते ।
धर्मो ज्ञानस्य हेतुश्चेत्तस्याम्नायो निबन्धनम् ॥

135. If knowledge were instinctive, then scripture is of no use;

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७०. कञ्चित्—ख.
७१. अन्तं—ग, घ.
७२. षु सत्स्वपि—घ.
७३. स्मृतिगतं—ख.
७४. शास्त्रे—घ.

but if virtue is the root of knowledge then the source of knowledge is the Vedas.

१३६. वेदशास्त्रा[७५]विरोधी च तर्कश्चक्षुरपश्यतां ।
रूपमात्राद्धि वाक्यार्थः केवलान्नावतिष्ठते[७६] ॥

136. (Regarding reasoning as a source of knowledge) :—
Reasoning which is not contradictory to the Vedas and the scriptures is an eye to those who do not possess the vision (into the significance of the Vedas). The sense of a Vedic sentence is not obtained from its form alone,

१३७. —यतो[७७]ऽविवक्षा पारार्थ्यं व्यक्तिरर्थस्य लैङ्गिकी ।
इति न्यायो बहुविधस्तर्केण प्रविभज्यते ।

137. —for which reason, various kinds of the means of interpreting sentences have been classified by logic, such as, for instance : the intended meaning of a sentence (is such and such), a statement is for a purpose different (from what is obvious) or, a meaning becomes clear from the evidence of another sentence.[34]

१३८. शब्दानामेव सा शक्तिस्तर्को यः[७८] पुरुषाश्रयः ।
शब्दा[७९]ननुगतो न्यायोऽनागमेष्वनिबन्धनः ॥

138. Human reasoning is the power of words. That reasoning is in accordance with the Word (ie, the scriptures) which is not based on anything other than the scriptures.

१३९. रूपादयो यथा दृष्टाः प्रत्यर्थं यतशक्तयः[८०] ।
शब्दास्तथैव दृश्यन्ते विषापहरणादिषु ॥

139. Just as different colours, etc., are found to possess (different and) fixed capacities, so are words (such as the words of a hymn) found (to possess capacity) in destroying poison etc.

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७५. स्त्रोपरोधी—ग.
७६. न्नातितिष्ठति—घ.
७७. सतोऽवि—क.
७८. कोऽयं पु—घ.
७९. स शब्दानुगतो न्यायो नागमेष्वनिबन्धनः—घ.
८०. र्थयतशक्तयः—ग.

१४०. यथैषां तत्र सामर्थ्यं धर्मेऽप्येवं प्रतीयताम् ।
साधूनां साधुभिस्तस्माद्वाच्यमभ्युदयार्थिनाम्[८१] ॥

140. Just as these words have power to do that, so are they understood (as possessing capacity) in regard to virtuous conduct. Therefore correct words should be used by those desirous of elevation.

१४१. सर्वोऽदृष्टफलानार्थानागमात्प्रतिपद्यते ।
विपरीतं च सर्वत्र शक्यते वक्तुमागमे ॥

141. Men learn about matters which have transcendental effects from the Vedas. Contrary results also can always be stated from the scriptures.

१४२. साधुत्वज्ञानविषया सैषा व्याकरणस्मृतिः ।
अविच्छेदेन शिष्टानां इदं स्मृतिनिबन्धनम् ॥

142. This tradition of grammar has the knowledge of correctness as its subject. And it is directly based on the unbroken (series of) recollections of learned men.

१४३. वैखर्या मध्यमायाश्च पश्यन्त्याश्चैतदद्भुतम् ।
अनेकतीर्थभेदायास्त्रय्या वाचः परं पदम् ॥

143. It is the highest source of Speech, threefold as Vaikharī, Madhyamā and Pas'yantī and having various stages (through which it is realised).[35]

१४४. तद्विभागाविभागाभ्यां क्रियमाणमवस्थितम् ।
स्वभावज्ञैश्च[८२] भावानां दृश्यन्ते शब्दशक्तयः ॥

144. It is seen as being constituted by two different features namely, the treatment (of words, etc.) in analytical terms or as integral units. The capacities of words are noticed by those wise in the attributes of objects.

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८१. थिभिः—ख, ग.

८२. ज्ञैस्तु—ग, घ.

१४५. [83]अनादिमव्यव[84]च्छिन्नां श्रुतिमाहुरकर्तृकाम् ।
शिष्टैर्निबध्यमाना तु न व्यवच्छिद्यते स्मृतिः ॥

145. The scripture is described as beginningless, authorless and endless. And the codes that have been composed by the wise do not perish.

१४६. अवि[85]भागाद्विवृत्तानामभिख्या [86]स्वप्नवच्छ्रुतौ ।
भावतत्त्वं तु विज्ञाय लिङ्गेभ्यो विहिता स्मृतिः ॥

146. (Another view about the scripture and the codes is given) :—
In the scripture are the utterances, which are like dream-words, of those (i.e., the sages) who have evolved from the Integral (Brahman). And the codes have been composed (by their authors) after knowing the truth about existent things through the (appropriate) evidence.

१४७. कायवाग्बुद्धिविषया ये मलाः समवस्थिताः ।
चिकित्सालक्षणाध्यात्मशास्त्रैस्तेषां विशुद्धयः ॥

147. Whatever impurity there exists, of the body, of the word and of the mind, their purification is effected through the sciences of physical treatment, grammar and spiritual welfare respectively.

१४८. शब्दः[87] संस्कारहीनो यो गौरिति प्रयु[88]युक्षिते ।
तमपभ्रंशमिच्छन्ति विशिष्टार्थनिवेशिनम् ॥

148. That ungrammatical form (for instance, 'goṇī') which is employed to denote a particular object when (a correct form for instance) 'gauḥ' is required to be used, is considered as a corrupt form.

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83. This karika is not given in manuscript घ. However Bhartṛhari notes this.

84. The reading ' 'अप्यवच्छिन्नां'' given in the Benares edition is obviously a mistake. It should be अव्यवच्छिन्नां as is given in the Charudeva Sastri's edition and in all manuscripts.

८५. अविघाताद्वि—ख.

८६. शब्दवच्छ्रु—क.

८७. शब्दसंस्कार—ग, घ ।

८८. प्रयुयुक्षते—घ.

१४९. अस्वगोण्यादयः शब्दाः साधवो विषयान्तरे ।
निमित्तभेदात्सर्वत्र साधुत्वं च[८९] व्यवस्थितम् ॥

149. Words like 'aśva' and 'goṇī' are correct forms when used to denote other objects (ie, objects other than a horse and a cow respectively). Correctness is everywhere determined on the basis of what meaning a word is to convey.

१५०. ते[९०] साधुष्वनुमानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतवः ।
तादात्म्यमुपगम्येव शब्दार्थस्य प्रकाशकाः ॥

150. These (incorrect forms) which through inference cause the comprehension of the meaning of the correct forms, apparently identify themselves (with the correct forms) and convey their meaning.

१५१. न शिष्टै[९१]-रनुगम्यन्ते पर्याया इव साधवः ।
ते यतः स्मृतिशास्त्रेण तस्मात्साक्षादवाचकाः ॥

151. Because these incorrect forms are understood neither by the learned nor by grammar as valid synonyms (of the correct forms), they are not capable of expressing the meaning directly.

१५२. अम्बाम्बेति यथा बालः शिक्षमाणोप[९२] भाषते ।
अव्यक्तं तद्विदां तेन व्यक्ते भवति निश्चयः ॥

152. When a boy who is being instructed indistinctly utters 'ambā' 'ambā', those who know the correct form understand it through the indistinct one.

१५३. एवं[९३] साधौ प्रयोक्तव्ये योऽप[९४]भ्रंशः प्रयुज्यते ।
तेन साधुव्यवहितः कश्चिदर्थोऽभिधीयते ॥

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८९. त्वं तु—ख, घ.

90. This karika is not given in manuscript घ.

९१. नुमन्यन्ते—घ.

९२. णः प्रभाषते—क, ग.

93. This karika is not found in manuscript ग.

९४. योऽपशब्दः—ख.

153. Similarly, the meaning covered by a correct form is conveyed by an incorrect form which is used where the correct one ought to be.

१५४. पारम्पर्यादपभ्रंशा विगुणेष्वभिधातृषु ।
प्रसिद्धिमागता येषु तेषां साधुरवाचकः ॥

154. And where there are in current use, forms which have become current among corrupt speakers from generation to generation, in such cases, the correct form is not the one which conveys the meaning.

१५५. दैवी वाग्व्यतिकीर्णेयमशक्तैरभिधातृभिः ।
अनित्य[९५]दर्शिनां त्व[९६]स्मिन्वादे बुद्धिविपर्ययः ॥

155. This divine Speech (Sanskrit) has been intermixed with incorrect forms by incompetent speakers. Those who hold the view that the word is non-eternal, (for instance the Naiyāyikas), hold a contrary view on this.

१५६. [९७]उभयेषामविच्छेदे[९८]ऽप्यन्यशब्दविवक्षया ।
योऽन्यः प्रयुज्यते शब्दो न सोऽर्थस्याभिधायकः ॥

समाप्तम् प्रथमकाण्डम्

156. And even according to the view that there is no difference between correct and incorrect forms, (as held by the upholders of the doctrine of the non-eternal word') a word used with the intention of using some other word, does not convey the meaning of the latter.

End. Canto I

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९५. त्यवादिनां—ग.

९६. तस्मिन्—ग, घ.

97. Manuscripts ग and घ do not give this karika.

९८. च्छेदादन्यशब्दः—क.

द्वितीयकाण्डम्

Canto II

१. आख्यात[९९]शब्दः संघातो जातिः संघातवर्त्तिनी ।
एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो बुद्ध्यनुसंहृतिः[१००] ॥
२. पदमाद्यं पृथक्सर्वपदं[१०१] साकांक्षमित्यपि ।
वाक्यं प्रति मतिर्भिन्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम् ॥

1. Theorists hold different views as to what a sentence is. Thus a sentence is defined as (1) the verb (2) a close
2. combination of words (3) the universal which resides in a close combination of words (4) an utterance which is one and devoid of parts (5) a sequence (of words) (6) the transformation of consciousness (7) the first word (8) all the component words severally and possessing expectancy for one another.

३. निघातादिव्यवस्थार्थं शास्त्रे यत्परिभाषितम् ।
साका[१०२]ङ्क्षावयवं तेन न[१०३] सर्वं तुल्यलक्षणम् ॥

3. The definition of the sentence given in grammar (by the author of the Vārttika) to establish the dropping of accent,[36] etc., as an entity whose parts possess mutual expectancy, is not parallel (to that given by the Mīmāṃsakas) in all respects.

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९९. —तश्शब्दसं—घ

१००. —संहृतः ङ

१०१. सर्वं पदं घ

१०२. आकांक्षावयवं घ

१०३. स सर्वं घ

४. साकाङ्क्षावयवं भेदे परानाकाङ्क्षशब्दकम् ।
कर्मप्रधानं गुणवदेकार्थं शब्दमिष्यते ॥

4. (The Mīmāmsakas' definition of the sentence is incidentally given) :—
A sentence is one which has its parts possessing mutual expectancy when they are considered separately, but not possessing expectancy for anything else (outside) when in combination, which has the verb as its principal element, and has qualifying words and one unified meaning.

५. सम्बोधनपदं यच्च तत् क्रियाया विशेषकम् ।
व्रजानि देवदत्तेति निघातो ऽत्र तथा सति ॥

5. (Certain possible objections to the Vārttikakāra's definition of the sentence are answered in 5 & 6):—
The word in the vocative (in a sentence) qualifies the verb; this being so, in the sentence 'vrajāni Devadatta' (Let me go, Devadatta), the vocative loses its accent.[37]

६. यथानेकमपि क्त्वान्तं तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् ।
तथा तिङन्तं तत्राहुस्तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् ॥

6. Just as several infinitives can qualify a finite verb, similarly a finite verb (which, in such a case, is taken as a principal verb) can qualify another finite verb.

७. यथैक एव सर्वा[१०४]र्थप्रत्ययः प्रविभज्यते ।
दृश्यभेदानुकारेण वाक्यार्थानुगमस्तथा ॥

7. (The Akhaṇḍavādin's position that the sentence is an indivisible whole (definition 4 above) is stated and illustrated (7—12) :—

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१०४. सर्वार्थः प्रकाशे प्रवि—ङ
सर्वार्थप्रकाशः प्रभविज्यते घ

१०६. This reading प्रभविज्यते makes no sense. It may only be an error of the scribe for प्रविभज्यते. The reading however, is noted here sine the good variant प्रकाश is given in this manuscript.

Just as an unified perception of a composite (picture) can be analysed (into the perception of the component parts), depending upon which part is required to be perceived, so likewise is the understanding of the meaning of the sentence.

८. चित्रस्यैकस्वरूपस्य यथा भेदनिदर्शनैः ।
नीलादिभिः समाख्यानं क्रियते भिन्नलक्षणैः ॥

8. Just as a single homogeneous picture is described through various features as being blue (green, etc.) as a result of its being perceived in different ways,

९. तथैवैकस्य वाक्यस्य निराकांक्षस्य सर्वतः ।
शब्दान्तरैः समाख्यानं [१०७]साकाङ्क्षैरनुगम्यते ।

9. —similarly the sentence which is single and does not possess expectancy is described in terms of words which possess mutual expectancy.

१०. यथा पदे विभज्यन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादयः ।
अपोद्धारस्तदा वाक्ये पदानाम्[१०८] पवर्ण्यते ॥

10. Just as roots and suffixes are analysed from a word, similarly words are analysed from sentences.

११. वर्णान्तरसरूपं[१०९] च वर्णभागेषु दृश्यते ।
पदान्तरसरूपाश्च पदभागा[११०] अवस्थिताः ॥

11. Parts of some letters (like conjunct consonants) appear as separate letters (though, of course, it is well-known that it is artificial to look at them in that way); so do parts of the word appear as separate words (while in truth, they are not).

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१०७. आकाङ्क्षैरनु—ङ

१०८. —नामुपपद्यते घ

१०९. —सरूपत्वं ङ

११०. —गा इव स्थिताः –घ

१२. भागैरनर्थकैर्युक्ता वृषभोदकयावकाः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तु व्यवहारनिबन्धनम् ॥

12. The words 'vṛṣabha', 'udaka' and 'yāvaka' are composed of parts which do not possess any meaning. (It should also be noted that the rule on the association and (absence of) dissociation (between the word on the one hand and the root and suffix on the other) is only for pragmatic purposes.[38]

१३. शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति कुतोऽर्थस्य भविष्यति ।
विभागैः प्रक्रियाभेदमविद्वान् प्रतिपद्यते ॥

13. (Just as sentences, words, etc., are indivisible so are their meanings) :—
The Word has no parts; how then can its meaning have any parts? The ignorant person gets a different idea of its formation by splitting it into parts.

१४. ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद् ब्राह्मणकम्बले ।
देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैव स्युरनर्थकाः ॥

14. (This is illustrated) :—
Just as the idea of 'Brāhmaṇa' does not exist in the meaning of the word 'Brāhmaṇakambalam', similarly words like 'Devadatta' have no (independent) meaning in a sentence.[39]

१५. सामान्यार्थस्तिरोभूतो न विशेषेऽवतिष्ठते ।
उपात्तस्य कुतस्त्यागो निवृत्तः क्वावतिष्ठताम् ॥

15. (The Mīmāmsaka's definition of the sentence as a mere combination (samghāta) of words with mutual expectancy and syntactical relationship is criticised. This is the abhihitānvaya position). The word which possesses a general meaning disappears when uttered in a context, and therefore is not associated with a particular meaning (which the context demands). Why should the word which exists (namely, with a general meaning) be abandoned and how does a word thus abandoned continue to exist ?

१६. अशब्दो यदि वाक्यार्थः पदार्थोऽपि तथा भवेत् ।
एवं[111] च सति सम्बन्धः शब्दस्यार्थे न हीयते ॥

16. (If the fact of words being a collection, and being in syntactical relationship constitutes the sentence, then logically it is not words, but their combinedness, and syntactical relationship which convey meaning of the sentence. This leads to wrong positions). If the meaning of a sentence is not derived from the (component) words then the meaning of the word (itself) cannot be (considered as) derived from them (i.e., the component sounds in it). This being so, is not the word's relation with its meaning broken?

१७. विशेषशब्दाः केषाञ्चित्सामान्यप्रतिरूपकाः ।
शब्दान्तराभिसम्बन्धाद्व्यज्यन्ते प्रतिपत्तृषु ॥

17. (Definitions 7 and 8 of the sentence are stated. These are held by the anvitābhidhāna school of Mīmāmsakas). According to the view of certain thinkers, words which (at first sight) may appear to be universals are revealed to the listeners as being particulars because of their connection with the other words in the sentence.

१८क. तेषां तु कृत्स्नो वाक्यार्थः प्रतिभेदं समाप्यते ।
१८ख. व्यक्तोपव्यञ्जना सिद्धिरर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तृषु ॥

18a. According to their view, the total meaning of the sentence exists in each of the individual words.

18b. (But) listeners get the meaning of the sentence through the clear utterance of (all) the words in it.

१९. [112]अव्यक्तः क्रमवान् शब्दः उपांश्वयमधीयते ।
[113]अक्रमस्तु वितत्येव बुद्धिर्यत्रावतिष्ठते ॥

19. (The sentence and its meaning are again discussed from the point of view of the Akhaṇḍa-school of Grammar):—

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१११. एवं सति च सं—घ
११२. सव्यक्तः घ
११३. अर्थतस्तु घ

This Speech is described as indistinct, sequential or as uttered in a low voice. The non-sequential appears as being stretched out (ie. having sequence) when the mind dwells on it.

२०. यथा[११४]क्षेपविशेषेऽपि कर्मभेदो न गृह्यते ।
आवृत्तौ व्यज्यते जातिः कर्मभिर्भ्रमणादिभिः ॥

20. (Definition 3 of the sentence is stated; that it is a universal, (jātisphoṭa). This position is also the doctrinal position of the Akhaṇḍavādi—grammarians). Just as (in an action of whirling round and round) the character of the action is not understood at each of the repeated revolutions, but the class of the action is revealed through the repetition of revolutions,

२१. वर्णवाक्यपदेष्वेवं तुल्योपव्यञ्जना श्रुतिः ।
अत्यन्तभेदे तत्त्वस्य [११५]सरूपेव प्रतीयते ॥

21. —in the same way, in letters, words, and sentences the speech-sounds, being produced at the same centres as the Word-principle, appear to resemble it, although they are fundamentally different from it.

२२. नित्येषु तु कुतः पूर्वं परं वा परमार्थतः ।
एकस्यैव तु सा शक्तिर्यदेवमवभासते ॥

22. (This Speech, in reality, is timeless) Now, in reality, can there be a preceding and subsequent part in timeless entities? This appearance (of sequence) is a result of the powers inherent in the integral entity itself.

२३. चिरं क्षिप्रमिति ज्ञाने कालभेदादृते यथा ।
भिन्नकाले प्रकाशेते स धर्मो ह्रस्वदीर्घयोः ॥

23. Just as the cognitions 'a long time' and 'a short time' do not differ in time (because they are cognitions and not time-measures) and yet appear as if they have different durations of time, similar is the nature of the long and short (sounds).

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११४. यथोत्क्षेप—घ
११५. स्वरूपेव—घ

२४क. स[116] नित्यः परमात्राभिः कालो भेदमिवार्हति ।
२४ख. व्यावर्त्तनीनां मात्राणामभावे कीदृशः क्रमः ॥

24a. (But, can one say that an indivisible entity becomes multiple on the basis of the media of its revelation ? That would mean a change in its integrity. Yes):—
Does not time which is indivisible appear to be divided into periods by durations taken by other things (like an atom)?

24b. (But such measuring of time on the basis of the behaviour of other things is not sound) : what sequence can there be in the absence of recurring periods ?

२५क. ताभ्यो या जायते बुद्धि—
रेका सा[117] भागवर्त्तिनी ॥
२५ख. सा हि स्वशक्त्या भिन्नेव
क्रमप्रत्यवमर्शिनी

25a. The cognition arising from these (ie. periods measured on the basis of the behaviour of other things) is one without parts.

25b. It is due to the power inherent in it that sequence appears in it as if it has parts.

२६क. क्रमोल्लेखानुषङ्गेण
२६ख. तस्यां यद्बीजमाहितम् ।
तत्त्वनानात्वयोस्तस्य
निरुक्तिर्नावतिष्ठते ।

26a. This is because it can be described in terms of sequence.

26b. (This is wrong) :—
Whatever be the seeds (of the behaviour of atoms, etc.) laid in the mind, a description of it either as identified with

११६. न नि— घ, ङ
११७. एकाऽसौ भागवर्जिता ङ
सा भागवर्जिता घ

the mind or as different from it is impossible.

२७. भावनासमये त्वेतत् [११८]क्रमसामर्थ्यमक्रमम् ।
व्यावृत्तभेदो येनार्थो भेदवानुपलभ्यते ॥

27. The sentence which is (really) indivisible becomes capable of division when it is (analytically) conceived and due to this the meaning which is, in fact, indivisible, is presented to the mind as if it consisted of parts.

२८. पदानि वाक्ये तान्येव वर्णास्ते च पदे यदि ।
वर्णेषु वर्ण [११९]भागानां भेदः स्यात्परमाणुवत् ॥

28. If these words (which are abstracted by analysis) exist as real entities in a sentence and letters similarly exist in words then letters themselves should be capable of division, just as atoms are (according to some schools of thought divisible).

२९. भागानामनुपश्लेषान्न वर्णो न पदं भवेत् ।
तेषामव्यपदेश्यत्वात्किमन्यदपदिश्यताम् ॥

29. Since the identification of (self-sufficient) parts is not, any way, possible (in a letter) there would be neither letter nor (as a consequence) the word, (if we follow the position of the Pada-school). And when neither letter nor word can be established how can anything else (ie. meaning) be conveyed ?

३०. यदन्तःशब्दतत्त्वं तु [१२०]नादैरेकं प्रकाशितम् ।
तदाहुरपरे शब्दं तस्य वाक्ये तथैकता ॥

30. (The definition of the sentence as a transformation of consciousness (def. no. 6) is stated) :—
Others say that speech is that indivisible inner Word-principle revealed through speech-sounds; and thus too it possesses unity in the sentence.[40]

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११८. क्रमं साम—घ
११९. —र्णवाक्यानां ख, घ
१२०. भागैरे—घ

३१क. अर्थभागैस्तथा तेषामान्तरोऽर्थः प्रकाशते ।
३१ख. एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक्स्थितौ ॥

31a. According to them meaning is an inner principle which is revealed by means of pieces of (verbal) meaning.

31b. Speech and meaning being the two halves of one fact, are not distinct and separable.

३२. प्रकाशकप्रकाश्यत्वं कार्यकारणरूपता ।
अन्तर्मात्रात्मनस्तस्य शब्दतत्त्वस्य सर्वदा ॥

32. The power of being the revealer and the revealed, the cause and the effect, eternally belongs to the Word-principle which is essentially internal.

३३. तस्यैवास्तित्वनास्तित्वसामर्थ्ये समवस्थिते ।
अक्रमे क्रमनिर्भासे व्यवहारनिबन्धने ॥

33. It (ie. the time-less Word-principle) has in fact the two powers of having or not having (attributes like sequence), the appearance of sequence in the non-sequential being merely dependent on pragmatic considerations.

३४. सम्प्रत्ययप्रमाणत्वा[१२१]त्प्रमा[१२२]स्तित्वकल्पने ।
पदार्थाभ्युच्चये त्यागादानर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते ॥

34. (The following arguments are given against the Pada-school) :—Since (their) evidence for the existence of word-meaning (as a real unit in the meaning of the sentence) is its cognition, this will result in the meaninglessness of the preceding words in a collection of word-meanings (which is the meaning of the sentence, in this view), since the mind leaves (cognising them as it passes on to the meaning of subsequent words).[41]

३५क. राजशब्देन राजार्थो भिन्नरूपेण गम्यते ।
३५ख. वृत्तावाख्यातसदृशं पदमन्यत्र युज्यते ॥

35a. The form *rāja* conveys the meaning 'king' in different forms.[42]

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१२१. —णत्वे—घ
१२२. पदार्थास्तित्व—ङ

35b. And the same word 'rāja' occuring in a complex grammatical formation though similar to a verbal form is (nevertheless) employed in a different sense (from the verb).[43]

३६. यथाश्वकर्ण इत्युक्ते विनैवाश्वेन गम्यते ।
कश्चिदेव विशिष्टोऽर्थः सर्वेषु प्रत्ययस्तथा ॥

36. Just as, when the word '*aśvakarṇa*' is uttered a certain definite meaning which has no reference to '*aś'va*' (a horse) is conveyed (to the listener), the same is the case in all verbal cognitions.[44]

३७. वाक्ये त्वर्थान्तरगतेः सादृश्यपरिकल्पने ।
केषाञ्चिद्रूढिशब्दत्वं शास्त्र एवानुगम्यते ॥

37. (An objection against the akhaṇḍa-school: If the meanings of all compounds are realised as single units, does this not make the distinction between rūḍhi and yaugika (etymologically explained) words superflous ? No) :— In reckoning (the degree) of similarity (between a complex word-formation and the sentence analysing it) certain words, because of their transfer to another meaning in the sentence, are understood to be rūḍhi—but only in grammar.[45]

३८क. उपादा[१२३]यापि ये हेयास्तानुपायान् प्रचक्षते ।
३८ख. उपायानां च नियमो नावश्यमवतिष्ठते ॥

38a. (Grammarians) propound means (for the understanding of language) which, once grasped, can be thrown overboard.[46]

38b.) And there is nothing necessarily absolute in the methods (of grammatical analysis).

३९क. अर्थं कथञ्चित्पुरुषः कश्चित्संप्रतिपद्यते ।
३९ख. संसृष्टा वा विभक्ता वा भेदा वाक्यनिबन्धनाः ॥

39a.) The meaning is realised by a person in some manner.
39b. (Summing up:) :—Therefore (all meaning of) parts (of a sentence, like a word) are derived from the sentence, whether (such parts remain) as isolates or in combination.

१२३. —पादेया—घ

४०. सोयमित्यभिसम्बन्धो बुद्धया प्रक्रम्यते यथा[१२४] ।
वाक्यार्थस्य तदेकोऽपि वर्णः प्रत्यायकः क्वचित् ॥

40. When the unity between a sentence and its meaning is grasped by the mind—a unity expressible in the form 'this is that' then, in some places, a single letter of the sentence is sufficient to convey the meaning of the sentence.

४१. केवलेन पदेनार्थो यावानेवा[१२५]भिधीयते ।
वाक्यस्थं तावतोऽर्थस्य तदाहुरभिधायकम् ॥

४२. सम्बन्धे सति सत्त्वन्यदाधिक्यमुपजायते ।
वाक्यार्थमेव तं प्राहुरनेकपदसंश्रयम् ॥

41. (The concept of the meaning of the sentence according
42. to the (samghāta) theory of the Abhihitānvayavādi Mīmāmsakas is stated)
Words, say some, when used in a sentence convey the same meanings as they convey as isolates. And the additional meaning which arises when they are in mutual relation, is described by them as the meaning of the sentence—a meaning which is dependent on several words.[47]

४३. स त्वेकपदस्थोऽपि प्रतिभेदं समाप्यते ।
जातिवत्समुदायेऽपि संख्यावत्कल्प्यतेऽपरैः ॥

43. (According to some in this school) the meaning of the sentence although it resides in several words reveals itself through the individual words (in turn), just as a class (reveals itself through the particulars): Others hold that it is realised in the totality of words just as numbers are.

४४. सर्वभेदानुगुण्यं तु सामान्यमपरे विदुः ।
तदर्थान्तरसंसर्गाद्भजते भेदरूपताम् ।

44. (The Anvitābhidhāna position is stated) Others consider that it (ie, the meaning of the sentence) is a unified whole in which all the parts are mutually compatible and that it partakes of the character of the meanings of the parts

१२४. यदा ङ
१२५. —वगम्यते—घ

(ie., of the words) because of the association of the meaning of one part with that of another.[48]

४५. भेदानाकाङ्क्षतस्तस्य या परिप्लवमानता ।
अवच्छिनत्ति सम्बन्धस्तां विशेषे निवेशयन् ॥

45. As regards the uncertainty (as to the meaning of the sentence) while it is still requiring (other) parts for its completion, that is removed when the meaning is understood as localised in the individual parts thus revealing its nature of being a connected whole.

४६. कार्यानुमेयस्सम्बन्धो रूपं तस्य न दृश्यते[१२६] ।
असत्त्वभूतमत्यन्तमतस्तं प्रतिजानते ॥

46. (The meaning of the sentence is thus nothing more than the inter-connection of word-meanings. And being a connection it is not perceptible; it has to be inferred) The interconnection (of the parts) is inferrable from its effect (namely, the collection of words-meanings conveying a new sense). It has no form. Therefore it is known as being non-existent in the ultimate analysis.[49]

४७. नियतं साधने साध्यं क्रिया नियतसाधना ।
स सन्निधानमात्रेण नियमः सन्[१२७] प्रकाशते ॥

47. (The same point is further explained). The means being present, the effect is fixed; and a verbal action has a fixed means of accomplishment. Thus, the meaning of the sentence being something fixed reveals itself by the mere juxtaposition (of verb and object).

४८. गुणभावेन साकाङ्क्षं तत्र नाम प्रवर्तते ।
साध्यत्वेन निमित्तानि[१२८] क्रियापदमपेक्षते ॥

48. (But the expectancy resident in verbs and nouns is different from each other):—
The noun functions in this respect as possessing expectancy

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१२६. विद्यते—घ
१२७. संप्रकाशते—घ
१२८. —त्तादि—घ

for the verb in the form of a subsidiary and the verb possesses expectancy for its subsidiary (i.e, the noun) as a thing to be performed.

४९. सन्त एव विशेषा ये पदार्थेषु व्यवस्थिताः ।
ते क्रमादनुगम्यन्ते न वाक्यमभिधायकम् ॥

49. (The sentence is a sequence of words; definition no. 5) Those functional features which already exist in the meanings of the words (i.e, the features of being the subject, object, etc.) are conveyed (to the listener) by the sequence of words and there is nothing distinct as a sentence conveying them.

५०क. शब्दानां क्रममात्रे च नान्यः[१२९] शब्दोऽस्ति वाचकः ।
५०ख. क्रमोऽपि[१३०] धर्मः कालस्य तेन वाक्यं न विद्यते ॥

50a. As long as there is some sequence of words there is no need for any other speech-entity to convey the meaning.

50b. And sequence is an attribute of time and, therefore, there is no sentence.

५१. ये च सम्भविनो भेदाः[१३१] पदार्थेष्वविभाविताः ।
ते सन्निधाने व्यज्यन्ते न तु वर्णेष्वयं क्रमः ॥

51. The functional features which are inherent in the meanings of words, but which are not manifest are revealed when the words are in each other's proximity. But the same is not the case with the sequence of letters. (i.e., wordmeaning is not a revelation of meanings of letters).

५२क. वर्णानां च पदानां च क्रममात्रनिवेशिनी ।
पदाख्या वाक्यसंज्ञा च ॥

52a. 'Word' and 'sentence' are respectively the names given to the sequence which resides in letters and words.

१२९. —न्यशब्दो—घ

१३०. —मो हि—घ

१३१. भावाः—घ

५२ख. शब्दत्वं नेष्यते तयोः ॥

52b. (But) the status of a speech-entity (conveying a complete-meaning) is not given to them (i.e., to the letter and the word).

५३. समाने ऽपित्व[132] शब्दत्वे दृष्टः संप्रत्ययः पदात् ।
प्रतिवर्णं त्वसौ नास्ति पदस्यार्थमतो विदुः ॥

53. Even if they have thus equal status as non-speech-elements, understanding is seen to proceed from the word; and there is no such understanding at each separate letter. Hence they say that meaning belongs to the word.

५४. यथा सावयवा वर्णा विना वाच्येन केनचित् ।
अर्थवन्तः समुदिता वाक्यमप्येवमिष्यते ॥

54. (The three different definitions of the sentence just discussed are re-stated in the following three stanzas. First the samghāta-view is re-stated):—
Just as letters, and their parts, are devoid of meaning (by themselves), but are meaningful when combined, the same is the case with the sentence (in respect of its being a mere combination of words).

५५. अनर्थकान्युपायत्वात्पदार्थेनार्थवन्ति वा ।
क्रमेणोच्चरितान्याहुर्वाक्यार्थं भिन्नलक्षणम् ॥

55. (The sequence-view is re-stated) :—
Words which, by themselves, do not possess any meaning or alternatively (according to a different doctrine) are meaningful as means (to understand the meaning of the sentence) convey that meaning of the sentence when they are uttered in a sequence; and the meaning of the sentence thus conveyed is different in features from the meanings of the words.

५६. नित्यत्वे समुदायानां जातेर्वा परिकल्पने ।
एकस्यैवार्थतामाहुर्वाक्यस्याव्यभिचारिणीम् ॥

56. (The vākya-sphoṭa view is summarised) :—

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१३२. तु श—ख.

Whether we consider that the individual speech-unit (here a sentence) is imperishable or that there is a generic entity (which is common) to a group of particulars, it is the unitary sentence which is meaningful in an invariable manner.

५७क. अभेदपूर्वका भेदाः कल्पिता वाक्यवादिभिः ।
५७ख. भेदपूर्वानभेदांस्तु मन्यन्ते पददर्शिनः ॥

57a. Those who consider the sentence as an indivisible unit consider (the recognition of) words (in it) as pragmatic and as subsequent to indivisibility (in the order of reality).

57b. And those who take a word as a real entity consider the indivisible sentence as subsequent to words.

५८क. पदप्रकृतिभावश्च वृत्तिभेदेन वर्ण्यते ।
५८ख. पदानां संहिता योनिः संहिता वा पदाश्रया ॥

58a. The definition of a connected discourse (given in the Ṛgveda prātiśākhya) is explained in different ways.[49]

58b. (They are) :—
A connected discourse is the source of words or it is built up from words.

५९. पदाम्नायश्च यद्यन्यः संहिताया निदर्शकः ।
नित्यस्तत्र कथं कार्यं पदं लक्षणदर्शनात् ॥

59. (The second view is criticised) If the Pada-text being other (than the Samhita) is the original of the Samhita and is itself not created, how is the Pada-text to be constructed according to rule ? (how can that which is eternal be also constructed or created ?).

६०. प्रतिवर्णमसंवेद्यः पदार्थप्रत्ययो यथा[१३३] ।
पदेष्वेवमसंवेद्यं वाक्यार्थस्य निरूपणम् ॥

60. Just as one does not get the cognition of the meaning of the word at each one of its letters. similarly the form of the meaning of the sentence is not realised at each of the words (taken individually).

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१३३. यदा—घ

६१. वाक्यार्थः सन्निविशते पदेषु सहवृत्तिषु ।
यथा तथैव वर्णेषु पदार्थः सहवृत्तिषु ॥

61. (The Pada-school replies that letters are not after all meaningless) :—
Just as the meaning of the sentence resides in words occuring side by side, similarly the meaning of the word exists in letters occuring side by side.

६२. सूक्ष्मं ग्राह्यं[134] यथाऽन्येन संसृष्टं सह गृह्यते ।
वर्णोऽप्यन्येन वर्णेन सम्बद्धो वाचकस्तथा ॥

62. Just as a small object is perceived when it is in the company of another object, similarly a letter too when it is united with another letter, conveys a meaning.

६३क. पदस्योच्चारणादर्थो यथा कश्चिन्निरूप्यते ।
६३ख. वर्णानामपि सान्निध्यात्तथा सोऽर्थः प्रतीयते ॥

(Further it is against experience to say that a letter has no meaning) :—
63a. Just as a certain meaning is understood (by the listener)
63b. from the utterance of a word, similarly the same sense is understood (by the listener) from the presence of the letters.[50]

६४. प्राप्तस्य यस्य सामर्थ्यान्नियमार्था यतः[135] श्रुतिः ।
तेनात्यन्तं विशेषेण सामान्यं यदि बाध्यते ॥

64. (Again, five difficulties arise if the pada-position that the meaning of a sentence is understood through the meanings of the component words is not accepted. The first of which is discussed in 64-71) :—
Since the scriptural hearing of that which is (already) implicitly legitimate is for the purpose of restriction, if the general is completely ruled out by this very different particular,

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१३४. —क्ष्मग्राह्यं—घ

१३५. पुनः श्रु—घ

६५. यजेतेति यदा द्रव्यं प्राप्तं सामर्थ्यलक्षणम् ।
व्रीहिश्रुत्या निवर्त्तेत न स्यात्प्रतिनिधिस्तदा[१३६] ॥

65. —and if a substance (in general) legitimate as being indicated by the implicit power of the verb 'yajeta' were to be ruled out by the word 'vrīhi', then no substitution would be possible.[51]

६६. तस्माद् व्रीहित्वमधिकं व्रीहिशब्दः प्रकल्पयन् ।
द्रव्यत्वमविरुद्धत्वात्प्राप्त्यर्थः सन् न बाधते ॥

66. Therefore the word 'vrīhi', while prescribing rice in addition (to the general 'sacrificial substance' implied by the verb), being (simply) for the purpose of providing (the general concept with a particular meaning), does not prohibit substance (in general), since the two things are not mutually exclusive.

६७. तेन चापि व्यवच्छिन्ने द्रव्यत्वे सहचारिणि ।
असम्भवाद्विशेषाणां तत्रान्येषामदर्शनम् ॥

67. And when (the concept of) substance (in general) which is part of (the verbal concept) is particularised by it (i.e., by the word 'vrīhi'), there is then no appearance of other particulars, because of the impossibility (of two objects occupying the same logical space).

६८. न च सामान्यवत्सर्वे क्रियाशब्देन लक्षिताः ।
विशेषा न हि सर्वेषां सतां शब्दोऽभिधायकः ॥

68. The verb (like yajati=to sacrifice) does not indicate every particular substance (with which the sacrifice can be performed) as it does the idea of substance in general. A word, of course, does not denote (at one and the same time) every existent (which can be named by it).

६९. शुक्लादयो गुणाः सन्तो यथा तत्राविवक्षिताः ।
तथा ऽविवक्षा भेदानां द्रव्यत्वसहचारिणाम्[१३७] ॥

69. Just as the qualities 'white' etc., though they are existents,

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१३६. —धिस्तथा—घ

१३७. —व्यत्वसहचारिणी—घ

are not (immediately) intended to be conveyed (by the word 'vrīhi') so also all the various substances which are associated with the concept of substance are not intended in the context (by the verb 'yajati').

७०. असन्निधौ प्रतिनिधिर्मा भून्नित्यस्य कर्मणः ।
काम्यस्य वा प्रवृत्तस्य लोप [१३८]इत्युपदिश्यते ॥

70. A substitute is enjoined in the absence (of the normal material) so that the performance of a compulsory ceremony, or of an optional ceremony already undertaken may not be cut short.

७१. विशिष्टैव क्रिया येन वाक्यार्थः परिकल्प्यते ।
द्रव्याभावे प्रतिनिधौ तस्य तत्स्यात्क्रियान्तरम् ।

71. (But substitution will be impossible if the position that the meaning of the sentence is an integral whole is accepted).
According to him who considers that the meaning of the sentence is an action (i.e., the meaning of the verb) qualified by (or accomplished through the nominal agents viz, instruments, etc.), it would be a different action if the material is absent and a substitute is employed.

७२. विज्ञातार्थं पदं यच्च तदर्थे प्रतिपादिते ।
पिकादि यदविज्ञातं तत्किमित्यनुयुज्यते ॥

72. (Now the second of the five objections against the Akhaṇḍa-position is stated) :—
When (in a sentence like 'vanāt pika ānīyatām' in which there are familiar and unfamiliar words), the meaning of the familiar word (or words) is conveyed, the question 'what is it' is asked about words like 'pika' which are not familiar.[52]

७३. सामर्थ्यप्रापितं यच्च व्यक्त्यर्थमनुषज्यते ।
श्रुतिरेवानुषङ्गे[१३९] सा बाधिका लिङ्गवाक्ययोः ॥

73. (The third objection is stated) :—

१३८. —त्युपपद्यते—घ
१३९. —षङ्गेण—घ

If a thing which could be understood by implication (from a statement) is, nevertheless, stated for the sake of clarity then such direct statement supersedes the authority of syntactical connection and evidence stated elsewhere.

७४. अप्राप्तो यस्तु शुक्लादेः सन्निधानेन गम्यते ।
स यत्नप्रापितो वाक्ये श्रुतिधर्मविलक्षणः ॥

74. (As for the difference between direct statement and syntactical connection) when ideas like 'whiteness' are conveyed not directly (from a direct statement), but from the proximity (of the relevant word to other words in a sentence), such conveying of the idea through a syntactical connection is of a different nature from its being conveyed through a direct statement.[53]

७५. अभिन्नमेव वाक्यं तु यद्यभिन्नार्थमिष्यते ।
तत्सर्वं श्रुतिभूतत्वान्न श्रुत्यैव विरोत्स्यते ॥

75. If it is considered that a sentence is an indivisible whole conveying an indivisible meaning then since all (relations) are from a direct statement, there is no (question of any) conflict (of syntactical connection or anything else) with direct statement.[54]

७६. वाक्यानां समुदायश्च[१४०] य एकार्थप्रसिद्धये ।
साकाङ्क्षावयवस्तत्र वाक्यार्थोऽपि न विद्यते ॥

76. (The next objection against the Akhaṇḍa-position is stated :—
Where we have a group of clauses (as in a mahāvākya, i.e., a complex or compound sentence) all intended to build up one principal idea and having expectancy for one another, then there would not be any meaning for the component parts (if the Akhaṇḍa-position of the indivisible sentence conveying the indivisible meaning is accepted).

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१४०. —दायाच्च—घ

७७. प्रासङ्गिकमिदं कार्यमिदं तन्त्रेण[१४१] लभ्यते ।
इदमावृत्तिभेदाभ्यामत्र बाधास[१४२]मुच्चयौ ॥

77. (A fifth objection is raised against the Akhaṇḍa-position. The acceptance of the position will lead to the meaninglessness of the rules employed in interpreting Vedic texts in order to decide such questions as the sequence of sacrifices, the relation of subsidiary and principal actions and so on (77-87) :—
This (action) should be performed as an incidental one, while this (other) should be performed according to the principle of tantra (i.e., different forms being contained in a single form); (again) this action should be performed (by several persons) using the same means one after another, and this (other) action should be performed, each person using a separate means; there is (the operation of) sublation and combination in this place.

७८. ऊहोऽस्मिन् विषये न्याय्यः[१४३] सम्बन्धोऽस्य न बाध्यते।
सामान्यस्यातिदेशोऽयं विशेषो[१४४]ऽतिदिश्यते ॥

78. A substitution is valid here; and here the connection of the word (is carried on from one sentence to another); a transference of the general attributes of an object is in indicated here; and (in this other place) some special attributes are transferred (from one object to another).

७९. अर्थित्वमत्र सामर्थ्यमस्मिन्नर्थो न भिद्यते ।
शास्त्रात्प्राप्ताधिकारोऽयं व्युदासो ऽस्य क्रियान्तरे ॥

79. Here (a person's) need to do an action (is shown) and (in this other place) his competence (is indicated); in this third sentence), the object of the two (i.e., of the person's need and his competence) is the same;

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१४१. तर्केण—घ
१४२. बाधसमुच्चयौ—घ
१४३. न्यायः—घ
१४४. —षोऽत्रातिदि—घ, ङ

he (who performs the sacrifice mentioned here) has scriptural authority to do so; he has not the authority to perform (that) other action.

८०. इयं श्रुत्या क्रमप्राप्तिरियमुच्चारणादिभिः[१४५] ।
क्रमोयमत्र बलवानस्मिंस्तु न विवक्षितः ॥

80. The sequence here is fixed by direct statement; and in this, the sequence is fixed on the basis of pronunciation; the sequence, here, is powerful and no sequence is intended in this (other one).

८१. इदं पराङ्गसम्बद्धमङ्गानामप्रयोजकम् ।
प्रयोजकमिदं तेषामत्रेद नान्तरीयकम् ॥

81. This non-operative one among the accessories is connected (to the principal) through the other (operative) accessories; among them (i.e., the accessories), this is the one which effects the action and this (other) is incidental.

८२. इदं प्रधानं शेषोऽयं विनियोगक्रमस्त्वयम् ।
साक्षादस्योपकारीदमिदमाराद्विशेषकम् ॥

82. (Among the actions) this one is principal and this is subsidiary; and this is the order of performance of the two (actions). This means serves the action directly and this other indirectly.

८३. शक्तिव्यापारभेदोऽस्मिन्फलमत्र तु [१४६]विद्यते ।
सम्बन्धा[१४७]ज्जातभेदोऽयं भेदस्तत्राविवक्षितः ॥

83. The things mentioned here have different potentialities and functions; and the results (of the action mentioned here) vary; this (particular) object has changed due to its association (with something else); no distinction is intended in that (other) place.

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१४५. —दिति—घ
१४६. भिद्य—ङ
१४७. सम्बद्धात् घ

८४. प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधोऽयं पर्युदासो ऽयमत्र तु ।
इदं गौणमिदं मुख्यं व्यापीदं गुरुलघ्विदम् ॥

84. (Further, besides these rules of interpretation, there are also others which will be nullified by the Grammarian's position (84-86). They are :—This is the negation of a possible case; and this (other) is a prohibition of a particular thing without enjoining an alternative; this word has a secondary meaning and this other, a primary meaning; the scope of the meaning of the word here is wide; the method employed here is a complex one; in this other place a simple method is employed.

८५. भेदेनाङ्गाङ्गिभावो ऽस्य बहु[148]भेदं [149]विभज्यते ।
इदं नियम्यते ऽस्यात्र योग्यत्वमुपजायते ॥

85. "There is a divided relation of whole and parts in this sentence and an option of different things (in this other context); a restriction is enjoined here; and here the appropriateness of another thing is stated.

८६. अस्य वाक्यान्तरे दृष्टाल्लिङ्गाद्भेदो ऽनुमीयते ।
अयं शब्दादपोद्धृत्य पदार्थः प्रविभज्यते ॥

86. The specification of this thing is inferred from the evidence of another sentence; the meaning of this word is obtained by analysis, after the word itself is detached from (the context of) its usage.

८७. इति वाक्येषु ये धर्माः पदार्थोपनिबन्धनाः ।
सर्वे ते न प्रकल्प्येरन् पदं चेत्स्यादवाचकम् ॥

87. The above-mentioned methods of exposition in sentences based on the meaning of words would not have been considered if a word were not a meaning-expressing agent.

८८. अविभक्तेऽपि वाक्यार्थे शक्तिभेदादपोद्धृते ।
वाक्यान्तरविभागेन यथोक्तं न विरुध्यते ॥

88. (The criticisms of the Padavādin are now answered):— The objections raised (by the Padavādin) do not con-

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१४८. —हुधेदं—घ
१४९. विकल्प्यते—ङ

tradict (our position) because (we concede that) the meaning of the sentence which is an undivided whole lends itself to division along the (lines of) the included clauses on the basis of its different aspects.

८९. यथैवैकस्य गन्धस्य भेदेन परिकल्पना ।
पुष्पादिषु तथा वाक्येऽप्यर्थभेदोऽभिधीयते ॥

89. Just as a single composite scent is analysed into (the component elements such as) the smell of flowers, etc. in the same way are different meanings (as meanings of clauses, phrases and words) pointed out in the sentence.[55]

९०. गवये नरसिंहे वाप्येकज्ञानावृते[१५०] यथा ।
भागं जात्यन्तरस्यैव सदृशं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

90. (The objection regarding words like 'pika' is answered) :— Just as in a Bos gavaeus or a man-lion which is the object of an integral cognition, a part of it assumes resemblance with another species.[56]

९१. अप्रसिद्धं तु यम्भागमदृष्टमनुपश्यति ।
तावत्त्वसं[१५१]विदं मूढः सर्वत्र प्रतिपद्यते ॥

91. —and when an ignorant person perceives that certain parts (of the Bos gavaeus etc.) have not been seen by him before and are unknown to him, he is (really) having an absence of understanding of the whole.

९२. तथा पिकादियोगेन वाक्येऽत्यन्तविलक्षणे ।
सदृशस्येव संज्ञानमसतो ऽर्थस्य मन्यते ॥

92. Similarly, when, by the use of words like 'pika' the sentence has become totally different, (the ignorant person) imagines to see in it something which resembles a meaning which (in fact) does not exist there.

९३. एकस्य भागे सादृश्यं भागे भेदश्च लक्ष्यते ।
निर्भागस्य प्रकाशस्य निर्भागेनैव चेतसा ॥

93. Just as light and the mind which are both integral and

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१५०. नाकृते—घ

१५१. —वत्यसं—घ

partless are found to be similar to each other in certain respects, and dissimilar in other respects,

९४. तथैव भागे सादृश्यं भागे भेदोऽवसीयते ।
भागाभावेऽपि वाक्यानामत्यन्तं भिन्नधर्मणाम् ॥

94. —similarly sentences which (in reality) are integral wholes are imagined to be similar to each other in certain parts and dissimilar from each other in certain other parts.

९५. रूपनाशे पदानां स्यात्कथं चावधिकल्पना ।
अगृहीतावधौ शब्दे कथमर्थो विविच्यते ॥

95. (The Akhaṇḍavādin now criticises the Padavādin) :— When the forms of words are impaired (in junctions) how can the boundaries of the word be determined ? And without determining the boundaries of the word how can its meaning be identified ?

९६. संसर्ग इव रूपाणां शब्देऽन्यत्र व्यवस्थितः ।
नानारूपेषु[१५२] तद्रूपं तन्त्रेणा[१५३]परमिष्यते ॥

96. (The objection based on sentences like 's'veto dhāvati' is answered) :—
Another school (i.e., another section of the Akhaṇḍa school) holds the view that in a form (like śveto), there is the conjunction, so to speak, of several forms and that the one form (rather than the other) is preferred among the various possible forms on the basis of tantra (i.e., different forms being contained in a combined form).

९७. तस्मिन्नभेदे भेदानां संसर्ग इव[१५४] वर्तते ।
रूपं रूपान्तरात्तस्मादनन्यत्प्रविभज्यते ॥

97. There is, so to speak, in the one undifferentiated form the coalescence of different words; and hence the one required form though outwardly identical (with others) can be distinguished (by contextual factors).

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१५२. —पेण—घ

१५३. —ण परमि—घ

१५४. —र्गं उपवर्त्तं—घ

९८. शास्त्रे प्रत्यायकस्यापि क्वचिदेकत्वमाश्रितम् ।
प्रत्याय्ये[१५५] तु क्वचिद्भेदो ग्राह्यग्रहणयोः स्मृतः[१५६] ॥

98. (The following few stanzas discuss, incidentally, the problem whether a meaning and that which conveys the meaning are identical or different) :—
In one grammatical statement the view is held that there is identity between that which expresses a meaning, and the meaning expressed; while in some other places it is stated that there is no such identity.

९९क. ऊ इत्यभेदमाश्रित्य यथासंख्यं प्रकल्पितम् ।
९९ख. लृङ्लृटोर्ग्रहणे भेदो ग्राह्याभ्यां [१५७]परिकल्पितः ॥

99a. Thus by the use of the identity-principle the sound 'ū' is used to indicate the three kinds of u-sounds, the short, the long and the prolated.[58]

99b. In symbolising lṛṅ and lṛṭ (by the sound lṛ) there is a difference (in numbers) assumed between the symbolised (and the symbol).[59]

१००. यस्येत्येतदणो रूपं संज्ञिनामभिधायकम् ।
न हि प्रतीयमानेन ग्रहणस्याऽस्ति सम्भवः ॥

100. The form 'yasya' which is (genitive of yam-combined form of 'a' and 'i') expresses those symbolised by it (namely, the vowels 'a' and 'i' short or long). No understanding of a thing is possible as conveyed by something which is itself 'a symbolised'.

१०१. ऊ इत्येतदभिन्नं च भिन्नवाक्यनिबन्धनम् ।
भेदेन ग्रहणं चास्य[१५८] पररूपमिव द्वयोः ॥

101. This sound 'ū' (prolated) which is non-different from the sounds of which it is the symbol, is also the basis of the different sentences (into which the original sūtra is analysed). It is understood in two ways just as a pararūpa is in regard to two meanings.[60]

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१५५. —य्येन क्व—घ
१५६. —योः स्थितः—घ
१५७. भ्यां सहकल्पितः—घ
१५८. —णं यस्य—घ

१०२. प्लुतस्याङ्गविवृद्धिं च समाहारमचोस्तथा ।
व्युदस्यता पुनर्भेदः शब्देष्वत्यन्तमाश्रितः ॥

102. (The view held by Kātyāyana the author of the Vārttika :— He (i.e., the author of the Vārttika), who rules that (1) the component parts of a prolated diphthong are themselves not prolated and (2) that a conjunction of vowels (with udātta and anudātta tones) is not a svarita-vowel, has (thus) adopted the position that there is an ultimate distinction among speech-sounds (i.e., that for instance, there is no numerical parity between the component-elements in the word 'śveto' on the one hand and the word itself in the sentence 'śveto dhāvati')

१०३. अर्द्धर्चादिषु शब्देषु रूपभेदः क्रमाद्यथा ।
तन्त्रात्तथैकशब्दत्वे भिन्नानां श्रुतिरन्यथा ॥

103. Just as in words like 'ardharca', a form is (assumed by the component elements) different (from their forms while in the analysed sentence), due to the difference in their sequence (of occurence), so likewise, even when a word remains the same, there is the (discriminative) hearing of different words from it.

१०४. संहिताविषये[१५९] वर्णाः स्वरूपेणाविकारिणः ।
शब्दान्तरत्वं यान्तीव शक्त्यन्तरपरिग्रहात् ॥

104. Letters which themselves are unchanging appear to become different ones when in combination because they assume different capacities.

१०५. इन्द्रियादिविकारेण दृष्टं ग्राह्येषु वस्तुषु ।
आत्मत्यागादृते भिन्नं ग्रहणं स क्रमः श्रुतौ ॥

105. It is observed about objects that, without their giving up their real nature, they are perceived as different due to changes in the perceiving sense organs (and other factors like the angle of vision). The same is the case with heard sounds (i.e. the same sound is heard in different forms in combinations and the like).

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१५९. —षया व—घ

१०६. अभिधानक्रिया[१६०] भेदाच्छब्देष्वविकृतेष्वपि ।
रूपमत्यन्तभेदेन तदेवैकं प्रकाशते ॥

106. (When words are uttered in combination) even though they remain intrinsically unchanged, a form will be heard at the very same time, as absolutely different due to the changed manner of pronunciation.

१०७. ऋचो वा गीतिमात्रं वा साम द्रव्यान्तरं न तु ।
[१६१]गीतिभेदाद्विगृह्यन्ते ता एव विकृता ऋचः ॥

107. (How does this apply to the Vedas ?) :—
The Sāma-verses are either only the Ṛk-verses or only the music. It is not a different entity altogether. And the same Ṛk-verses are heard as altered, due to the difference through the music.

१०८. उपायाच्छ्रुतिसंहारे भिन्नानामेकशेषिणाम् ।
तन्त्रेणोच्चारणे तेषां शास्त्रे साधुत्व[१६२]मिष्यते ॥

108. When there are forms which are different among themselves, but have one of them capable of including the others, the texts concede that they are valid in that manner of combined utterance.

१०९. परिल[१६३]भ्य श्रुतिं चैकं[१६४] रूपं[१६५] भेदवतामपि ।
तन्त्रेणोच्चारणं कार्यमन्यथा ते न साधवः ॥

109. (Therefore in a situation of this kind) words, even though they are different from each other should be uttered with a common form of utterance. If used otherwise they are not valid.

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१६०. —या योगाच्छ—ङ
१६१. रीतिभेदं तु गृह्यन्ते—घ
१६२. —त्वमुच्यते—घ
१६३. —रिगृह्य—घ
१६४. चैकां—ङ—
१६५. रूपभेद—घ

११०. सरूपाणां च वाक्यानां शास्त्रेण[166] प्रतिपादितम् ।
तन्त्रेणोच्चारणादेकं रूपं साध्वुपलभ्यते ॥

110. Sentences which are similar to each other get a common valid form which is prescribed by the texts, when they are uttered with a common form of utterance.

१११. एकस्यानेकरूपत्वं नालिकादिपरिग्रहात् ।
यथा तथैव तत्र स्यात् बहूनामेकरूपता ॥

111. Just as one (wind) takes various forms depending on how it is received (i.e.) by a flute or by other musical instrument, similarly in the present instance various forms can take a common form.

११२. यथा पदसरूपाणां वाक्यानां सम्भवः पृथक् ।
तथा वाक्यान्तराभावे स्यादेषां पृथगर्थता ॥

112. (The Pada-school's objections regarding subsidiary clauses (stanza 76) is answered) :—
Again, clauses do exist and they can be compared to words; at the same time they will have independent meanings, if there were not another sentence (of which they form parts).

११३. अभिधेयः पदस्यार्थो वाक्यस्यार्थः प्रयोजनम् ।
यस्य तस्य न सम्बन्धो वाक्यानामुपपद्यते ॥

113. (In this connection the Mīmāmsaka view that "purpose" is the significance of a sentence is criticised with special reference to the problem of the subsidiary clauses) :—
He who holds that meaning belongs to the word and that the significance of the sentence is its purpose cannot consistently admit any kind of relation between subsidiary clauses.

११४. तत्र क्रियापदान्येव व्यपेक्षन्ते परस्परम् ।
क्रियापदानुषक्तस्य[167] सम्बन्धोऽतः प्रतीयते ॥

114. (This argument is refuted and possibility of recognising

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१६६. —स्त्रेणाप्रति—घ

१६७. क्तस्तु सम्वद्धोऽर्थः—घ
—क्तश्च—ङ

subsidiary clauses is discussed from the angle of the Anvitābhidhāna view of the Mīmāmsakas) :—
It is the verbs (in the subsidiary clauses) which expect each other. Therefore a mutual relation is seen (among them), as based on the verbs.

११५. आवृत्तिरनुवादो वा पदार्थव्यक्तिकल्पने ।
प्रत्येकं तु समाप्तोऽर्थः सहभूतेषु वर्तते ॥

115. (An objection about the Anvitābhidhāna view is answered in this connection):—
Repetition (of the meaning of the sentence conveyed by the first word, in subsequent words), is a repetition for the sake of defining the meanings of the (individual) words. The meaning of the sentence which is completed in the individual words (thus) resides in the collection.

११६क. अविकल्पे[१६८]ऽपि वाक्यार्थे विकल्पा भावनाश्रयाः ।
११६ख. अत्राधिकरणे वादाः पूर्वेषां बहुधा मताः[१६९] ॥

116a. Even though the meaning of the sentence did not vary, various different views, as discussed in this section, were
116b. held on it by the ancient teachers, depending on their (various) conceptions.

११७. अभ्यासात्प्रतिभाहेतुः शब्दः सर्वोऽपरैः[१७०] स्मृतः ।
बालानां च तिरश्चां च यथार्थप्रतिपादने ॥

117. (The Akhaṇḍa-position on the meaning of the sentence is stated) —
Others held that the total utterance caused instantaneous mental conception as a result of practice just as in the matter of conveying a meaning to children or animals.

१६८.—कल्पितवाक्या—घ

१६९. गताः—ङ

१७०. सर्वशब्दोऽपरै घ

११८. अनागमश्च सोऽभ्यासः समयः कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
अनन्तरमिदं कार्यमस्मादित्युपदर्शनम्[१७१] ॥

118. Some consider this practice to be a convention which has existed from times immemorial and it imparts the knowledge of the kind "after this, this should be done."

११९. अस्त्यर्थः सर्वशब्दानामिति प्रत्याय्यलक्षणम् ।
अपूर्वदेवतास्वर्गैः सममाहुर्गवादिषु ॥

119. (Granting the Khaṇḍavādin's position that the meaning of the sentence is built up by the meaning of words, different views are now given on what word-meaning is, and how it is conveyed) "Words all have a (general) meaning"—such a definition of the meaning of the word has been put forth by some, as being applicable as much to words like "gauḥ" as to words like "apūrvam" "devatā" and "svargaḥ".

१२०. प्रयोग[१७२]दर्शनाभ्यासादाकारावग्रहस्तु यः ।
न स शब्दस्य विषयः स हि यत्नान्तराश्रयः ॥

120. What understanding of the form of an object is obtained through the use of a word, through seeing the object and through repeating the act of connecting the two, that is due to these other efforts; it does not pertain exactly to the field of the function of the word.

१२१. केचिद्भेदाः प्रकाश्यन्ते शब्दैस्तदभिधायिभिः ।
अनुनिष्पादिनः कांश्चिच्छब्दार्थ[१७३] इति मन्यते ॥

121. (Another view about the denotation of words is stated) :— Some differentiating features (of the object like the universal residing in it) are conveyed by the word as its signification; while some others which are incidental are (also) taken to be the meaning of the word.

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१७१. —शंकः—घ

१७२. —योगादृर्श—ङ

१७३. —ब्दार्थान् ङ—घ

१२२. जातिप्रत्यायके शब्दे या व्यक्तिरनुषङ्गिणी ।
न तान् व्यक्तिगतान् भेदान् जातिशब्दोऽवलम्बते ॥

122. (This view is criticised) :—
When the idea of an individual attaches itself to the word whose meaning is the universal, that class-word does not denote the particular features of the individual.

१२३. घटादीनां न चाकारान् प्रत्याययति वाचकः ।
वस्तुमात्रनिवेशित्वात्तद्गतिर्नान्तरीयकी ॥

123. The word does not denote the shape (and such other attributes) of objects like pots, because words denote only the mere object (divested of its attributes). The attributes are conveyed incidentally.

१२४. क्रिया विना प्रयोगेण न दृष्टा शब्दचोदिता ।
प्रयोगस्त्वनुनिष्पादी शब्दार्थ इति मन्यते ॥

124. (An example of the incidental expression of an idea by a word is given) :—
An action enjoined by a word (i.e., by a verb) is never seen except as accompanied by those which bring it into being (like agent, instrument, etc). The idea of this relation of the action with agent, etc., is an incidental meaning of the word (while the action itself is its meaning).

१२५. नियतास्तु प्रयोगा ये नियतं यच्च साधनम् ।
तेषां शब्दाभिधेयत्वमपरैरनुगम्यते ॥

125. (Still another view about the denotation of a word is stated) :—
Whatever relations (of the verb with agent etc.) are constant, and whatever instruments (agent, etc.) are constant, they form part of the (directly conveyed) meaning of the word according to others.

१२६क. समुदायोऽभि[१७४]धेयः स्यादविकल्पसमुच्चयः ।
१२६ख. असत्यो वाऽपि संसर्गः शब्दार्थः कैश्चिदिष्यते ॥

126a. (A fourth view is stated) :—

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१७४. —योऽभिधेयो वाप्यवि—घ

The word denotes the totality of the attributes of the object (and it denotes it) neither as members one after the other nor as an addition.[61]

126b. (A fifth view is given) :—

Some think that a word denotes an association (of the object with the universal, etc.)—an association which is unreal.

१२७क. असत्योपाधि यत्सत्यं तद्वा शब्दनिबन्धनम् ।

१२७ख. शब्दो वाप्यभिजल्पत्व[१७५]मागतो याति वाच्यताम् ॥

127a. (The sixth view) :—

Or Reality revealed through (the flux of) the Unreal is what the word denotes.

127b. (The seventh view) :—

Or the word (falsely) assumes the character of being produced and becomes (its own) meaning.

१२८. सोऽयमित्यभिसम्बन्धाद्रूपमेकीकृतं यदा ।
शब्दस्यार्थेन तं शब्दमभिजल्पं प्रचक्षते ॥

128. When a word has its form identified with its meaning in the manner which can be described as 'this (i.e., the word) is that' (i.e, the meaning), then the word is considered as 'produced'.

१२९. तयोरपृथगात्मत्वे रूढे[१७६]रव्यभिचारिणि ।
किञ्चिदेव क्वचिद्[१७७]द्रव्यं प्राधान्येनावतिष्ठते ॥

129. Although (in theory) the identity of a word and the thing denoted by it is invariable, in some places (both in ordinary and textual usage) one of them does stand out as prominent.

१३०क. लोकेऽर्थरूपतां शब्दः प्रतिपन्नः प्रवर्त्तते ।

१३०ख. शास्त्रे तूभयरूपत्वं प्रविभक्तं विवक्षया ॥

130a. (In life the thing denoted is more prominent) :—

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१७५. —जन्य—ख, ङ
१७६. —ढिस्य—घ
१७७. —द् रूपं—घ

130a. In life the word functions by becoming identified with the thing denoted by it.

130b. In grammar words are studied as divided into both kinds (namely those which convey an external object as their meaning, and those which convey their own form as meaning).

१३१. अशक्तेः सर्वशक्तेर्वा शब्दैरेव प्रकल्पिता ।
एकस्यार्थस्य नियता क्रियादिपरिकल्पना ॥

131. (The eighth and the ninth views regarding what a word denotes) :—
Something (for instance, an action) which might be looked upon either as having powers of all kinds or as having no power of any kind, is so described (as an action etc.) invariably through words.

१३२. यो वार्थो बुद्धिविषयो बाह्यवस्तुनिबन्धनः ।
स बाह्य[१७८]वस्त्विति ज्ञातः शब्दार्थः[१७९] कैश्चिदिष्यते ॥

132. (The tenth view) :—
A conception formed about an external object is (erroneously) understood to be the object and considered as the connotation of the word by some people.[62]

१३३. आकारवन्तः संवेद्या [१८०]व्यक्तस्मृतिनिबन्धनाः ।
ये ते प्रत्यवभासन्ते संविन्मात्रं [१८१]त्वतोऽन्यथा ॥

133. (The eleventh view) :—
Some words present meaning as comprising the (detailed) appearance (of the objects) and as producing their vivid recollection; Others, present it as a mere indefinite idea.

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१७८. —ह्यं वस्त्वि—घ

१७९. —र्थं इति गम्यते घ

१८०. व्यक्तिस्मृ—घ

१८१. ततोऽन्यथा—घ

१३४. यथेन्द्रियं सन्निपतद्वैचित्र्येणोपदर्शकम् ।
तथैव शब्दादर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिरनेकधा ॥

134. (The twelfth view) :—
Just as a defective sense-organ reveals an object in an unusual form, similarly meaning is understood from words in various different forms.

१३५ वक्त्रान्यथैव प्रक्रान्तो भिन्नेषु प्रतिपत्तृषु ।
[182]स्वप्रत्ययानुकारेण शब्दार्थः प्रविभज्यते ॥

135. (Thus) a word-meaning intended in a certain way by a speaker takes different shapes in different hearers depending upon the comprehension of each.

१३६. एकस्मिन्नपि दृश्ये ऽर्थे दर्शनं भिद्यते पृथक् ।
कालान्तरे[183] ऽपि वै[184]कोऽपि तं पश्यत्यन्यथा पुनः ॥

136. Although the same object is perceived, its perception varies (from person to person). Again, even the same person perceives the same object in a different form on another occasion.

१३७. एकस्यापि च शब्दस्य निमित्तैरव्यवस्थितैः ।
एकेन बहुभिश्चार्थो बहुधा परिकल्प्यते ॥

137. The same person (at different times), and different persons, understand the meaning of the same word in different forms due to the changing conditions of understanding.

१३८. तस्माददृष्टतत्त्वानां सापराधं बहुच्छलम् ।
दर्शनं वचनं[185]चापि नित्यमेवा[186]नवस्थितम् ॥

138. Therefore, both the comprehension and report of people who have not seen the truth (about things) are defective, unreliable and perpetually inconsistent.

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१८२. सप्र—ङ
१८३. —न्तरेण घ, ङ
१८४. चैको—घ
१८५. वापि—घ
१८६. —मेवाव्यव—घ

१३९. ऋषीणां दर्शनं यच्च तत्त्वे किञ्चिदवस्थितम् ।
न तेन व्यवहारो ऽस्ति न तच्छब्दनिबन्धनम् ॥

139. (Nor can we stabilise meaning and usage on the basis of the vision of sages) :—
That vision of the sages which is based on Reality cannot be put to ordinary use; their vision is not linked with words.

१४०. तलवद् दृश्यते व्योम खद्योतो हव्यवाडिव ।
[१८७]नैव चास्ति तलं व्योम्नि न खद्योते[१८८] हुताशनः ॥

140. (Nor can any reliance be placed on the perceptions of people) :—
The sky is seen as a surface, and the glow-worm seen as a (spark of) fire; but there is no surface in the sky nor any fire in the glow-worm.

१४१. तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षमप्यर्थं विद्वानीक्षेत युक्तितः ।
न दर्शनस्य प्रामाण्यात् दृश्यमर्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥

141. Therefore a wise man should see through (the eye of) logic even a thing which he perceives with his eye. Let him not determine a thing on the evidence of his (physical) perception.

१४२. असमाख्येयतत्त्वानामर्थानां लौकिकैर्यथा ।
व्यवहारे समाख्यानं तत्प्राज्ञो न विकल्पयेत् ॥

142. When pragmatic people give pragmatic descriptions of things whose essential nature is beyond words, the wise man does not take them (as statements of reality).

१४३. विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽन्यैव जायते ।
वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम् ॥

143. The meaning of the sentence as a flash of insight (pratibhā) is described) :—

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१८७. न चेन्नास्ति ख
१८८. —द्योतो हु—घ

When the word-meanings in a sentence are detached (from out of the sentence) and (thus) understood, a different flash of insight is produced (out of it). That (flash of insight) presented by the word-meanings is described as the meaning of the sentence.

१४४. इदं तदिति सान्येषामनाख्येया कथञ्चन ।
प्रत्यात्म[१८९]वृत्तिसिद्धा सा कर्त्राऽपि न निरूप्यते ॥

144. It is by no means describable to others in such terms as "it is like this". Having been formed from the function of one's inner self, its nature is not known even to the person.

१४५. उपश्लेषमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता ।
[१९०]सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्तते ॥

145. It effects the fusion of the (individual) word-meanings, without itself being logically thought out, and it is comprehended as seemingly taking the form of the collection (of the word-meanings).[63]

१४६. साक्षाच्छब्देन जनितां भावनानुगमेन वा ।
इतिकर्तव्यतायां तां न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ॥

146. In the matter of the knowledge of what to do, no one trangresses it (i.e. this flash of insight) which is either produced directly from speech or is a result of recollection.

१४७. प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनु[१९१]पश्यति
समारम्भाः [१९२]प्रतीयन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥

147. The whole world looks upon it as authority (for their conduct). Even in animals the knowledge of the beginning of behaviour dawns by virtue of it.

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१८९. —त्यर्थवृत्ति—घ

१९०. सारूप्य—घ.

१९१. नुगच्छति—घ

१९२. प्रताय—घ

१४८. यथा द्रव्यविशेषाणां परिपाकैरयत्नजाः ।
मन्दादिशक्तयो दृष्टाः प्रतिभास्तद्वतां तथा ॥

148. Just as qualities like softness are seen to belong to particular objects without further effort by virtue of their ripeness alone, so is the flash of insight in those who possess it.

१४९. स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य कः ।
जन्त्वादयः कुलायादिकरणे केन[१९३] शिक्षिताः ॥

149. Who alters the note of the cuckoo in the spring? By whom are creatures taught to make nests and so on?

१५०. आहारप्रीत्यभिद्वेषप्लवनादिक्रियासु कः ।
जात्यन्वयप्रसिद्धासु प्रयोक्ता मृगपक्षिणाम् ॥

150. Who directs animals and birds in functions like eating, loving, hating and leaping which are well known to each species or family.

१५१. भावनानुगता[१९४]देतदागमादेव जायते ।
आसत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामागमस्तु विशिष्यते ॥

151. And this (flash of insight) arises from precepts accompanied by recollection. The precept is qualified by either proximity or distance. (That is, it may be of the near past, or of ancient times).

१५२. स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादृष्टोपपादिता ।
विशिष्टोपहिता चेति प्रतिभां षड्विधां विदुः ॥

152. That flash of insight is considered to be of six kinds, as obtained (1) by nature (2) by action (3) by practice (4) by meditation (5) by invisible causes and (6) as handed down by the wise.

१५३. यथा संयोगिनि द्रव्यैः लक्षितेऽर्थे प्रयुज्यते ।
गोशब्दो न त्वसौ तेषां विशेषाणां प्रकाशकः ॥

153. (A discussion of the division of words as primary and

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१९३. शिक्षिताः कथम्—घ

१९४. —गमाते—घ

secondary depending on the meaning conveyed is given) Just as the word "gauḥ" is applied to an object which is in conjunction with and recognisable by, (other) material things, but the word (itself) does not denote those (material things) which (so) qualify (the object),[64]

१५४. आकारवर्णावयवैः संसृष्टेषु गवादिषु ।
शब्दः प्रवर्त्तमानोऽपि न तानङ्गीकरोत्यसौ ॥

154. —(similarly) although a word functions as denoting an object, which is associated with shape, colour and parts, it does not denote these (as part of its meaning).

१५५. संस्थानवर्णावयवैर्विशिष्टे[१९५] य प्रयुज्यते ।
शब्दो न तस्यावयवे प्रवृत्तिरुपलभ्यते ॥

155. (However), words (signifying colour, etc.) employed to refer to an object qualified by shape, colour and parts, do not denote those (qualifying) constituents alone.

१५६. दुर्लभं कस्यचिल्लोके सर्वावयवदर्शनम् ।
कैश्चित्त्ववयवैर्दृष्टैरर्थः कृत्स्नोऽनुमीयते ॥

156. The perception of all parts of any object is rare in this world; from some perceived parts, the whole is inferred.

१५७. [१९६]यथा जात्युत्पलादीनां गन्धेन सहचारिणाम्[१९७] ।
नित्यसम्बन्धिनां दृष्टं गुणानामवधारणम् ॥

157. —just as we see that through the instrumentality of the scent of a jasmine, or of a lotus flower, the accompanying qualities (of shape, colour, etc.), which are invariably associated with the scent, are also apprehended.

१५८. संख्याप्रमाणसंस्थाननिरपेक्षः प्रवर्त्तते ।
बिन्दौ च समुदाये च वाचकः सलिलादिषु ॥

158. The word ("water") functions as denoting water—whether it is a drop or a mass—without reference to attributes, number, quantity and location.

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१९५. —शिष्टो यः—ख
१९६. त—घ
१९७. —रिणा घ

१५९. संस्कारादिपरिच्छिन्ने तैलादौ यो व्यवस्थितः।
आर्हकदेशं[१९८] तत्त्वेन तस्यावयववर्तिता[१९९] ॥

159. But words which function as denoting oil, etc., which are delimited by (attributes like) refinement, denote quantities of it and such words do in fact function in relation to parts.

१६०. येनार्थेनाभिसम्बद्धमभिधानं प्रयुज्यते ।
तदर्थापगमे तस्य प्रयोगो[२००] विनिवर्तते ॥

160. A word withdraws from functioning when separated from that meaning linked to which it has been used.

१६१. यांस्तु सम्भविनो धर्मानन्तर्णीय प्रयुज्यते ।
शब्दस्तेषां न सान्निध्यं नियमेन व्यपेक्षते ॥

161. Whatever non-permanent distinctions a word might be used to imply (in the object it denotes) the word does not necessarily require their presence for its operation.

१६२. यथा रोमशफादीनां व्यभिचारेऽपि दृश्यते ।
गोशब्दो न तथा जातेर्विप्रयोगे प्रवर्त्तते ॥

162. Just as the word "gauḥ" is seen (functioning) even in the absence of horn, hoof, etc., (in the animal it is used for), it does not likewise, function dissociated from the universal.

१६३. तस्मात्सम्भविनोऽर्थस्य शब्दात्संप्रत्यये सति ।
अदृष्टविप्रयोगोऽर्थः सम्बन्धित्वेन[२०१] वर्त्तते ॥

163. Therefore while there may be comprehension of the non-permanent things from the word, the thing which is never seen in separation (from the object) is the one connected with it. (ie, the word).

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१९८. —शतत्त्वेन ।—घ
१९९. त्तिना ।—ङ
२००. —गोऽपि निवर्तते—घ
२०१. —न गम्यते—घ

१६४क. वाचिका द्योतिका वा स्युर्द्वित्वादीनां विभक्तयः ।
१६४ख. स्याद्वा संख्यावतो ऽर्थस्य समुदायोऽभिधायकः ॥

164a. (The place of root and suffix in the scheme of the meaning of the word is now discussed according to various views held on it) :—
"The suffixes denoting duality and the like can be expressive or illuminating."

164b. "Or perhaps the aggregate of (root and suffix) denotes an object with its number, etc."

१६५. विना संख्याभिधानाद्वा संख्याभेदसमन्वितान् ।
अर्थान् स्वरूपभेदेन कांश्चिदाहुर्गवादयः ॥

165. "Or words like "gauḥ" convey through a change in their forms a meaning which contains the idea of number, etc,. without (actually) mentioning them".

१६६. ये शब्दा नित्यसम्बन्धा विवेके ज्ञातशक्तयः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तेषामर्थो विभज्यते ॥

166. The meanings of those words which have a permanent connection (with their meaning) and the powers of which become clear when analysed, are analysed (into root-meaning and suffix-meaning) through (the test) of association and absence of dissociation.

१६७. यत्र चाव्यभिचारेण तयोः शक्यं प्रकल्पनम् ।
नियमस्तत्र नत्वेवं नियमो नुट्शबादिषु ॥

167. Where they (i.e. association and absence of dissociation) can be established without exception, (there alone) it is obligatory (that the root and suffix are significant elements); but there is no such rule about "nuṭ" "śap", etc.[65]

१६८. सम्भवे वाभिधानस्य लक्षणं तु न कल्प्यते ।
आपेक्षिक्यो हि संसर्गे नियताः शब्दशक्तयः ॥

168. Where such exists (i.e. the root and the suffix having distinct meanings), the implication of one meaning (by the other) is not conceived. The powers of word-elements

(i.e. root and suffix) raise expectancy (for each other) when in combination.

१६९. न कूपसूपयूपानामन्वयोऽर्थस्य दृश्यते ।
अतोऽर्थान्तरवाचित्वं संघातस्यैव [२०२]गम्यते ॥

169. The words "kūpa", "sūpa" and "yūpa" have no parallelism of meaning; therefore the capacity for expressing another idea belongs to the combination of letters.

१७०. अन्वाख्यानानि भिद्यन्ते शब्दव्युत्पत्तिकर्मसु ।
बहूनां सम्भवेऽर्थानां निमित्तं किञ्चिदुच्यते[२०३] ॥

170. Etymological explanations of words vary; where more than one meaning is possible a derivation is stated (for each meaning).

१७१. वैरवासिष्ठगिरिशास्तथैकागारिकादयः ।
कैश्चित्कथंचिदाख्याता निमित्तावधिसंकरैः ॥

171. Words like "vaira", "vāsiṣṭha, "giris'a" and similarly "ekāgārikā" and others are explained by various people in various ways through a variety of derivations.

१७२. यथा पथः समाख्यानं वृक्षवल्मीकपर्वतैः ।
अविरुद्धं गवादीनां भिन्नैश्च सहचारिभिः ॥

172. Just as the description of a path is possible through a tree, an anthill or a mountain, explanation of a word through different concomitant features is not impossible.

१७३. अन्यथा च समाख्यानमवस्थाभेददर्शिभिः[२०४] ।
क्रियते किंशुकादीनामेकदेशेऽवधारणात्[२०५] ॥

173. (The basis of employing a word to denote an object is discussed) :—
Descriptions of objects like a kimśuka tree are made in different forms by those who can see them in different conditions and based on the partial understanding (of them).

२०२. विद्यते —घ
२०३. —ञ्चिदिष्यते—घ
२०४. The first two lines are omitted in manuscript च— obviously a slip of the scribe.
२०५. —रणम्—घ

१७४. केश्चिन्निर्वचनं भिन्नं गिरतेर्गर्जतेर्गमेः ।
गुवतेर्गदतेर्वापि गौरित्यत्रानुदर्शितम् ॥

174. (Similarly) different derivations of the word 'gauḥ' from 'girati' (to swallow), 'garjati' (to roar), 'gama' (to go), 'guvati' (to void by stool) or 'gadati' (to speak articulately) have been given by different interpreters.

१७५क. गौरित्येव स्वरूपाद्वा गोशब्दो गोषु वर्तते ।
व्युत्पाद्यते न वा सर्वं
१७५ख. केश्चिच्चोभयमिष्यते ॥

175a. (Another view on the basis of the function of a word is given) "Or the word 'gauḥ' denotes the meaning 'cow', by virtue of its form 'gauḥ'. Not all words are etymologically derived.

175b. Both (i.e. the form of the word and features of the object it denotes) are so considered (i.e. as the basis of the operation of the word) by some.

१७६. सामान्येनोपदेशश्च शास्त्रे लघ्वर्थमाश्रितः ।
जात्यन्तरवद[२०६]स्यापि विशेषाः प्रतिपादकाः ॥

176. In grammar (different) forms are indicated by a common form for the sake of brevity. The particular ones are indicators of this (common form) as if it were another universal.

१७७. अर्थान्तरे च यद्वृत्तं तत्प्रकृत्यन्तरं विदुः ।
तुल्यरूपं न तद्रूढावन्यस्मिन्ननुषज्यते ॥

177. When a word denotes another meaning it is a different word altogether; where a form is fixed to one meaning by convention, the same form does not get linked with another meaning.

१७८. भिन्नाविजियजौ धातू नियतौ विषयान्तरे ।
केश्चित्कथंचिदुद्दिष्टौ चित्रं हि प्रतिपादनम् ॥

178. The two roots "ij" and "yaj" different from each other and established as functioning in different settings are

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२०६. दन्यस्य—घ

treated in different ways by different teachers. Indeed the treatment (of things) is found in different ways.

१७९. एवं च बालवायादि जित्वरीवदुपाचरेत् ।
भेदाभेदाभ्युपगमे न विरोधोऽस्ति कश्चन ॥

179. In this way treat the word 'bālavāya'' as identical ('with vidūra') in the same way as the word "jitvarī" is. There is no (mutual) contradiction in approaching words as different (from) or as identical with, each other.

१८०. अडादीनां व्यवस्थार्थं पृथक्त्वेन [२०७]विकल्पनम् ।
धातूपसर्गयोः शास्त्रे धातुरेव तु तादृशः ॥

180. In grammar roots and prefixes are assumed to be different for the sake of establishing aṭ, etc., but their combination is (really) the root.

१८१. तथा हि सङ्ग्रामयतेः सोपसर्गाद्विधिः स्मृतः ।
क्रियाविशेषाः संघातैः[२०८] प्रक्रम्यन्ते तथाविधाः ॥

181. Thus the injunction (of the operation of aṭ) is made from the form 'saṃgrāmayati'. Verbs are introduced in these ways (i.e. both in combination with and separation from prefixes.)

१८२क. कार्याणामन्तरङ्गत्वमेवं[२०९] धातूपसर्गयोः ॥
१८२ख. साधनै[२१०]र्याति सम्बन्धं तथाभूतैव सा क्रिया ॥

182a. Because of this the grammatical operations involving roots and prefixes are considered to be internal.
182b. It is the root in that form (i.e. in combination with a prefix) which is related to the nominal cases.

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२०७. प्रक—घ
२०८. —घाते—घ
२०९. —मेव धा—ख
२१०. —नैर्यदि—घ

१८३. प्रयोगा[211]र्हेषु सिद्धः सन् भेत्तव्योऽर्थो[212] विशिष्यते ।
प्राक् च साधनसम्बन्धात्क्रिया नैवोपजायते ॥

183. (An objection is raised against this view) :—When they (i.e. the roots) are to be employed, their meaning (i.e. the action symbolised) which is to be qualified is first accomplished before (it is so qualified); an action is not accomplished. before its connection with the accomplishing means (i.e. agent, instrument, etc.)[66]

१८४. धातोः साधनयोगस्य भाविनः प्रक्रमाद्यथा ।
धातुत्वं कर्मभावश्च तथान्यदपि दृश्यताम् ॥

184. (But), just as through an anticipated association of the root with the accomplishing means, it is (admitted to be) a root and a verb, so let the other also be (i.e. so let it be considered as being with a prefix).

१६५. बीजकालेषु सम्बद्धा[213] यथा लाक्षारसादयः ।
वर्णादिपरिणामेन फलानामुपकुर्वते ॥

185. Just as the red-dye-juice, etc., which are associated (with a tree) in its stage as a seed serves the fruit through its change of colour and the like,

१८६. बुद्धिस्थादभिसम्बन्धात्तथा धातूपसर्गयोः ।
अभ्यन्तरी[214]कृतो भेदः पदकाले प्रकाशते ॥

186. —similarly, the modification (of an action by a prefix) which is made to exist as an internal feature between the root and the prefix by virtue of their mutual relation which exists conceptually, becomes manifest at the time of the formation of the word (by their combination).

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२११. —ह्येषु—घ
२१२. —व्यो हि—घ
२१३. न्वाद्यथा—घ
२१४. —न्तरकृता—घ

१८७. क्वचित्सम्भविनो भेदाः केवलैर[215] निर्दशिताः ।
उपसर्गेण सम्बन्धे व्यज्यन्ते [216] प्रपरादिना ॥

187. (The nature and function of prefixes are discussed) :— In some places possible modifications (of the actions) not denoted by the verbs without the prefixes are revealed through their association with the prefixes like "pra" and "parā".

१८८. स वाचको विशेषाणां सम्भवाद्द्योतकोऽपि वा ।
शक्त्या[217] धानाय धातोर्वा सहकारी प्रयुज्यते ॥

188. Sometimes a prefix expresses the particular features (of the action) as its (prefix's) own meaning or it might illuminate those features which potentially exist (in the actions themselves). Or again it is used as a co-worker of the root for bringing out its powers.

१८९. स्थादिभिः केवलैर्यच्च गमनादि न[218] गम्यते ।
तत्रानुमानाद्द्विविधात्तद्धर्मा प्रादिरुच्यते ॥

189. Those features as "going" etc., which are not understood as existing in the uncompounded roots like "sthā" are conveyed by (the prefixes) "pra" and the like through two forms of inference.

१९०. अप्रयोगेऽधिपर्योश्च यावद्दृष्टं क्रियान्तरम् ।
तस्याभिधायको धातुः सह ताभ्यामनर्थकः ॥

190. When the prefixes "adhi" and "pari" are not used, a root denotes a certain other action (different from that which it conveys when compounded with a prefix). This root (by itself) does not convey the uncompounded meaning just as the prefixes by themselves are (meaningless).

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२१५. —रभिद—ख
—रुपद—घ
२१६. प्रनिरा—घ
२१७. शक्याधा—घ
२१८. —दि तु ग—ख

१९१. तथैव स्वार्थिकाः केचित्संघातान्तरवृत्तयः ।
अनर्थकेन संसृष्टाः प्रकृत्य[२१९]र्थानुवादिनः ॥

191. Similarly some suffixes of the svārthika type (like 'kan') existing in combination with other elements and coalescing with these same elements which (themselves) do not convey a meaning, function as repeating the meaning of the (same) bases.

१९२. निपाताः द्योतकाः केचित्पृथगर्थाभि[२२०] धायिनः ।
आगमा इव केऽपि[२२१] स्युः सम्भूय.र्थस्य [२२२]वाचकाः ॥

192. (Conjunctions are now discussed) :—
Some particles illumine (meaning); (others) express meaning (of their own) independently; some like grammatical augments, convey the meaning while in union (with the words which govern them).

१९३. उपरिष्टात्परस्ताद्वा द्योतकत्वं न भिद्यते ।
तेषु प्रयुज्यमानेषु भिन्नार्थेष्वपि सर्वथा ॥

193. Whether they are used before or after or in different meanings, their being illuminators (of meaning) does not alter.

१९४. चादयो न प्रयुज्यन्ते पदत्वे सति केवलाः ।
प्रत्ययो वाचकत्वेऽपि केवलो न प्रयुज्यते ॥

194. Particles, like 'ca' although they are words, are not used by themselves, (just as) a suffix is not used by itself, although it expresses meaning.

१९५क. समुच्चिताभिधानेऽपि व्यतिरेको न विद्यते ।
१९५ख. असत्त्वभूतो भावश्च [२२३]क्रियान्येनाभिधीयते ॥

195a. And although they refer to something aggregated there is no separateness (between them and the aggregate which

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२१९.—कृतार्था—घ
२२०. —र्थप्रकल्पने घ
२२१. केचित्तु घ
२२२. साधकाः घ
२२३. तिङपदैरभि—घ

would necessitate the use of a genitive case in the context).[67]

195b. A particle denotes a thing which does not exist as well as something which exists, as its meaning, just as an action is also denoted by something different (i.e. by a noun besides by the verb itself).[68]

१९६. समुच्चिताभिधाने ऽपि विशिष्टार्थाभिधायिनाम् ।
गुणैः पदानां सम्बन्धः परतन्त्रास्तु चादयः ॥

196. In the case of attributives they are connected with the words (which they qualify and) which convey particular meanings; 'ca' and the like, on the other hand, are for the sake of others, even when they convey the idea of the combined.

१९७. जनयित्वा क्रिया[२२३a] काचित्सम्बन्धं विनिवर्तते ।
श्रूयमाणे क्रियाशब्दे सम्बन्धो जायते क्वचित् ॥

197. (After thus discussing nouns, verbs, prefixes and particles, a discussion on karmapravacanīyas starts with this stanza. Karmapravacanīya is a term for certain prepositions or particles not connected with a verb but generally governing a noun (either separated from it or forming a compound with it).

Certain verbs withdraw after generating (a relationship between nouns) and thus becoming the substratum of the relation. In some places, such relationship comes into being with the verb itself heard.[68a]

२२३a. The reading in the Benares text is क्रियां कांचित् सम्बन्धो विनिवर्तते This is not right. Puṇyarāja interprets the text as follows. तत्र क्वचित् सम्बन्धं जनयित्वा क्रिया विनिवर्तते यथा राजपुरुष इति । अत्र हि राज्ञः पुरुषोऽयं यस्मात् स राजा पुरुषं बिभर्ति, अतः भरणलक्षणा क्रिया आश्रयाश्रयिभावलक्षणं सम्बन्धं जनयित्वा निवृत्ता I have therefore accepted the reading given in the footnote in the Benares text with a modificaton. The footnote reading as given in the Benares text is क्रिया काचित् सम्बन्धित्वे—

१९८. तत्र षष्ठी प्रतिपदं समासस्य निवृत्तये ।
विहिता दर्शनार्थं तु कारकं प्रत्युदाहृतम् ॥

198. (A point about the prescription of the genitive case in the expression "mātuḥ smaraṇam" is discussed) :— There, the genitive is especially enjoined in order to prevent a compound (from being employed): and the contrary example of an instrumental is given in order that it might be seen (that the word 'guṇāh' is an instrumental and not an accusative).[68b]

१९९. स चोपजातः सम्बन्धो विनिवृत्ते क्रियापदे ।
कर्मप्रवचनीयेन तत्र तत्र नियम्यते ॥

199. (It was stated in 197 that sometimes a verb, after effecting a relation between nouns ceases to exist in the context. This stanza continues that statement) :—
And when the relation has come into being and the verb has withdrawn, the Karmapravacanīya establishes the relation (as being brought about by the verb).

२००. येन क्रियापदाक्षेपः स कारकविभक्तिभिः ।
युज्यते विर्यथा तस्य लिखावनुपसर्गता ॥

200. That (Karmapravacanīya) (with which a verb starts) which implies the existence of another verb (in the context) is connected with (the nominal and the pronominal) case-forms in the sentence, as for instance, does (the Karmapravacaniya) 'vi'; when used with (the root) 'likh' it does not have the status of (being) a prefix.

२०१क. तिष्ठते[२२४]रुपयोगश्च दृष्टो ऽप्रत्यजयन्निति ।

२०१ख. सुन्वतीत्याभिमुख्ये ऽभिः केवलोऽपि प्रयुज्यते ।

201a. It is found that the verb 'tiṣṭhati' is used in the verb apratyajayan'.

201b. The (Karmapravacanīya) 'abhi' functions uncompounded with the verb 'sunvati' in the sense 'in the direction of'.[69]

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२२४. —तेरप्रयोगश्च घ

२०२. कर्मप्रवचनीयत्वं क्रियायोगे विधीयते ।
षत्वादिविनिवृत्त्यर्थं स्वत्यादीनां विधर्मणाम् ॥

202. 'Su', 'ati', etc., which are different in characteristics are declared to be Karmapravacanīyas when they are associated with verbs, in order to avoid the change of 'sa' etc into 'ṣa' in certain forms. the sa etc being different from the latter.

२०३. हेतुहेतुमतोर्योगपरिच्छेदे ऽनुना कृते ।
आरम्भाद् बाध्यते प्राप्ता तृतीया हेतुलक्षणा ॥

203. (Another specific function of the Karmapravacanīya is stated) :—When (the Karmapravacanīya) 'anu' denotes the union of a cause and effect, the instrumental which is to function in the cause is set aside.

२०४. क्रियाया द्योतको नायं सम्बन्धस्य न वाचकः ।
नापि क्रियापदाक्षेपी सम्बन्धस्य तु भेदकः ॥

104. (This stanza rejects the views already stated about the function of the Karmapravacanīya) :—It is not an illuminator of the verb; it does not express a relation; nor does it imply a verb. It defines a relation.

२०५. अनर्थकानां सङ्घातः सार्थकोऽनर्थकस्तथा ।
वर्णानां पदमर्थेन युक्तं नावयवाः पदे ॥

205. Having thus discussed the word as occuring as the five parts of speech, the Akhaṇḍavādin's position and criticism of the Khaṇḍa theory are again stated.) :—A collection of letters which are meaningless by themselves can be meaningful or meaningless (in combination); if meaningful, it is a word; and there are no parts in a word.

२०६. पदानामर्थयुक्तानां संघातो भिद्यते पुनः ।
अर्थान्तरावरोधेन सम्बन्धविगमेन च ॥

206. A combination of meaningful words varies as giving rise to another meaning or as not having any connection among themselves.

२०७. सार्थकानर्थकौ भेदे सम्बन्धं नाधिगच्छतः ।
अधिगच्छत इत्येके कुटीरादिनिदर्शनात् ॥

207. If one of two (letter-groups) is meaningful and the other is not, when they are considered in separation, (as for example kuṭī and ra respectively) then they do not combine into a connected word. But some others say that they do combine (into a whole) as, for instance, in the words 'kuṭīra' and the like.

२०८. अर्थवद्भ्यो विशिष्टार्थः सङ्घात[225] उपजायते ।
नोपजायत इत्येके समासस्वार्थिकादिषु ॥

208. (Some thinkers hold that if the aggregate is meaningful, the components also should be meaningful) :—According to some, an aggregate with a distinct meaning is formed or not formed from meaningful words, as in compounds and svārthika-formations (respectively).

२०९. केचित्तु[226] युतसिद्धार्था भेदे निर्ज्ञातशक्तयः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां केचित्कल्पितशक्तयः ॥

209. Some of these have fixed meaning while in combination and have their functions known on analysis. With some others, functions are attributed to their parts based on the test of association and (absence of) dissociation.

२१०. शास्त्रार्थ एव वर्णानामर्थवत्त्वे[227] प्रदर्शितः ।
धात्वादीनां[228] विशुद्धानां लौकिकोऽर्थो न विद्यते ॥

210. Only a technical significance is intended by the statement that syllables are meaningful; isolate syllables which are (technically significant) like roots etc are not meaningful in ordinary usage.

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२२५. सम्बन्ध घ
२२६. चिद्धि घ
२२७. —र्थतत्त्वे ङ
२२८. हि शुद्धा—घ

२११. कृत्तद्धितानामर्थश्च केवलानामलौकिकः ।
प्राग्विभक्तेस्तदर्थस्य[२२९] तथैवार्थो न विद्यते ॥

211. The meaning of kṛt and taddhita suffixes by themselves is technical. It is therefore that forms ending in these have no meaning before the addition of the case endings.

२१२. अभिव्यक्ततरो योऽर्थः प्रत्ययान्तेषु[२३०] लक्ष्यते ।
अर्थवत्ताप्रकरणादाश्रितः स तथाविधः ॥

212. And the distinct meaning which one finds in words ending in these suffixes (i.e. kṛt and taddhita) is derived from factors like meaning of adjoining words and topic-context.

२१३. आत्मभेदो न चेत्कश्चिद्वर्णेभ्यः पदवाक्ययोः ।
अन्योन्यापेक्षया शक्त्या वर्णः स्यादभिधायकः ॥

213. If words and sentences are not different in character from syllables, these syllables (and not words and sentences) would be expressive (of meaning) due to their power of possessing expectancy for one another.

२१४. वर्णेन केनचिन्न्यूनः सङ्घातो योऽभिधायकः ।
न चेच्छब्दान्तरमसावन्यूनस्तेन गम्यते ॥

214. If a collection (of letters) is meaningful when it is less than the normal by one letter, then (what happens is that) the whole is understood from a fraction of it assuming that the (reduced) form is not an entirely different word.[70]

२१५. स तस्मिन् वाचके शब्दे निमित्तात्स्मृतिमादधत् ।
साक्षादिव व्यवहितं शब्देनार्थमुपोहते ॥

215. Under certain conditions it (i.e. the fraction) causes re-collection of the (complete) word which expresses the meaning as if it had been actually presented by the (whole) word.

२१६. पदवाच्यो यथा नार्थः कश्चिद्गौरखरादिषु ।
सत्यपि प्रत्यये ऽत्यन्तं समुदाये न गम्यते ॥

216. Just as in 'gaurakhara' and other such words, there does

२२९. —दन्तस्य ङ
२३०. —यार्थेषु घ

not exist any separate meaning of the component words and no such meaning is realised during the comprehension of the meaning of the combined word,

२१७. समन्वित इवार्थात्मा पदार्थैर्यः प्रतीयते
पदार्थदर्शनं तत्र तथैवानुपकारकम् ॥

217. —similarly in the meaning of the sentence which appears to be a combination of word-meanings, the recognition of word-meanings is of no use.

२१८. समुदायावयवयोर्भिन्नार्थत्वे च वृत्तिषु ।
युगपद्भेदसंसर्गौ विरुद्धावनुषङ्गिणौ ॥

218. If in complex formations the complete word and the component parts have different meanings, then there is the co-existence of contradictory meanings, namely the analytic and the synthetic.

२१९. कश्च साधनमात्रार्थान् अध्यादीन् परिकल्पयेत् ।
अप्रयुक्तपदश्चार्थो बहुव्रीहौ कथं भवेत् ॥

219. (Another objection to the recognition of words and word-meanings in sentences, etc., is given) :—Who will consider 'adhi', etc., as purely having the meaning of the (locative) case? And how can a bahuvrīhi compound have its meaning when the word for it is not (actually) used ?

२२०क. प्रज्ञुसंज्ञ्वाद्यवयवैर्न चास्त्यर्थावधारणम् ।
२२०ख. तस्मात्संघात एवैको विशिष्टार्थनिबन्धनम् ॥

220a. The meanings of words like 'prajñu' and samjñu' are not understood through their component parts.

220b. Therefore the combination as a whole is connected to a specific meaning.

२२१. गर्गा इत्येक एवायं बहुष्वर्थेषु वर्तते ।
द्वन्द्वसंज्ञोऽपि सङ्घातो बहूनामभिधायकः ॥

221. [In the next few verses (221-225) the status of a dvanda or copulative compound in the philosophy of Akhaṇḍa-vāda is raised and established. If an expression, that is, a sentence, compound etc. is an integral speech when it

conveys an integral meaning then how can a dvandva compound convey the meaning of its components as it necessarily should by virtue of the fact that it is a dvandva compound? This question is answered. Also are answered in other verses (226-227) the same questions in regard to vṛttis (complex grammatical formations) and negative compounds. The sum total of the arguments is that in all these the abstraction of component words is only a grammatical necessity, and not the logical truth].

The single word 'gargāḥ' denotes many people. Similarly a combination of words known as a dvandva compound may denote many people.

२२२. यथैकदेशे भुज्यादिः प्रत्येकमवतिष्ठते ।
क्रियैवं द्वन्द्ववाच्ये ऽर्थे प्रत्येकं प्रविभज्यते ॥

222. Just as 'bhuj' (to eat) and other verbs get related to the parts (of a collective subject) individually, similarly the verb is conceived separately for each (component) of the meaning (of the subject) denoted by a dvandva compound.

२२३. यच्च द्वन्द्वपदार्थस्य तच्छब्देन व्यपेक्षणा ।
सापि व्यावृत्तरूपेऽर्थे सर्वनामसरूपता ॥

223. And so far as representing the meaning of one component of a dvandva-compound by the pronoun 'tad' is concerned (as in the example janapadatadavadhyoḥ) in this case, there is only the appearance of a pronoun in the meaning of the compound.

२२४. यथा च खदिरच्छेदे भागेषु क्रमवांश्छिदिः ।
तथा द्वन्द्वपदार्थस्य भागेषु क्रमदर्शनम् ॥

224. Just as in cutting the khadira tree, the (act of) cutting (which is a single act) has a sequence in its parts (in the form that the bark of the tree is first cut, then the inside and so on) similarly a sequence is seen in the meanings of the components of a dvandva compound.

२२५. सङ्घैकदेशे[231] प्रक्रान्तान्यथा सङ्घानुपातिनः ।
क्रियाविशेषान्[232] मन्यन्ते स द्वन्द्वावयवे[233] क्रमः ॥

225. Particular actions which pertain to groups are considered to function through individuals. Similar is the case of the parts of a dvandva compound.

२२६. प्रतिपादयता वृत्तिमबुधान्वाच्य[234] पूर्विकाम् ।
वृत्तौ पदार्थभेदेन प्राधान्यमुपदर्शितम् ॥

226. In discussing, for the benefit of the untutored, complex grammatical formations with (particular) reference to their (extended) sentence-forms, the chief significance is attributed to the meaning of one or other of the (component) words.

२२७. अभेदाभिधेयस्य नञ्समासे विकल्पितम् ।
प्राधान्यं बहुधा भाष्ये दोषास्तु प्रक्रियागताः ॥

227. Since the meaning of a negative compound is (really) indivisible, diverse conceptions of the (comparative) significance (of their parts) are given as optionals in the Bhāṣya; these are nothing more than evils which are necessitated by the grammatical explanations (of these words).

२२८. जहत्स्वार्थविकल्पे च सर्वार्थत्यागमिच्छता ।
बहुव्रीहिपदार्थस्य त्यागः सर्वत्र[235] दर्शितः ॥

228. The rejection of all (component) meanings is shown in the case of bahuvrīhi compounds by him (i.e. the teacher) who desires the rejection of all component meanings according to the view-point that 'the individual words in a compound give up their meanings.'

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२३१. —शप्र—घ
२३२. —षा जन्यन्ते घ
२३३. —यवक्रमः घ
२३४. —क्यपू—ङ
२३५. —र्वस्य द—ङ

२२९. शास्त्रे क्वचित्प्रकृत्यर्थः प्रत्ययेनाभिधीयते ।
प्रकृतौ विनिवृ[२३६]त्तायां प्रत्ययार्थश्च धातुभिः ॥

229. (The point that conceptions used in the technique of grammatical analysis may not represent the logical truth about language is still further exemplified. One may break a unified utterance into parts for the sake of explanation; but still unity is the truth).

In grammar the meaning of the root (in a word) is expressed by the suffix in some places, when the root has ceased to function; and (sometimes) the meaning of the suffix by the roots.

२३०. यमर्थमाहतुर्भिन्नौ प्रत्ययावेक एव तम् ।
क्वचिदाह पचन्तीति धातुस्ताभ्यां विना क्वचित् ॥

230. The same meaning which two different suffixes express in the form 'pacanti' is conveyed in some places by one of them; and in some (other) places the root conveys the same meaning without either of them.

२३१. अन्वाख्यातस्मृता ये च प्रत्ययार्था निबन्धनम् ।
निर्दिष्टा[२३७]स्ते प्रकृत्यर्थाः स्मृत्यन्तर उदाहृताः ॥

231. The same suffix-meanings which in certain inumeratory texts are considered as linked to suffixes, are designated as root-meanings in other texts.

२३२क. प्रसिद्धेरुद्वमिकरीत्येव शास्त्रे ऽभिधीयते ।

२३२ख. व्यवहाराय मन्यन्ते शास्त्रार्थप्रक्रिया यतः ।

232a. Similarly in grammar words like 'udvami' and 'kari' alone are used because they are well-known (as substitutes ,[71]

232b. —since the analytical explanation of words adopted in grammar is (only) for the sake of ordinary usage.

२३३क. शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते ।

२३३ख. अनागमविकल्पा तु स्वयं विद्योपवर्तते ॥

233a. It is Unreality which is described in the scriptures (like grammar) through various explanations.

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२३६. वा निवृ—घ

233b. And Real ty itself remains unaffected by these differences of textual explanations.

२३४. अनिबद्धं निमित्तेषु निरुपाख्यं फलं यथा ।
तथा विद्याप्यनाख्येया ऽास्त्रोपायेन लक्ष्यते ।।

234. Just as an effect is not (definably) connected with its cause, nor is it describable, similarly the true knowledge which is indescribable is pointed out as having grammar as its means of realisation.

२३५ क. यथाभ्यासं हि वागर्थे प्रतिपत्तिं समीहते ।
२३५ख. स्वभाव इव चानादिर्मिथ्याभ्यासो व्यवस्थि : ।।

235a. It is practice (of grammar) which helps to create understanding in the meaning of words.

235b. This practice is considered as unreal like the beginningless nature (of things.)[77]

२३६. उत्प्रेक्षते सावयवं परमाणुमपण्डितः ।
तथावयविनं युक्तमन्यैरवयवैः पुनः ।।

236. (This beginningless and unreal nature of things is illustrated) :—The untutored imagines an atom as having parts and a whole having parts as being linked to other parts (of which it really is not made).

२३७. घटादिदर्शनाल्लोकः परिच्छिन्नोऽवसीयते ।
समारम्भाच्च भावानामादिमद् ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ।।

237. The world is understood as limited from the sight of pots, etc. And because objects have a beginning, the timeless Brahman is (erroneously) understood as having a beginning.

२३८. उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामपलापनाः ।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ।।

238. Means are intended as a concealment of the truth for the sake of the unwise who are learning. Remaining on the path of Unreality one strives after Reality.

२३९. अन्यथा प्रतिपद्यार्थं पदग्रहणपूर्वकम् ।
क्रियते ते निवर्त्तन्ते तस्मात्तास्तत्र नाश्रयेत् ।।

239. After grasping the meaning (of a word) in a certain form

through the comprehension of the word, the same meaning is again grasped in the sentence in a different form.

२४०. उपात्ता बह्वोऽप्यर्था येष्वन्ते प्रतिषेधनम् ।
क्रियते ते निवर्त्तन्ते तस्मात्तास्तत्र नाश्रयेत् ॥

240. Of the many meanings (of words) presented (to the reader of a sentence) those which in the end are repudiated (by the meaning of the sentence) are not operative. Therefore they should not be resorted to there (i.e. in the understanding of the meaning of the sentence).

२४१. वृक्षो नास्तीति वाक्यं च विशिष्टाभावलक्षणम् ।
नार्थेन बुद्धौ सम्बन्धो निवृत्तेरवतिष्ठते ॥

241. [The impossibility of recognising words in sentences and word-meanings in the meaning of the sentence in the ultimate sense, is shown with reference to a sentence like Vṛkṣo nāsti) (there is no tree)]. If we recognise 'na' as a separate word in the ultimate sense, what does it negate?] The sentence 'vṛkso nāsti' has a particular negation as its significance. The meaning (of the word 'vṛkṣa') cannot be considered to be connected in the mind (to the meaning of the particle 'na'), because that would mean the negation of something which exists.[73]

२४२क. विच्छेदप्रतिपत्तौ च यद्यस्तीत्यवधार्यते ।
२४२ख. अशब्दवाच्या सा बुद्धिर्निवर्तेत स्थिता कथम् ॥

242a. If, when the sentence is understood analytically, the
242b. knowledge 'there is (a tree)' is formed, how can that concept which is non-verbal in character be removed (by the particle 'na').

२४३क. अथ [२४१]यज्ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं तन्मिथ्येति नञा कृतम् ।
२४३ख. नञो व्यापारभेदेऽस्मिन्नभावावगतिः कथम् ॥

243a. Or again, the knowledge that there is (a tree) is falsified by 'na' (according to one view).

२४१. —ज्ञात—थ्व

243b. How then, can the knowledge of an absence (of the tree) be obtained if the function of 'na' is modified like this ?

२४४क. निराधारप्रवृत्तौ च प्राक्प्रवृत्तिर्नञो भवेत् ।
२४४ख. अथाधारः स एवास्य नियमार्था श्रुतिर्भवेत् ॥

244a. Again can it be said that the particle 'na' functions in isolation, without reference to any of the sectional notions referred to above ? No):

If 'na' is functioning without reference to any substratum, then it should be employed (in the beginning) before (all the others).

244b. (Can the use of the substratum, i.e. vṛkṣa be explained by the Bheda-school as follows):—
Again, (it may be said) that it (i.e. 'vṛkṣa') alone shall be its (i.e. the particle's) substratum. (The defect of this position is that) a direct statement, then, becomes a restrictive statement.

२४५क. नियमद्योतनार्था वाऽनुवादोऽथवा[२४२] भवेत् ।
२४५ख. कश्चिदेवार्थवांस्तत्र शब्दाश्शेषास्त्वनर्थकाः ॥

245a. Or (it becomes) a statement which brings out an implied restriction. Or it might become a repetition.

245b. (Therefore if the sentence 'vṛkṣo nāsti' is interpreted in the way stated in 244a, then):—only one word (i.e., 'na') will have meaning there; others will have no meaning.

२४६. विरुद्धं चाभिसम्बन्धमुदहार्यादिभिः कृतम् ।
वाक्ये समाप्ते वाक्यार्थमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ॥

246. (The argument against the recognition of word-meanings is further illustrated) :—
Words 'udahāri' and others in the sentence 'udahāri bhagini' etc. enter into an incompatible kind of relationship (among themselves); and when the sentence is comleted the meaning of the sentence is comprehended in a different form.

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२४२. —दो यथा भ—घ

२४७. स्तुतिनिन्दाप्रधानेषु वाक्येष्वर्थो[२४३] न तादृशः ।
पदानां प्रविभागेन यादृशः परिकल्प्यते ॥

247. In the case of sentences with praise or censure as their import the meaning of the sentence is not the same as is constructed by its analysis into words.

२४८. अथासंसृष्ट एवार्थः पदेषु समवस्थितः ।
वाक्यार्थस्याभ्युपायोऽसावेकस्य प्रतिपादने ॥

248. (The Pada-vādin's position is again stated for repudiation:—) Or it is the un-integrated meaning which remains in the words; and it is (also) the means for the construction of the integrated sentence-meaning.

२४९. पूर्वं पदेष्वसंसृष्टो यः क्रमादुपचीयते ।
छिन्नग्रथितकल्पत्वान्न विशिष्टतरं विदुः ॥

249. (But) that (meaning) which originally remains unintegrated in the words, and is then gradually built up is not any different from it, since it is like something restrung after being broken.

२५०. एकमाहुरनेकार्थं शब्दमन्ये परीक्षकाः ।
निमित्तभेदादेकस्य सार्वार्थ्यं तस्य भिद्यते ॥

250. (Granting that words are realities within the scheme of analysis, the question of primary and secondary signification of words is taken up for discussion).
Other investigators say that the same word has more than one meaning; they say that the same word has many meanings due to various causes.[74]

२५१क. यौगपद्यमतिक्रम्य पर्याये व्यवतिष्ठते ।
२५१ख. अर्थप्रकरणाभ्यां वा योगाच्छब्दान्तरेण वा ॥

251a. The simultaneity (of the functioning of the word in all
251b. its meanings) is avoided and the word is established in one meaning at a time, through (such contextual factors as) the meaning (of other words) or situation context or due to association with other words.

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२४३. —च्येष्व—ख

२५२. यथा सास्नादिमान् पिण्डो गोशब्देनाभिधीयते ।
तथा स एव गोशब्दो वाहीकेऽपि व्यवस्थितः ।।

252. Just as the mass (of flesh) with dew-lap, etc., is named by the word 'gauḥ', similarly the same word 'gauḥ' is established as conveying the meaning 'a Vāhīka' (name of a tribe or person in the tribe).

२५३. सर्वशक्तेस्तु तस्यैव शब्दस्यानेकधर्मणः ।
प्रसिद्धिभेदाद् गौणत्वं मुख्यत्वं चोपवर्ण्यते ।।

253. On the basis of the difference in the currency of the (corresponding) meanings, the same word is described as primary and secondary, it having all potentialities and several aspects.

२५४. एको मन्त्रस्तथाध्यात्ममधिदैवमधिक्रतु ।
असङ्करेण सर्वार्थो भिन्नशक्तिर्व्यवस्थितः[२४४] ।।

254. Thus the same hymn having various meanings and possessing different potentialities, is established as functioning in regard to the self, to a god and to the sacrifice, without its functions getting mixed up.

२५५. गोत्वानुषङ्गो वाहीके निमित्तात्कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
अर्थमात्रं विपर्यस्तं शब्दः स्वार्थे व्यवस्थितः ।।

255. The attribution of cow-ness on the Vāhīka for (certain) reasons is desired by some. (Thus) only the object denoted has changed; the word remains fixed in its meaning (namely cow-ness).

२५६. तथा स्वरूपं शब्दानां सर्वार्थेष्वनुषज्यते ।
अर्थमात्रं विपर्यस्तं स्वरूपे तु स्थितिः[२४५] स्थिरा ।।

256. Again the form of the word is associated with all its meanings. Only the objects denoted change. The word permanently remains linked to its (own) form (as its meaning).

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२४४. —क्तिरवस्थितः घ

२४५. तु श्रुति स्थि—घ

२५७. एकत्वं तु स्वरूपत्वाच्छब्दयोर्गौणमुख्ययोः ।
प्राहुरत्यन्तभेदेऽपि भेदमार्गानुदर्शिनः ॥

257. Those who adopt the line of the plurality of words say that the one-ness between principal and secondary words is but formal, and that they are fundamentally different.

२५८क. सामिधेन्यन्तरं चैवमावृत्तावनुषज्यते ।

२५८ख. मन्त्राश्च विनियोगेन लभन्ते भेदमूहवत् ॥

258a. Thus a different sāmidheni hymn is associated with (each) repetition (of the hymn).

258b. Hymns become different by being employed just as they do when altered by a substitution.

२५९क. तान्याम्नायान्तराण्येव पठ्यन्ते कश्चिदेव तु[२४६] ।

२५९ख. अनर्थकानां पाठो वा शेषस्त्वन्यः प्रतीयते ॥

259a. (Nevertheless), they too (that is, those too which get their being through repetition) are Vedic hymns; only, certain ones are actually mentioned there (i.e., in the texts).

259b. Or (alternatively) it is those which have no use as Vedic hymns) which are mentioned there. (Through them) the remaining ones come to mind.[75]

२६०क. शब्दस्वरूपमर्थस्तु [२४६]पाठेऽन्यैरुपवर्ण्यते ।

२६०ख. अत्यन्तभेदस्सर्वेषां तत्सम्बन्धात्तु तद्वताम् ॥

260a. Others describe that when a hymn is recited, its own form is its meaning.

260b. Hence all hymns are totally different from each other and those other hymns (which are produced, so to say, from the recitation of the mentioned hymns) are also different from each other, they having their distinct forms, through their connection with the mentioned hymns.

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२४६. किञ्चिदेव तु —घ

२६१. अन्या संस्कारसावित्री कर्मण्यन्या प्रयुज्यते ।
अन्या जपप्रबन्धेषु सा त्वेकैव प्रतीयते ॥

261. The Sāvitrī hymn which is the source of purification is one; a different hymn is employed in sacrifice; and a different one is employed in the contexts of muttering hymns. But all these appear to be the same.

२६२क. अर्थस्वरूपे शब्दानां स्वरूपाद्वृत्तिरिष्यते[२४७] ।
२६२ख. वाक्यरूपस्य वाक्यार्थे वृत्तिरन्यानपेक्षया ॥

262a. The functioning of words in their meaning is through their forms.

262b. And the functioning of a sentenee in conveying the meaning of the sentence is through its dependence on nothing else (other than the form of a sentence).

२६३. अनेकार्थत्वमेकस्य यैः शब्दस्यानुगम्यते ।
सिद्ध्यसिद्धिकृता तेषां गौणमुख्यप्रकल्पना ॥

263. Those who follow the idea that the same word possesses several meanings base their conclusion regarding the meaning being primary or secondary on its being well-known or otherwise.

२६४. अर्थप्रकरणापेक्षो यो वा शब्दान्तरैः सह ।
युक्तः प्रत्याययत्यर्थं तं गौणमपरे विदुः ॥

264. Others think that a word which conveys its meaning depending on the meaning (of other words) or situation context or by association with other words, is called secondary.

२६५. शुद्धस्योच्चारणे स्वार्थः प्रसिद्धो यस्य गम्यते ।
स मुख्य इति विज्ञेयो रूपमात्रनिबन्धनः ॥

265. (The definition of a word which conveys a primary meaning is given according to the view of the Saṃgraha): That word from which, when it is pronounced as an isolate, its own well-known meaning is understood and

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२४७. स्वरूपा वृ—ङ
स्वरूपा वृत्तिमिच्छतः—घ

which depends solely on its form (in conveying this meaning) should be known as primary).

२६६. यस्त्वन्यस्य प्रयोगेण यत्नादिव नियुज्यते ।
तमप्रसिद्धं मन्यन्ते गौणार्थाभिनिवेशिनम् ॥

266. That word which is made to convey the meaning as if with difficulty, through the use of another word is considered obscure and connected to a secondary meaning.

२६७. स्वार्थे प्रवर्त्तमानस्य यस्यार्थं योऽवलम्बते ।
निमित्तं तत्र मुख्यं स्याद् निमित्ती गौण इष्यते ॥

267. When a word (in conveying a secondary meaning) depends on itself as functioning in its own meaning (i.e. the principal meaning), then the principal meaning acts as the basis (for the secondary meaning) and the secondary meaning is based on it.

२६८. पुरारादिति भिन्नेऽर्थे यौ वर्त्तेते विरोधिनि ।
अर्थप्रकरणापेक्षं तयोरप्यवधारणम् ॥

268. (Contextual derivation of meaning will not always necessarily lead to a primary—secondary classification. As for example: The words 'purā' and 'ārād' each of which conveys meanings which are different and mutually contradictory are understood through the meanings (of other words) and the situation context; (but both meanings of each word is a primary meaning)
(purā=distant or near in time
ārād=distant or near in time)

२६९. वाक्यस्यार्थात्पदार्थानामपोद्धारे प्रकल्पिते ।
शब्दान्तरेण सम्बन्धः कस्यैकस्योपपद्यते ॥

269. (Siddhānta or the Akhaṇḍa view)
When the analysis of word-meanings from the meaning of the sentence is artificial, how can any (word) properly have relation with another word ?

२७०. यच्चाप्येकं पदं दृष्टं चरितास्तिक्रियं क्वचित् ।
तद् वाक्यान्तरमेवाहुर्न तदन्येन युज्यते ॥

270. Where it is seen sometimes that a single word possesses a complete verb 'to be' (implied in it), that word is

considered as a complete sentence; and it is not constructed with another word.

२७१. यच्च कोऽयमिति प्रश्ने गौरश्व इति चोच्यते ।
प्रश्न एव क्रिया तत्र प्रक्रान्ता दर्शनादिका ॥

271. As the answer 'cow' or 'horse' is given to the question 'what is it.', words like 'dṛśyate' (seen) are included in the question itself (i.e., koyam : who, what is it).

२७२क. नैवाधिकत्वं धर्माणां न्यूनता वा प्रयोजिका ।
२७२ख. आधिक्यमपि मन्यन्ते प्रसिद्धेर्न्यूनतां क्वचित् ॥

272a. (Another view on primary-secondary classification of meaning is stated) The criterion (for judging whether a word is principal or secondary with reference to a meaning) is not whether it conveys more or less of the attributes (of the object denoted).

272b. Conveying more (such attributes) is considered as the basis of the word being well-known (in some places) while, in some other places, conveying less is so considered.

२७३. जातिशब्दोऽन्तरेणापि जातिं यत्र प्रयुज्यते ।
सम्बन्धिसदृशाद्धर्मात्तं गौणमपरे विदुः ॥

273. (Other views on primary-secondary classification) Others consider that a secondary meaning is that to convey which a word whose significance is a universal is used without its having to signify the universal, on the basis that it (the object) has atributes similar to those of the individual associated with the universal.

२७४. विपर्यासादिवार्थस्य यत्रार्थान्तरतामिव ।
मन्यन्ते स गवादिस्तु गौण इत्युच्यते क्वचित् ॥

274. Where a meaning (of a word) is taken to be another apparently by mistake, then (such) words like 'gauḥ' are considered by some as 'secondary'.

२७५. नियताः साधनत्वेन रूपशक्तिसमन्विताः ।
यथा कर्मसु गम्यन्ते सीरासिमुसलादयः ॥

275. Just as objects like a plough, a sword or a pestle which possess specific forms and powers are invariably taken as instruments of specific actions,

२७६. क्रियान्तरेण चैतेषां भवन्ति न हि शक्तयः ।
रूपादेव तु तादर्थ्यं नियमेन[२४८] प्रतीयते ॥

276. —but when used for other actions they do not possess these powers, and are invariably associated with their (proper) actions right from their forms,

२७७. तथैव रूपशक्तिभ्यामुत्पत्त्या समवस्थितः ।
शब्दो नियततादर्थ्यः शक्त्यान्यत्र प्रयुज्यते ॥

277. —similarly a word which has its meaning settled on the basis of its formal capacity is used (to convey) a different meaning by virtue of a (different) potentiality.

२७८. श्रुतिमात्रेण यत्रास्य तादर्थ्यमवसीयते ।
[२४९]मुख्यं तमर्थं मन्यन्ते गौणं यत्नोपपादितम् ॥

278. (How then is the primary-secondary distinction to be understood in this case ?) :—

When on merely listening, one understands the word as having a (certain) meaning, that meaning is considered to be principal, and the meaning is secondary where it has to be explained.

२७९. गोयुष्मन्महतां च्व्यर्थे स्वार्थादर्थान्तरे स्थितौ ।
अर्थान्तरस्य तद्भावस्तत्र[२५०] मुख्येऽपि दृश्यते ॥

279. When words like "gauḥ' 'yuṣmat' and 'mahat' convey a different meaning (from what they ordinarily mean) through the operation of the suffix 'cvi', there we find the identification of the principal meaning with the other meaning.

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२४८. निधनेन ख

२४९. तं मुख्यमर्थं मन्यन्ते घ, ङ

२५०. सद्भावं —घ

२८०. महत्त्वं शुक्लभावं च प्रकृतिः प्रतिपद्यते ।
भेदेनापेक्षिता सा तु गौणत्वस्य [२५१]प्रयोजिका ॥

280. (An objection arising from the idea in the stanza above is stated) :—
Bigness and Whiteness remain in their original state. But that (state) when looked at in different ways become the basis of the secondary nature (of the meanings of the words).[76]

२८१. अग्निसोमादयः[२५२] शब्दा ये स्वरूपनिबन्धनाः ।[२५३]
संज्ञिभिः संप्रयुज्यन्ते प्रसिद्धेस्तेषु गौणता ॥

281. (Yet another objection is answered) :—
Words like 'Agni' and 'Soma' which are connected to their forms (as their meanings) are secondary when they are used as names of persons because they are well-known as the names of gods.[77]

२८२. अग्निदत्तस्तु योऽग्निः स्यात्तत्र स्वार्थोपसर्जनः ।
शब्दो दत्तार्थवृत्तित्वाद्गौणत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

282. On the other hand, the word 'Agni' used as (an abbreviated) substitude for the word 'Agnidatta', having given up its own meaning conveys a secondary meaning since it (also) conveys the meaning of the word 'Datta'.

२८३. निमित्तभेदात्प्रक्रान्ते शब्दव्युत्पत्तिकर्मणि ।
हरिश्चन्द्रादिषु सुटो भावाभावौ व्यवस्थितौ ॥

283. If their etymological derivation is approached from different angles there is the existence and the non-existence of the augment 'suṭ' in words like 'Hariścandra'.[78]

२८४. ऋष्यादौ प्राप्तसंस्कारो यः शब्दोऽन्येन युज्यते ।
तत्रान्तरङ्गः संस्कारो बाह्येऽर्थे न निवर्त्तते ॥

284. If words which have become established as names of sages and the like are used to denote some one different

२५१. प्रसाधिका —घ
२५२. —ग्निसामा —घ
२५३. —रूपपदार्थकाः —घ

(i.e., an ordinary person) then grammatical changes effected in the body of such words (when they mean sages, etc.) do not revert (although the words themselves are in the second instance used in their secondary signification and therefore in the light of what has been said above, grammatical operations should not take place in these cases).

२८५. अत्यन्तविपरीतोऽपि यदा योऽर्थोऽवधार्यते ।
यथासम्प्रत्ययं शब्दस्तत्र मुख्यः प्रवर्त्तते ॥

285. (The problem of primary—secondary classification is approached from a different angle) :—
Even when a meaning completely antithetical (to the normal meaning of the word) is conveyed by it the word is functioning in a primary capacity since the mind is at that time comprehending it in that way.

२८६. यद्यपि प्रत्ययाधीनमर्थतत्त्वावधारणम् ।
न सर्वः प्रत्ययस्तस्मिन्नसिद्ध इव जायते ॥

286. (Arguments are given now to show that here too classification of words into primary and secondary is possible). Although the comprehension of the true nature of an object is dependent on how it is conceived, conception is not everything in it, as (is evident) in the case of an imperfect comprehension of an object.

२८७. दर्शनं सलिले तुल्यं मृगतृष्णादिदर्शनैः ।
तुल्यत्वे दर्शनादीनां न जलं मृगतृष्णिका ॥

287. Seeing (an object) in water resembles seeing (it) in a mirage. But while its apprehension, etc., (in the two media) are thus, similar, water is not mirage.

२८८. यदसाधारणं कार्यं प्रसिद्धं रज्जुसर्पयोः ।
तेन भेदः[२५४] परिच्छेद्यस्तयोस्तुल्येऽपि दर्शने ॥

288. What effect there is which a rope and a serpent have not in common, by that is determined a difference between

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२५४. भेदपरिच्छेदः —घ

them in spite of their similar appearance (in certain conditions like twilight).

२८९. प्रसिद्धार्थविपर्यासनिमित्तं यच्च दृश्यते ।
यस्तस्माल्लक्ष्यते भेदः तमसत्यं प्रचक्षते ॥

289. A difference (in an object) effected through a cause which caused a contrary appearance of (such) a well-known object, is also considered unreal.[79]

२९०. यच्च निम्नोन्नते चित्रे[२५५] सरूपं पर्वतादिभिः ।
न तत्र प्रतिघातादि कार्यं तद्वत्प्रवर्तते ॥

290. And digging, etc., are not possible in the place where a picture (of a mountain etc.) showing elevations and depressions, resembles the mountain.

२९१. स्पर्शप्रबन्धो हस्तेन यथा चक्रस्य सन्ततः ।
न तथाऽलातचक्रस्य विच्छिन्नं स्पृश्यते हि तत् ॥

291. It is possible for a (real) wheel to have continuous contact with the hand (which holds it); but that is not the case with an imaginary wheel of fire caused by a revolving torch; it breaks when it is touched.

२९२. वप्रप्राकारतल्पैश्च स्पर्शनावरणे यथा ।
नगरेषु न ते तद्वद्गन्धर्वनगरेष्वपि ॥

292. While a rampart, a fort, or a turret in a real city can be touched, covered and so on, the same cannot be done with those in a magic city.

२९३. मृगपश्वादिभिर्यावान् मुख्यैरर्थः प्रसाध्यते ।
तावान् न मृण्मयेऽप्यस्ति तस्मात्ते विषयः कनः ॥

293. Actions of the type performed by the original animals are not performed by their models made of clay. Therefore (the suffix) 'kan' is added to such words (for forming the words which denote the models).

२९४. महानाक्रियते देशः प्रसिद्धैः पर्वतादिभिः ।
अल्पदेशान्तरावस्थं प्रतिबिम्बं तु दृश्यते ॥

294. A large space is occupied by real mountains and the like. But their images are found to occupy only a small space.

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२५५. —न्नतं चित्रं घ, ङ

२९५. मरणादिनिमित्तं च यथा मुख्या विषादयः ।
न ते स्वप्नादिषु स्वस्य तद्वदर्थस्य साधकाः ॥

295. While real poison, etc., can cause death, they are not able to produce the same effects in a dream.

२९६. देशकालेन्द्रियगतैर्भेदैर्यद् दृश्यतेऽन्यथा ।
यथा प्रसिद्धिर्लोकस्य तथा तदवसीयते ॥

296. (The argument is concluded) :—
A thing which appears otherwise, due to differences in time, place, or the sense-organs (with which it is perceived), is, nevertheless, finally understood in the form in which it is well-known to the world.

२९७. यच्चोपघातजं ज्ञानं यच्च ज्ञानमलौकिकम् ।
न ताभ्यां व्यवहारोऽस्ति शब्दा लोकनिबन्धनाः ॥

297. The knowledge whose source is an error, and the knowledge which is not about the world (of sense-experience) are beyond words. Words are instruments of empirical knowledge.

२९८. घटादिषु यथा दीपो येनार्थेन प्रयुज्यते ।
ततोऽन्यस्यापि [२५६]साचिव्यात्स करोति प्रकाशनम् ॥

298. (After discussing the classification of meaning as primary and secondary, a primary-incidental classification of meaning is now discussed) :—
When a lamp is used associated with a pot with a specific purpose (of revealing the pot), the lamp also reveals another (additional) object (like a wall) in association with its original specific purpose.

२९९. संसर्गिषु तथार्थेषु शब्दो येन प्रयुज्यते ।
तस्मात्प्रयो[२५७]जकादन्यानपि प्रत्याययत्यसौ ॥

299. Similarly whatever (particular) meaning, out of the many meanings (of a word), operates as the (specific) cause for the employment of the word, the word also

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२५६. सान्निध्यात् —घ
२५७. —जनाद —घ

(incidentally) conveys meanings other than that operative one.

३००. निर्मन्थनं यथारण्योरग्न्यर्थमुपपादितम् ।
धूममप्यनभिप्रेतं जनयत्येकसाधनम् ॥

300. Just as the churning of two kindling sticks performed to produce fire produces also the unintended smoke, which has the same cause as the fire,

३०१. तथा शब्दोऽपि कस्मिश्चित्प्रत्याय्यार्थे विवक्षिते ।
अविवक्षितमप्यर्थं प्रकाशयति सन्निधेः ॥

301. —similarly, when a certain meaning which is to be conveyed is intended (when using a word), the word also conveys the unintended meaning due to its proximity (with the intended one).[80]

३०२. यथैवात्यन्तसंसृष्टस्त्यक्तुमर्थो न शक्यते ।
तथाशब्दोऽपि सम्बन्धी प्रविवेक्तुं न शक्यते ॥

302. Just as it is impossible to discard an object which is in close connection with another, similarly a word which is in (intimate) connection with all its meanings cannot be divided (in its function).

३०३. [२५८]व्यर्थानां सन्निधानेऽपि सति चैषां प्रकाशने ।
प्रयोजकोऽर्थः शब्दस्य रूपाभेदेऽपि शस्यते ॥

303. Even when unrequired meanings are present and revealed, the meaning which is operative is accepted. word-from remaining the same.

३०४. क्वचिद्गुणप्रधानत्वमर्थानामविवक्षितम् ।
क्वचित्सान्निध्यमप्येषां प्रतिपत्तावकारणम् ॥

304. (A discussion follows about the relation between primary meaning and secondary meaning) :—

In some places the distinction of meaning into primary and secondary is not intended. And in some (other) places even the presence of a secondary meaning does

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२५८. अर्था —घ, ङ

not act as the cause for the word to operatie (in the context).

३०५. यच्चानुपात्तं[259] शब्देन तत्कस्मिंश्चित्प्रतीयते ।
क्वचित्प्रधानमेवार्थो भवत्यन्यस्य लक्षणम् ॥

305. In some (other) places the meaning which the word actually conveys is the one which it does not verbally indicate. Elsewhere the principal meaning points to another meaning.

३०६. आख्यातं तद्धितार्थस्य यत्किञ्चिदुपदर्शकम् ।
गुणप्रधानभावस्य तत्र दृष्टो विपर्ययः ॥

306. When the verb conveys the idea of a taddhita, the primary and secondary meaning are seen to exchange their status.

३०७क. निर्देशे लिङ्गसंख्यानां सन्निधानमकारणम् ।
३०७ख. प्रमाणमेव ह्रस्वादावनुपात्तं प्रतीयते ॥

307a. (Even) when gender and number are expressed, their presence is not the operative cause (for the word to function in the context).

307b. In the expression "a short vowel" etc. what is understood is a mātra, and this is not stated.

३०८. ह्रस्वस्यार्द्धं च यद् दृष्टं तत्तस्यासन्निधावपि ।
ह्रस्वस्य लक्षणार्थत्वात्तद्वदेवाभिधीयते ॥

308. And when it is stated "half of a short vowel" this is understood in the same way (i.e., as meaning a mātra) even in the contexts of long and prolonged vowels, since the expression "short vowel" is used in a representative sense.

३०९क. दीर्घप्लुताभ्यां तस्य स्यात् मात्रया वा विशेषणम् ।
३०९ख. जातेर्वा लक्षणा यस्मात्सर्वथा सप्तपर्णवत् ॥

309a. (Three ways of interpreting the word (ardhahrasvam' (half of a short vowel) in the sūtra referred to above are discussed) :—

259. Stanzas 305, 306 and 307 a are omitted in manuscript ग.

It (i.e., the word 'ardha') applies also to the long and the prolonged (vowels, apart from applying to the short vowel); Or it might qualify (and apply to) a mātra.

309b. Or again a class might also be understood by implication from it.

३१०. गन्तव्यं दृश्यतां सूर्य इति कालस्य लक्षणे।
ज्ञायतां काल इत्येतत्सोपायमभिधीयते ॥

310. (This stanza illustrates the point stated in the second half of 307) :—
'We must go now. Look at the sun'—when time is indicated by implication in this way the idea 'know the time' is conveyed through its means.

३११. विध्यत्यधनुषेत्यत्र विशेषेण निदर्श्यते ।
सामान्यमाश्रयः शक्तेर्यः कश्चित्प्रतिपादकः ॥

311. (The same idea is further illustrated) :—
In the injunction, 'Pierce without a bow' a general instrument is indicated by the particular. The basis of the capacity (for the instrument to pierce) is provided for by any (object).

३१२. काकेभ्यो रक्ष्यतां सर्पिरिति बालोऽपि चोदितः।
उपघातपरे वाक्ये न श्वादिभ्यो न रक्षति ॥

312. A boy who is instructed to protect clarified butter from crows does not prevent himself from protecting it from dogs and the like, the (instructing) sentence having the significance of protecting (the clarified butter), in general.

३१३. प्रक्षालनं शरावाणां स्थालीनां[२६०] मार्जनं तथा।
अनुक्तमपि रूपेण भुज्यङ्गत्वात्प्रतीयते ॥

313. (Sometimes secondary ideas are conveyed as accessories to the principal meaning without making an actual statement of them) :—
(From the very expression 'Give him food') the (ideas

२६०. स्थाननिमर्जिनं —घ

of the) washing of the plates and the scrubbing of the pots are conveyed although they are not mentioned by words because they form accessories to the act of eating.

३१४. [२६१]वाक्यात्प्रकरणादर्थादौचित्याद्देशकालतः ।
शब्दार्थाः प्रविभज्यन्ते न रूपादेव केवलात् ॥

314. (The factors which help to determine the meaning of a word are now discussed) :—
The meanings of words are determined from (their) syntactical connection (in the sentence), situation-context, the meaning of another word, propriety, place, and time, and not from their mere form.

३१५. संसर्गो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता ।
अर्थः[२६२] प्रकरणं लिङ्गं शब्दस्यान्यस्य सन्निधि:॥[२६३]

315. (Another list) : (Constant) association (of two things), (their) dissociation, company, and hostility, the meaning (of another word), situation-context, evidence from another sentence, and the proximity of another word.[81]

३१६. भेदपक्षेऽपि सारूप्याद्भिन्नार्थाः प्रतिपत्तिषु[२६४] ।
नियता यान्त्यभिव्यक्ति शब्दः प्रकरणादिभिः ॥

316. Even according to the view of the plurality of the word (i.e., in the view that with each meaning a word becomes a different entity although it may retain its phonetic form,) words which have the same form but which, on realisation are found to be different in meaning have their meanings understood after they are determined by means of situation-context and the like.

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२६१. अर्थात्प्रकरणाल्लिङ्गादौ —घ

२६२. अर्थप्रकर—ङ

263. After this verse, the following verse is found which is not found in the Benaras text (ख).
सामर्थ्यमौचिती देशः कालो व्यक्तिस्वरादयः ।
शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्मृतिहेतवः ॥

२६४. —पत्तृषु—घ

३१७. नामाख्यातसरूपा ये कार्यान्तरनिबन्धनाः ।
शब्दा[२६५] वाच्यश्च तेष्वर्थो न रूपादधिगम्यते[२६६] ॥

317. Words, which, according to their application in one way or another are either nouns or verbs though of identical form, do not have the meaning which they are to convey understood from their form alone (but also from context etc.)

३१८. या प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यर्था स्तुतिनिन्दाप्रकल्पना ।
कुशलः प्रतिपत्ता तामयथार्थां प्रतीयते[२६७] ॥

318. The employment of praise and censure as incentives to action and inaction is understood by a clever hearer as being not literally intended.

३१९. विधीयमानं यत्कर्म दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनम् ।
स्तूयते सा स्तुतिस्तस्य कर्त्तुरेव प्रयोजिका ॥

319. That action which has been enjoined (in the Vedas) as productive of result tangible or intangible is praised; and praise is only an incentive to the performer.

३२०. व्याघ्रादिव्यपदेशेन यथा बालो निवर्त्यते ।
असत्योऽपि तथा कश्चित्प्रत्यवायो विधीयते ॥

320. Just as a child is dissuaded from crying by the threat of a tiger and the like (eating it), similarly an evil result (of the nonperformance of a sacrificial action) is stated, which is not true.

३२१. न संविधानं कृत्वापि प्रत्यवाये तथाविधे ।
शास्त्रेण प्रतिषिद्धेऽर्थे विद्वान् कश्चित्प्रतीयते ॥

321. When an evil result of this sort is laid down, no wise man performs an action (thus) prohibited, after avoiding it. (i.e., the evil result).

३२२. सर्पेषु संविधायापि सिद्धैर्मन्त्रौषधादिभिः ।
नान्यथा प्रतिपत्तव्यं न दतो गमयेदिति ॥

322. The prohibition 'Do not eat (puroḍāśa) with the teeth'

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२६५. शब्दवाच्यश्च—ङ
२६६. —दपि गम्य—घ
२६७. समीहते—घ

should not be sct aside by avoiding the serpents through effective spells and medicines.

३२३. क्वचित्तत्त्वसमाख्यानं क्रियते स्तुतिनिन्दयोः ।
तत्रापि च प्रवृत्तिश्च निवृत्तिश्चोपदिश्यते ॥

323. In some places, praise and censure are made as the real meanings (of the passages); but even in these places action and absention from action are enjoyed.

३२४क. रूपं सर्वपदार्थानां वाक्यार्थोपनिबन्धनम् ।
३२४ख. सापेक्षा ये तु वाक्यार्थाः पदार्थैरेव ते समाः ॥

324.a The nature of all word-meaning is dependent on the meaning of the sentence.

324b. That meaning of a sentence (i.e., of a clause) which is itself dependent (on the meaning of other sentences) is comparable to the meaning of a word.

३२५क. वाक्यं तदपि मन्यन्ते यत्पदं चरितक्रियम् ।

325a. A single word which has a verb implied in it is also considered as a sentence (and therefore is a final reality as an utterance)[82]

३२५ख. आख्यातशब्दे नियतं साधनं यत्र गम्यते[२६८] ।
३२६क. तदप्येकं समासार्थं[२६९] वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥

325b. That verb in which a specific nominal category is
326a. (automatically) understood (as existing by implication) is also called a sentence because it has a completed meaning.[83]

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268. After this, the manuscript घ gives two additional lines.They are :

अन्तरेण क्रियाशब्दं
वाक्यादेवानिदर्शनात्

२६९. —माप्तार्थ—घ

३२६ख. शब्दव्यवहिता बुद्धिरप्रयुक्तपदाश्रया ।
३२७क. अनुमानात्तदर्थस्य प्रत्यये हेतुरुच्यते ॥[२७०]

326b. (To the Mīmāṃsaka, a single word-utterance is not an
327a. integral sentence. According to him, in such cases too the meaning of the sentence is made up through the addition of wordmeanings. He expounds the theory of srutārthāpatti in this connection).

The act of intellection in which the uttered word intervening (between itself and the unuttered word) and working in association with the unuttered word is considered as causing the comprehension of the meaning of the letter through inference.

३२७ख. यस्मिंस्तूच्चरिते शब्दे यदा योऽर्थः प्रतीयते ।
३२८क. तमाहुरर्थं तस्यैव नान्यदर्थस्य लक्षणम् ॥

327b. (The grammarian's objection to such inference is given)
328a. When a certain utterance is made and a meaning is conveyed through it, that meaning is considered as the meaning of that utterance alone. None else is the definition of meaning.

३२८ख. क्रियार्थोपपदेष्वेवं स्थानिनां गम्यते क्रिया ।
३२९क. वृत्तौ निरादिभिश्चैव क्रान्ताद्यर्थो[२७१] **ऽवगम्यते ॥**

328b. (Cases of utterances conveying the meaning of the un-
329a. uttered also are given) In the case of secondary words with a verbal significance, that action (which is the meaning) of the verbs whose place they occupy is understood.[84] And the sense of 'gone' etc., is understood from indeclinables like 'niḥ' themselves in complex combinations.

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270. After this the manuscript घ gives the following stanza :—

अपरे तु पदस्यैव तमर्थं प्रतिजानते ।
शब्दान्तरादिसम्बन्धमन्तरेण व्यवस्थितम् ॥

२७१. र्थः प्रतीयते—घ

३२९ख. तानि शब्दान्तराण्येव ॥[२७२]
३३०क. पर्याया इव लौकिकाः ॥
३३०ख. अर्थप्रकरणाभ्यां तु तेषां स्वार्थो नियम्यते ॥

329b. (If thus, the meaning of the sentence 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati' can
330a. be obtained from the utterance of the word 'vṛkṣaḥ' then
330b. why use the word 'tiṣṭhati' at all in such utterances as 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati' ? —a question put to the grammarian.) They (i.e., the word 'vṛkṣaḥ' as meaning an object as its referent, and the word 'vṛkṣaḥ' as an utterance implying the verb "tiṣṭhati') are two different pieces and are comparable to synonyms in everyday language. And their own meanings are determined by the meaning of the accompanying words, situation-context, etc.[85]

३३१क. प्रतिबोधाभ्युपायास्तु[२७३] ये तं तं पुरुषं प्रति ॥
३३१ख. नावश्यं तेऽभिसम्बद्धाः[२७४] शब्दाः ज्ञेयेन वस्तुना ।

331a. Words which are means of the understanding (of the
331b. meaning of the sentence) for each individual person are not necessarily connected directly to the thing meant[86]

३३२. असत्यां प्रतिपत्तौ च[२७५] मिथ्या वा प्रतिपादने ।
स्वैरर्थैर्नित्यसम्बद्धास्ते ते शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः ॥

332. (If meaning of an utterance is what is understood when the utterance is made (327b and 328a) then non-comprehension of meaning or comprehension of a false-meaning can also form meanings of utterance). Even when there is no comprehension of meaning (from a word) or when a wrong meaning is comprehended, such words remain fixedly connected to their own meanings.

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272 After the stanza, the numbering in the Benaras text (ख) is as 334a. This is a mistake and is corrected here.

२७३. —पायस्तु—घ

२७४. —ते ऽपि सम्बद्ध

२७५. वा—घ

३३३. यथाप्रकरणं द्वारमित्यस्यां कर्मणः श्रुतौ ।
बधान देहि [२७६]वेत्येतदुपायादधिगम्यते ॥

333. (Therefore the Mīmāṃsaka re-states the 'S'rutārthāpatti-view stated in 326b and 327a.).
When the word 'dvāram' (door or way) in the accusative is heard, either (the meaning) 'close the door' or (the meaning) 'allow to enter the door' is obtained according to the situation context, in accordance with the intention of the speaker.

३३४. यत्र साधनवृत्तिर्यः शब्दः सत्त्वनिबन्धनः ।
न सप्रधानभूतस्य साध्यस्यार्थस्य वाचकः ॥

334. (The grammarian's view that the one-word utterance vṛksa which is a sentence conveys the meaning of 'vṛksa-stiṣṭhati' without bringing the unuttered word in the context is criticised by the Mīmāṃsaka). Since a word (like 'vṛkṣaḥ) symbolises a means (i.e., the word-meaning which is the means to the realisation of the meaning of the sentence) and is connected to an existent (as its meaning), it cannot convey the meaning (of a sentence like 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati') which is principal and is to be accomplished.

३३५. स्वार्थमात्रं प्रकाश्यासौ साकाङ्क्षो विनिवर्त्तते ।
अर्थस्तु तस्य सम्बन्धी प्रकाशयति सन्निधिम् ॥

335. (The Mīmāṃsaka re-states the Śrutārthāpatti-position):—
It (i.e., the word 'vṛkṣaḥ'), having expressed its meaning alone, retires with expectancy; and its meaning which is connected (to another meaning) brings to light the proximity (of the latter).

३३६. [२७७]पारार्थस्याविशिष्टत्वान्न शब्दाच्छब्दसन्निधिः ।
नार्थाच्छब्दस्य सान्निध्यं न शब्दादर्थसन्निधिः[२७८] ॥

336. (The grammarian criticises the Mīmāṃsaka's view):—

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२७६. चे--ङ

२७७. परार्थस्य घ, ङ

278. Manuscript च does not give the second half of this stanza begining with नार्थाच्छन्दस्य etc.

Since the other meaning is not specifically given, the proximity of another word cannot be obtained from the (uttered) word; nor the proximity of the word from the meaning of the uttered word; nor the proximity of the meaning (of the unuttered word) from the (uttered) word.

३३७. नष्टरूपमिवाख्यातमाक्षिप्तं कर्मवाचिना[२७९] ।
यदि प्राप्तं प्रधानत्वं युगपद्भावसत्त्वयोः ॥

337. (Another criticism of the grammarian's position is made by the Mīmaṃsaka. vṛkṣaḥ is a noun; tiṣṭhati is a verb. How can the one convey the meaning of the other also?) If the verb whose form has, so to speak, disappeared is also brought to light by the word (in the accusative) which conveys (the idea of) the object, then there shall be the simultaneous presence as primary ideas (in the same word) of 'becoming' and 'existence' (i.e, the verbal and the nominal notions).[88]

३३८क. तैस्तु नामसरूपत्वमाख्यातस्योपवर्ण्यते[२८०] ।
३३८ख. अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्यवहारो विभज्यते ॥

338.a (The Grammarian replies) —
The verb is described by them (i.e., by the teachers of the school of grammar) as having a form similar to the noun.

338b. And usage is distinguished on the evidence of the principle of association and (absence of) dissociation.

३३९क. न चापि रूपात्सन्देहे वाचकत्वं निवर्त्तते ।
३३९ख. अर्द्धं पशोरिव[२८१] यथा सामर्थ्यात्तद्विकल्प्यते ॥

339a. Even when there is doubt (as to the proper meaning of a word), due to its having the same form in its several occurances, the expressives power of the word is not affected.

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२७९. —वादिना ख, घ
२८०. —स्यास्य वर्ण्यते —घ
२८१. —रिति —घ

339b. As is found in the case of the meaning of (the expression) ardham paśoḥ (half of the sacrificial animal), in the same way it(i e., expressive capacity of words) is decided on the basis of competency as the factor.

३४०. सर्वं सत्त्वपदं शुद्धं यदि भावनिबन्धनम् ।
संसर्गे च विभक्तो[२८२]ऽस्य तस्यार्थो न पृथग्यदि ॥

340. (Another objection against the grammarian's Akhaṇḍa-position :— If all 'existence-words' (i.e., nouns) are linked with 'becoming' (i.e., the verbal notion) in combination, and have no separate meanings as isolates,

३४१. क्रियाप्रधानमाख्यातं नाम्नां सत्त्वप्रधानता ।
चत्वारि पदजातानि सर्वमेतद्विरुध्यते ।

341. —then all such (statements of grammar) as "a verb primarily denotes an action", "nouns primarily denote existence" and "there are four kinds of words" stand contradicted.

३४२. वाक्यस्य बुद्धौ नित्यत्वमर्थयोगं च लौकिकम् ।
दृष्ट्वा चतुष्ट्वं नास्तीति [२८३]वार्त्ताक्षौदुम्बरायणौ ॥

342. (Grammarian's answer) Vārttākṣa and Audumbarāyaṇa hold that there are no four classes of words, when it is considered that the sentence is real (only) in the mind, and that its being linked with word-meanings is only (a matter of) ordinary practice.[89]

३४३. व्याप्तिमांश्च लघुश्चैव व्यवहारः पदाश्रयः ।
लोके शास्त्रे च कार्यार्थं विभागेनैव कल्पितः ॥

343. In life and in grammar, the description (of a sentence) in terms of words, is (both) wide (in its use) and is (also) easy and it is artificially employed, following (the technique of) analysis.[90]

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२८२. —भक्तस्य —घ

२८३. वदत्यौदुम्बरायणः —घ

३४४. न लोके प्रतिपतॄणामर्थयोगात्प्रसिद्धयः ।
तस्मादलौकिको वाक्यादन्यः कश्चिन्न विद्यते ॥

344. In life, listeners do not obtain (the meaning of the sentence) as associated with word-meanings. Therefore other than the sentence, there is nothing which is more than (a mere matter of) ordinary practice.

३४५. अन्यत्र श्रूयमाणैश्च लिङ्गैर्वाक्येषु सूचिताः ।
स्वार्था एव प्रतीयन्ते रूपाभेदादलक्षिताः ॥

345. The meaning of words not determinable (by themselves) because of the lack of specification in their forms is determined only from the sentence on the basis of evidence stated elsewhere.

३४६. उत्सर्गवाक्ये यदुक्तमशब्दमिव शब्दवत् ।
तद् बाधकेषु वाक्येषु श्रुतमन्यत्र गम्यते ॥

346. (A discussion of the problem of rules and exceptions follows. This naturally is connected with the grammarian's central theme of the integral nature of utterances, and their meanings). An exception which is verbally made in a general rule, (verbally made because it forms part of the significance of the general rule) but apparently without a specific verbal statement of it, is stated separately in a statement of exception and its meaning accrues elsewhere (i.e., to the general rule).[91]

३४७. ब्राह्मणानां श्रुतिर्दध्नि प्रक्रान्ता [२८४]माठरं विना ।
माठरस्तक्रसम्बन्धात्तत्राचष्टे यथार्थताम् ॥

347. The injunction about sour-milk for Brahmins is previously made excluding the Māṭharas (and the statement of) the Māṭhara being connected with curds declares this as a real fact.

३४८. अनेकाख्यातयोगेऽपि वाक्यं न्याय्यापवादयोः ।
एकमेवेष्यते कैश्चिद्भिन्नरूपमिव स्थितम् ॥

348. It is considered by some that a rule and an exception

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२८४. —क्रान्तान्माठराद्विना —घ

form one sentence (statement) even if they have several verbs. Only, they appear to be different sentences.

३४९क. नियमः प्रतिषेधश्च विधिशेषस्तथा सति ।
३४९ख. द्वितीये यो लुगाख्यातस्तच्छेषमलुकं विदुः॥

349a. Thus a restriction or prohibition forms part of the general injunction; and since this is so, commentators say that the prohibition of 'luk' (in Panini Chapter VI) forms part of the enjoining of 'luk' in Chapter 2.

३५०. निराकाङ्क्षाणि निर्वृत्तौ प्रधानानि परस्परम् ।
तेषामनुपकारित्वात्कथं स्यादेकवाक्यता ॥

350. (Here the upholder of the doctrine that such sentences are really distinct intervenes) :—

When the sentences have no expectancy (for anything outside) and are at rest so to speak, they are independent of one another. Therefore, since there is the absence of a relation of one being for the sake of the other, how can they together form one sentence ?

३५१. विशेषविधिनार्थित्वाद्वाक्यशेषोऽनुमीयते ।
विशेषवन्निवर्त्येऽर्थे तस्मात्तुल्यं व्यपेक्षणम् ॥

351. (The upholder of the view that the two form one sentence replies) :—

A special rule causes the remaining part of a sentence (i.e., the prohibitory sentence here) to be inferred because it (the special rule) needs such inference. Therefore, there is in the object to be prohibited as much expectancy as there is in the object of the special rule.

३५२. संज्ञाशब्दैकदेशो यस्तस्य लोपो न विद्यते ।
विशिष्टरूपा सा संज्ञा कृता च न निवर्त्तते ॥

352. (If the recognition of parts in a sentence and the meaning of the sentence is wrong, the recognition of parts in a word is equally meaningless)

There is no elision of a part of a proper name. A proper name which is coined in a particular form does not relinquish that form.

३५३क. संज्ञान्तराच्च दत्तादेर्नान्या संज्ञा प्रतीयते ।
३५३ख. संज्ञिनं देवदत्ताख्यं दत्तशब्दः कथं वदेत् ॥

353a. Another name is not conveyed from (the use of) a name like 'Datta'.

.353b. How can the word 'Datta' name the 'person-named' called 'Devadatta' ?

३५४. सर्वैरवयवैस्तुल्यं सम्बन्धं समुदायवत् ।
केचिच्छब्द[२८५] स्वरूपाणां मन्यन्ते सर्वसंज्ञिभिः ॥

354. Some hold that all the parts of a name are (individually) as much connected to the 'person-named' as the totality (of the word) is.

३५५क. वर्णानामर्थवत्त्वं तु संज्ञानां संज्ञिभिर्भवेत् ।
३५५ख. सम्बद्धो[२८६] ऽवयवः संज्ञाप्रविवेकेन कल्प्यते ॥

355a. (Two objections are raised against this view) :—In that case the syllables of a proper name will be meaningful through the 'person-named.'

३५६. सर्वस्वरूपैर्युगपत् सम्बन्धे सति संज्ञिनः ।
नैकदेशसरूपेभ्यस्तत्प्रत्यायनसम्भवः ॥

356. (To re-state this objection) :—
Since the 'person-named' is related to all parts at the same time, it cannot be conveyed by something which looks like one part.

३५७. एकदेशात्तु सङ्घाते केषाञ्चिज्जायते स्मृतिः ।
स्मृतेस्तु विषयाच्छब्दात्सङ्घातार्थः प्रतीयते ॥

357. (Another view on the subject is given) :—
According to some people recollection of the aggregate (of the parts) is brought about by a part. (And) the word which thus becomes an object of recollection conveys the meaning of the aggregate (i.e., of itself).

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२८५. —चित्त बुद्धिरूपाणां —घ

२८६. —म्बन्धोऽवयवः ख, घ

३५८. एकदेशात्स्मृतिर्भिन्ने सङ्घाते जायते कथम् ।
कथं प्रतीयमानः स्याच्छब्दोऽर्थस्याभिधायकः ।

358. (This view is criticised) :—

(But), through a part (of the word) how can there occur a recollection of the aggregate which is different from it ? How can a word which is recollected convey a meaning ?[92]

३५९. एकदेशसरूपास्तु तैस्तैर्लिङ्गैः[२८७] समन्विताः ।
अनुनिष्पादिनः शब्दाः संज्ञासु समवस्थिताः ।

359. (The author's doctrine is stated) :—

Words which have the appearance of being parts of a name, and have their own marks (for distinguishing them) are fixed (as parts) in names because they are produced along with the names.

३६०. साधारणत्वात्सन्दिग्धाः सामर्थ्यान्नियताश्रयाः ।
तेषां ये साधवस्तेषु शास्त्रे लोपादि शिष्यते ॥

360. Words (like 'Deva' and 'Datta') which are ambiguous in meaning due to their having a common form (for different meanings), which nevertheless convey (through combination) a fixed meaning (like Devadatta) by virtue of their fixed capacity and are, therefore, considered correct usage are enjoined for elision and the like in grammar.[93]

३६१. तुल्यायामनुनिष्पत्तौ ज्ये द्रा घ इत्यसाधवः ।
न ह्यान्वाख्यायके शास्त्रे तेषु दत्तादिवत्स्मृतिः ॥

361. (But) parts like 'jye') (from 'Jayeṣṭha, 'for instance), 'drā' (from 'drākṣā', for instance) and 'gha' (from 'māgha', for instance) are not valid (as capable of conveying the meaning of the whole), although they are also produced simultaneously with the whole words. These are not (therefore) mentioned in the explanatory section (of grammar).

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२८७. —स्तैर्भेदैः —घ

३६२. कृतणत्वाश्रये शब्दा नित्यं खरणसादयः ।
एकद्रव्योपदेशित्वात्तान् साधून् संप्रचक्षते ॥

362. Words like 'kharaṇasa' are technically immutable after the change (of 'n') into 'ṇ' is effected. They are considered as correct forms because they convey the idea of integral objects.[94]

३६३. गोत्राण्येव तु तान्याहुः संज्ञाशक्तिसमन्वयात् ।
निमित्तापेक्षणं तेषु स्वार्थेनावश्यमिष्यते ॥

363. They (the proper names) are described as clan-names; and since they possess the power of proper names, they do not necessarily require an (external) cause to aid them to convey their meanings.

३६४. व्यवहाराय नियमः संज्ञानां संज्ञिनि क्वचित् ।
नित्य एव तु सम्बन्धो डित्थादिषु गवादिवत्[२८८] ॥

364. Sometimes the use of a proper name is limited to one 'named' for (convenience of) usage. But the word-meaning relation is permanent in the case of (proper names) 'Datta' and the like as in the case of (words like) 'gauḥ'.

३६५. वृद्धयादीनां च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन् शक्त्यवच्छेदलक्षणः ।
अकृत्रिमो[२८९]भिसम्बन्धो विशेषणविशेष्यवत्[२९०] ॥

365. (The permanent nature of the mutual connection between word and meaning is true also of technical terms in grammar).

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288. After this the manuscript घ gives the following additional verses.

कृतकत्वादनित्यत्वं सम्बन्धस्योपजायते ।
संज्ञायां स हि पुरुषैर्यथाकामं नियुज्यते ॥
यथा हि पांसुलेखानां बालकैर्मधुरादयः ।
संज्ञा क्रियन्ते सर्वासु संज्ञास्वेषैव कल्पना ॥

२८९. मो हि सं—घ ख

२९०. Manuscript ङ does not give stanza 365, but comments on it.

And in grammar (technical terms) 'vṛddhi' and the like bear (with their meanings) a relation which is (fundamentally) not started (by any agent), but, which is characterised (only) by a particularisation in their function as in the case of (the relation between a qualifier and a qualified).[95]

३६६. संज्ञास्वरूपमाश्रित्य निमित्ते सति लौकिकी ।
काचित्प्रवर्त्तते काचिन्निमित्तासन्निधावपि ॥

366. Some everyday proper names function through their forms aided by causal factors; others even in the absence of such.

३६७. शास्त्रे तु महती संज्ञा स्वरूपोपनिबन्धना ।
अनुमानं निमित्तस्य सन्निधाने प्रतीयते ॥

367. The long technical terms used in grammar depend on their forms (in conveying their meaning). And inference reveals the presence of causal factors (aiding the understanding of the meaning of these terms).[96]

३६८. आवृत्तेरनुमानं वा सारूप्यात्तत्र लभ्यते ।
शब्दभेदानुमानं वा शक्तिभेदस्य वा गतिः ॥

368. (On repeating such a long technical term as an experiment to understand its relation with its parts) the inference is either made on the basis of the sameness of form, that it is a repetition (of the same word); or that they are two different words; or that there is a difference in the aspect of the functioning of the same word).[97]

३६९क. क्वचिद्विषयभेदेन कृत्रिमा व्यवतिष्ठते ।
३६९ख. संख्यायामेकविषयं व्यवस्थानं द्वयोरपि ॥

369a. (Two kinds of technical terms used in grammar are discussed) :—

In some places (in grammar) coined technical terms are used with different significations.[97a]

369b. In the Sūtra on numbers the same technical term (namely 'saṃkhyā') is used as a coined one and as a natural one.[98]

३७०. विषयं कृत्रिमस्यापि लौकिकः क्वचिदुच्चरन् ।
व्याप्नोति दूरात्सम्बुद्धौ तथा हि ग्रहणं तयोः ॥

370. (Sometimes) a term with a non-technical sense when uttered might extend in application as a coined one. It is in this way that both are understood from the statement 'dūrātsambuddhau'.[99]

३७१. संघैकशेषद्वन्द्वेषु केचित्सामर्थ्यलक्षणम् ।
प्रत्याश्रयमवस्थानं क्रियाणां प्रतिजानते ॥

371. (The following discussion is whether the verb in a sentence with a group subject refers to the individual or to the group) :—
The verb (i.e., the verbal meaning) (in a sentence) is considered by some to be connected to a group, or an individual or a dvandva compound (as the subject), depending upon its 'meaning-capacity'.[100]

३७२. भोजनं फलरूपाभ्यामेकैकस्मिन् समाप्यते ।
अन्यथा हि व्यवस्थाने न तदर्थः प्रकल्प्यते[२९०] ॥

372. Eating, both in regard to the result of the act and the act itself is accomplished by the individual. Considered otherwise the meaning of verb cannot be understood.

३७३. अन्नादानादिरूपां च सर्वे तृप्तिफलां भुजिम् ।
प्रत्येकं प्रतिपद्यन्ते न तु नाटयक्रियामिव ॥

373. All (the Brahmins) individually perform the action of eating which assumes such forms as the taking of food, etc., and which has the satisfaction of hunger as its result, unlike actions such as dancing.

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२९०. प्रतीयते ख.

३७४. पाद्यवत्सा विभागेन सामर्थ्यादवतिष्ठते ।
भुजिः करोति भुज्यर्थं न तन्त्रेण प्रदीपवत् ॥

374. Like (the ceremony of) washing of feet[101] the verb 'bhuj' ('to eat') remains attached to individuals because of its 'meaning-capacity'. Unlike a lamp, the verb 'bhuj' does not accomplish its purpose (namely, satisfying hunger) on a group-basis.[102]

३७५. दृश्यादिस्तु क्रियैकापि तथाभूतेषु कर्मसु ।
आवृत्तिमन्तरेणापि समुदायाश्रया भवेत्

375. On the other hand a verb like 'dṛs' ('to see') although it is stated only once (in a sentence with a plural subject) functions, in bringing about the appropriate actions as pertaining to the group without their being repeated.

३७६. भिन्नव्यापाररूपाणां व्यवहारादिदर्शने ।
कर्तृणां दर्शनं भिन्नं सम्भूयार्थस्य साधकम् ॥

376. As for the aspects of performance, etc., (namely, holding the food, heating it, etc., which unite to make up the act of cooking), the different aspects of the agents (i.e., Devadatta, the pot and the fire), which have different tasks to perform unite to accomplish the meaning (of the verb.

३७७. लक्ष्यस्य लोकसिद्धत्वाच्छास्त्रे लिङ्गस्य दर्शनात् ।
आर्थित्वादैक्षु भेदेन वृद्धिसंज्ञा [२९१]समाप्यते ॥

377. The technical term 'vṛddhi' refers individually to its 'symbolised', namely, 'ā', 'ai', and 'au' since supporting examples are obtainable from life and evidence is seen in grammar.[104]

३७८. शातादाने [२९२]प्रधानत्वाद् दण्डने शातकर्मके ।
अर्थिनां गुणभेदेऽपि संख्येयोऽर्थो न भिद्यते ॥

378. In the matter of taking 100 (pieces as a fine from Gargās),

२९१. समाप्यते घ
२९२. —दानप्रथा—घ, ङ

since the prime sense lies in the fining which has the hundred as its object, this countable meaning is not divided up although there is a qualitative distinction between the individuals to whom the meaning of the word 'Gargāh' refers.[105]

३७९. संघस्यैव विधेयत्वात् कार्यवत्प्रतिपादने ।
तत्र तन्त्रेण सम्बन्धः समासाभ्यस्तसंज्ञयोः ॥

379. When considered from the view-point that names are given to 'the named' (as different from the view that the connection between a name and a named is timeless), the terms 'samāsa' (compound) and 'abhyasta' (reduplicated') describe the aggregate (of the components of the words) to which they are used to refer.

३८०. लक्षणार्था[२९३]स्तुतिर्येषां काञ्चिदेव क्रियां प्रति ।
तैर्व्यस्तैश्च समस्तैश्च स धर्म[२९४] उपलक्ष्यते ॥

380. When an instruction in reference to an action is made in regard to certain persons mentioning them in a representative capacity, the statement is considered to refer to them in a collective and individual capacity alike.

३८१. वृषलैर्न प्रवेष्टव्यमित्येतस्मिन् गृहे यथा ।
प्रत्येकं संहतानां च प्रवेशः प्रतिषिध्यते ॥

381. —just as in the sentence 'Vṛṣalas should not enter this house' the entry (of Vṛṣalas) individually and collectively is prohibited.[106]

३८२. संभूय त्वर्थलिप्सादिप्रतिषेधोपपादने ।
पृथगप्रतिषिद्धत्वात्प्रवृत्तिर्न विरुध्यते ॥

382. When a collective prohibition of an action like coveting wealth is made, the application (of the prohibition to the individuals) is not prevented on the ground that they have not been severally prohibited.

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२९३. श्रुतिर्ये —घ

२९४. —र्म इव लक्ष्यते घ

३८३. व्यवायलक्षणार्थत्वादट्कुप्वाङादिभिस्तथा ।
प्रत्येकं वा समस्तैर्वा णत्वं न प्रतिषिध्यते ॥

383. The change of 'n' into 'ṇ' (in words) takes place in spite of the intervention of aṅ, ku, pu, ā' etc., individually or collectively because the mention of these has the representative significance of 'intervention.'[107]

३८४. [२९५]अनुग्रहार्थं भोक्तॄणां भुजिरारभ्यते यदा ।
देशकालाद्यभेदेन नानुगृह्णाति तानसौ ॥

384. (The discussion on the act of eating is resumed) :— When the act of eating is begun for the satisfaction of the eaters does it not satisfy them without reference to place, time, etc ?

३८५. पात्रादिभेदान्नानात्वं यस्यैकस्योपदिश्यते ।
विपर्यये वा भिन्नस्य तस्यैकत्वं प्रकल्प्यते ॥

385. That single one (act of eating) to which plurality is attributed due to the difference of the plates (used) and the like is alternatively considered (by an opposite school) as being really different but assumed to be one.

३८६. संहृत्यापि च कुर्वाणा भेदेन प्रतिपादिता ।
स्वं स्वं भोज्यं विभागेन प्राप्तं संभूय भुञ्जते ॥

386. When the action of eating is performed collectively, but is stated individually then they eat together having each taken his own food separately.[108]

३८७. वीप्साया विषयाभावाद् विरोधादन्यसंख्यया ।
द्विधा समाप्त्ययोगाच्च शतं संघेऽवतिष्ठते ।

387. (The sentence 'Gargāḥ' s'atam daṇḍyantām' is again discussed) :—
Because there is no scope for reference to the individuals one after another since another number will contradict the sentence, and because it is impossible for the verb

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295. This karika is not seen after 383 in manuscript ङ. Instead the karika पात्रादिभेदा——etc. is given.

to have a dual application (i.e. to the individual and the group), the (meaning of the) word 's'atam' ('hundred') is located in the group.[109]

३८८. भुजिर्द्वन्द्वैकशेषाभ्यां यत्रान्यैः सह शिष्यते ।
[२९६] तत्रापि लक्षणार्थत्वाद् द्विधा वाक्यं समाप्यते ॥

388. When eating with others is prescribed by a dvandva compound or by an ekaseṣa (like pitarau for father and mother), there also the meaning of the sentence terminates both in the individual and in the group because of its representative significance.

३८९. वाक्यान्तराणां प्रत्येकं समाप्तिः कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
रूपान्तरेण युक्तानां वाक्यानां तेन संग्रहः ॥

389. Some consider that as far as the constituent clauses (of a compound sentence are enncerned each accomplishes its meaning separately and in this way the compound sentence is a collection of clauses (each) having different form.

३९०. न वाक्यस्याभिधेयानि भेदवाक्यानि कानिचित् ।
तस्मिंस्तूच्चरिते भेदांस्तथान्यान् प्रतिपद्यते ॥

390. There are no separate clauses which are presented by the compound sentence (during its utterance). (Only), after the latter is uttered, these others, which are parts are recognised.[110]

३९१. येषां समस्तो वाक्यार्थः प्रतिभेदं समाप्यते ।
तेषां तदानीं भिन्नस्य किं पदार्थस्य सत्तया ॥

391. (The Akhaṇḍavādin in this connection criticises the Padavādin) :—

To those, according to whom the total meaning of the sentence culminates[111] in the parts (i.e. in the words) individually, what is the need for the existence of a separate word-meaning ?

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२९६. तस्यापि ङ

३९२. अथ तैरेव जनितः सोऽर्थो भिन्नेषु वर्तते ।
पूर्वस्यार्थस्य तेन स्याद्विरोधः सह वा स्थितिः ॥

392. If the sentence-meaning which is formed out of them (i.e., the words) culminates in the separate parts of the sentence, (i.e., in the words), then either it contradicts the original word-meanings or coexists with them.

३९३.क सहस्थितौ विरोधित्वं स्याद्विशिष्टाविशिष्टयोः ।
ख व्यभिचारी तु सम्बन्धस्त्यागेऽर्थस्य प्रसज्यते ॥

393a. If they co-exist then there will be incompatibility between the qualified and the unqualified.[112]

393b. (And) in the dropping of its meaning (by the word) the relation (between, word and meaning) will have become inconstant.

३९४. एकः साधारणो वाच्यः प्रतिशब्दमवस्थितः ।
संघे संघेषु चार्थात्मा सन्निधाननिदर्शकः ॥

394. (The Akhaṇḍavadin's notion of the sentence-meaning culminating collectively is discussed) :—
The expressible meaning of the sentence which is common (to all the words) and which is established word by word exists in the aggregate and also in the component parts as is shown by the proximity (of the components with each other).[113]

३९५. यथा साधारणे स्वत्वं त्यागस्य च फलं धने ।
प्राप्तिश्चाविकला तद्वत् सम्बन्धोऽर्थेन तद्वता ॥

395. Just as there is the sense of possession, the (meritorious) result of giving and perfect happiness (for a group) in a common wealth, similar is the relation borne to meaning by those (ie the sentence and its parts) possessing it.[114]

३९६. वर्णानामर्थवत्तायां तेनवार्थेन तद्वति ।
समुदायेन चैकत्वं भेदेन व्यवतिष्ठते ॥

396. (In this connection the topic that case-endings are added to the aggregate of the letters and not to each letter, in a word is discussed). If the letters are individually meaningful then by virtue of the same meaning, it is in the aggregate which possesses that meaning and not individually that the singular suffix is added.[115]

३९७. एकेनैव प्रदीपेन सर्वे साधारणं धनम् ।
पश्यन्ति तद्वदेकेन सुपा संख्याऽभिधीयते ॥

397. Just as several people see a common treasure with one lamp, similarly grammatical number is expressed by one ending.

३९८. क नार्थवत्ता पदे वर्णे वाक्ये चैवं विशिष्यते ।
ख अभ्यासात्प्रक्रमोऽन्यस्तु विरुद्ध इव दृश्यते ॥

398a. (Therefore) meaningfulness does not exclusively belong to letters, words or sentences (but to aggregates).

398b. (But this does not contradict the Akhaṇḍa view stated originally that meaningfulness resides in the sentence) :— When a person is accustomed to a view, other views appear to be incompatible with it (but only appear to be so).

३९९. विनियोगादृते शब्दो न स्वार्थस्य प्रकाशकः ।
अर्थाभिधानसम्बन्धमुक्तिद्वारं प्रचक्षते ॥

399. (The essential condition for a word to convey its meaning is discussed) :—
A word does not convey its meaning without its being employed (for it). It is considered that the relationship between the meaning and the word conveying it has utterance as its gateway.

४००. यथा प्रणिहितं चक्षुर्दर्शनायोपकल्प्यते ।
तथाऽभिसंहितः शब्दो भवत्यर्थस्य वाचकः ॥

400. Just as the eye serves for seeing, only when directed (towards the object), so the word expresses its meaning only when it is purposefully uttered.

४०१. क्रियाव्य[२९७]वेतः सम्बन्धो दृष्टः करणकर्मणोः ।
अभिधा नियमस्तस्मादभिधानाभिधेययोः ॥

401. The relation between the 'instrument' and 'object' is found to be effected through the intervention of the verbal action (between them); similarly utterance governs the relation between a word and its meaning.

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२९७. —व्यपेतः घ

४०२. बहुष्वेकाभिधानेषु सर्वेष्वेकार्थकारिषु ।
यत्प्रोक्ताभिसन्धत्ते शब्दस्तत्रावतिष्ठते ॥

402. When several meanings may be conveyed by one word and several words may convey one meaning, a word operates on that meaning towards which the speaker directs it.[115]

४०३. आम्नायशब्दानभ्यासे केचिदाहुरनर्थकान् ।
स्वरूपमात्रवृत्तश्च परेषां प्रतिपादने ॥

403. Some say that Vedic words are meaningless when they are repeated (for practice) and when they are being taught to others they have their forms as their meaning.[116]

४०४. अभिधानाक्रिया[२९८]भेदादर्थस्य प्रतिपादकान् ।[२९८ए]
नियोग भेदान्मन्यन्ते तानेवैकत्वदर्शिनः ॥

404. Those who uphold the doctrine of the sameness of the word throughout all the instances of its occurence consider these same (Vedic words) as expressing (a 'thing-meant' as their) meaning (when they are employed in sacrificial actions) due to the difference in (the purpose of) their utterance, and due to their being (thus) directed otherwise.[117]

४०५. तेषामत्यन्तनानात्वं नानात्वव्यवहारिणः ।
अक्षादीनामिव प्राहुरेकजातिसमन्वयात् ॥

405. Those who consider that the word is different in every so-called instance of its occurence, hold that these are really different words and are only treated under one class-form as, for instance, the words 'akṣa' and others are.[118]

४०६. प्रयोगादभिसन्धान[२९९]मन्यदेषु न विद्यते ।
विषये यतशक्तित्वात्सतु तत्रा व्यवस्थितः ॥

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२९८. —यायोगाद —घ

२९८ए —पादकात् ख

299. The reading given in the Benares text is मपदेकन. This makes no sense. Manuscript घ gives the reading अन्यदेक which makes sense,

406. (Therefore, according to them), the speaker has not got to aim the word at the meaning (it is to convey) apart from (merely) uttering it. Because a word has the fixed capacity to denote a particular object, it remains connected to that meaning.[119]

४०७. नानात्वस्यैव संज्ञानामर्थप्रकरणादिभिः ।
न जात्वर्थान्तरे वृत्तिरन्यार्थानां कथञ्चन ॥

407. (And) it is the (real) difference (between apparently identical words) which is understood from (factors like) the meaning of another word, and situation-contcxt and not at all the employment of words-with-one-meaning in another meaning (of the same word).

४०८. पदरूपं तु[१००] यद्वाक्यमस्तित्वोपनिबन्धनम् ।
कामं विमर्शस्तत्रायं न वाक्यावयवे पदे ॥

408. Our discussion is about the sentence, which appears as a word and is dependent on the verb 'asti' (for its character of being a sentence): and not about a word which is part of a sentence.[120]

४०९. यथैवानर्थकैरेवं विशिष्टार्थोऽभिधीयते ॥
पदैरनर्थकैरेवं विशिष्टार्थोऽभिधीयते ॥

409. Just as (according to the Pada-school) letters which individually have no meaning present a specific word-meaning, similarly (according to our school) words having no meanings (of their own) present (the sentence which has) a specific meaning.

४१०. यदन्तराले ज्ञानं तु पदार्थेषूपजायते ।
प्रतिपत्तेरुपायोऽसौ प्रक्रमानवधारणात् ॥

410. That cognition of the meaning of words, which arises in the interim is a means to the understanding (of the meaning of the sentence), since we do not understand (the meaning of the sentence) in the beginning.[121]

४११. पूर्वैरर्थैरनुगतो यथार्थात्मा परः परः ।
संसर्ग एव प्रक्रान्तस्तथाऽन्येष्वर्थवस्तुषु ॥

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१००. —प च —घ

411. The nature of the meaning of the sentence is discussed. First the view according to the Anvitābhidhānavāda of the Mīmāmsaka is stated) :—
At the time when the meaning (of each subsequent words) is associated with the meaning of the preceding words, the coalescence (of the individual word-meanings) resides as an accomplished fact in these word-meanings.[122]

४१२. अङ्गीकृते तु केषाञ्चित् साध्येनार्थेन साधने ।
आधारनियमार्थैव साधनानां पुनः श्रुतिः ॥

412. According to some, the means is implied in the end which is to be effected. The actual mentioning of the case-relationships again is to restrict their sphere-of-operation.

४१३. आधारनियमाभावात्तदाक्षेपो न विद्यते ।
सामर्थ्यात्सम्भवस्तस्य श्रुति[३०१]स्त्वन्यनिवृत्तये ॥

413. Without this restriction of the sphere-of-operation no direct implication of it (i.e., the means) appears. It has a possible existence through potentiality and the actual mention of it is to rule out other (possibilities).

४१४. क्रिया क्रियान्तराद्भिन्ना नियताधारसाधना ।
प्रक्रान्ता प्रतिपत्तॄणां भेदाः सम्बोधहेतवः ॥

414. (Considering the verbal action as the meaning of the sentence). The action (that is the meaning of the verb), which is different from other actions, and the means of which has a specific sphere-of-operation (i.e., itself), is here stated (as the meaning of the sentence). Words (used in the sentence) are for the hearers to understand the meaning (of the sentence).

४१५. [३०२]अविभागं तु शब्देभ्यः क्रमवद्भ्योऽपदक्रमम् ।
प्रकाशते तदन्येषां वाक्यं वाक्यार्थमेव च ॥

415. (The Akhaṇḍa-position about the sentence and its meaning is re-stated) :—

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३०१. —तिस्तस्य —घ
३०२. प्रविभागन्तु घ

According to others the sentence as well as its meaning is an integral entity revealed by the words which are in a certain order, but it itself does not show the order of the words.

४१६. स्वरूपं विद्यते यस्य तस्यात्मा न निरूप्यते ।
नास्ति यस्य स्वरूपं तु तस्यैवात्मा निरूप्यते ॥

416. We do not investigate the real nature of that (here, the word-meaning) which (obviously) has a form of its own. It is only when a thing (here, the meaning of the sentence) does not have such a form that we seek for its essential nature.

४१७. अशब्दमपरेऽर्थस्य रूपनिर्द्धारणं विदुः ।
अर्थाविभासरूपा हि[३०३] शब्देभ्यो जायते स्मृतिः ॥

417. There are others who think that the understanding of the meaning of the sentence is not through words. The words only give rise to a mental recollection which has the appearance of the meaning (of the sentence).[123]

४१८. अन्यथैवाग्निसम्बन्धाद्दाहं दग्धोऽभिमन्यते ।
अन्यथा दाहशब्देन दाहा[३०४] र्थः प्रतीयते ॥

418. (Illustration for the notion that the real nature of things can be different from what one understands from words):— The burnt man understands burning in a certain way from his (direct) contact with fire; but the meaning 'burning' is conveyed by the word (burning) in a different way.

४१९. पृथङ्निविष्टतत्त्वानां पृथगर्थानुपातिनां ।
इन्द्रियाणां यथा कार्यमृते देहान्न कल्प्यते ॥

419. Just as the sense organs which possess separate principles, and act on their objects independently of each other cannot function except through the body,

४२०. तथा पदानां सर्वेषां पृथगर्थनिवेशिनाम् ।
वाक्येभ्यः प्रविभक्तानां अर्थवत्ता न विद्यते ॥

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३०३. च —घ

३०४. —हार्थस्सप्रं —घ

420. Similarly words which are fixed to their meanings independently of each other have no meaningfulness apart from sentences.

४२१. संसर्गरूपं संसृष्टेष्वर्थवस्तुषु गृह्यते ।
नात्रोपाख्यायते तत्वमपदार्थस्य दर्शनात् ॥

421. The meaning of the sentence is grasped as of the nature of a synthesis, when the individual word-meanings are in mutual association. Its essential nature is not presented (at the individual word-meanings) since it is seen as not being constituted of word-meanings.

४२२. दर्शनस्यापि यत्सत्यं न तथा दर्शनं स्थितम् ।
वस्तुसंसर्गरूपेण तदरूपं निरूप्यते ॥

422. A preception is not identical with its actual constituents (ie, the sense-data); and similarly that formless one (ie, the meaning of the sentence) is understood in the form of the synthesis of the word-meanings.

४२३. अस्तित्वेनानुषक्तो वा निवृत्यात्मनि वा स्थितः ।
अर्थोऽभिधीयते यस्मादतो वाक्यं प्रयुज्यते ॥

423. (Yet another argument to prove that the meaning of the sentence is conveyed only by the sentence) :—Since a fact is conveyed either as existent or as non-existent, only a sentence is used to convey it.[125]

४२४. क्रियानुषङ्गेण विना न पदार्थः प्रतीयते ।
सत्यो वा विपरीतो वा व्यवहारे[३०५]न सोस्त्यतः ॥

424. (The point is further clarified) :—
Word-meaning, whether positive, or negative, is not in practice understood without its being associated with a verb. Therefore it does not (in reality) exist.

४२५. सदित्येव तु यद्वाक्यं तदभूदस्ति नेति वा ।
क्रियाभिधानसम्बन्धमन्तरेण न[३०६]मन्यते ॥

425. The statement 'existence' (which is a one-word-sentence) is not understood in the form 'there was existence' 'there is no existence' or 'there is no existence' except through its association to the mention of a verb.

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३०५. —हारो —घ

३०६. गम्यते घ

४२६. आख्यातपदवाच्येऽर्थे साधनोपनिबन्धने ।
विना सत्त्वाभिधानेन नाकाङ्क्षा विनिवर्त्तते ॥

426. When the meaning-expressed-by-a-verb is connected with nominal accessories, its expectancy is not satisfied without the mention of the 'existence-idea' (ie, the meaning of the nominal accessories).

४२७. प्राधान्यात्तु क्रिया पूर्वमर्थस्य प्रविभज्यते ।
साध्यप्रयुक्तान्यङ्गानि फलं तस्याः प्रयोजकम् ॥

427. The action-part of the meaning of a sentence is first picked out because of its primacy. The nominal accessories used to effect the objective-to-be-accomplished (i. e., the verbal action) are (therefore) secondary. However, the effect which the action (itself) brings about is its (own) result (for instance, the satisfaction of hunger in the case of the verb 'bhuj').

४२८. प्रयोक्तैवाभिसन्धत्तु साध्यसाधनरूपताम् ।
अर्थस्य[३०७]वाभिसम्बन्धकल्पनां प्रसमीहते ॥

428. It is only the speaker who conceives the notion of ends and means or desires to construe the meaning (of the sentence) as a system of relations (between the end and means).[126]

४२९. पचिक्रियां करोमीति कर्मत्वेनाभिधीयते ।
पक्तिः करणरूपं तु साध्यत्वेन प्रतीयते ॥

429. The action of 'cooking' is taken as an object in (the sentence) 'I do cooking'. And when 'cooking' is expressed as the action-meaning of a verb, it is seen as an objective-to-be-accomplished.[127]

४३०. योऽसौ येनोपकारेण प्रयोक्तॄणां विवक्षितः ।
अर्थस्य सर्वशक्तित्वात्स तथैव व्यवस्थितः ॥

430. With whatever use (in view) a meaning is sought to be conveyed by the speaker, the meaning is established like that (in that context), because a meaning has several capacities.[128]

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३०७. चाभि— घ

४३१. आराद्वृत्तिषु सम्बन्धः[३०७] कदाचिदभिधीयते ।
आश्लिष्टो योऽनुपश्लिष्टः स कदाचिदभिधीयते ॥

431. Sometimes a connection (of contact) is said to exist between things which exist far from each other; and sometimes things in contact appear as being apart.

४३२. संसृष्टानां[३०८] विविक्तत्वं संसर्गश्च विवेकिनाम् ।
नानात्मकानामेकत्वं नानात्वं च विपर्यये[३१०] ॥

४३३. सर्वात्मकत्वादर्थस्य नैरात्म्याद्वा व्यवस्थितम् ।
अत्यन्तयतशक्तित्वाच्छब्द एव निबन्धनम् ॥

432) The separation of the (really) united, the union of the
433) (really) separated, the unity of the (really) diverse and the diversity of the (really) single,—(in this way) things are established (as existing in contrary forms), either because they have many forms or have no forms. The only binding factor (in the determination of what is meant whenever reference is made to them) is the word because it has its capacity fixed.

४३४. वस्तूपलक्षणं शब्दो नोपकारस्य वाचकः ।
न स्वशक्तिः पदार्थानां संस्प्रष्टुं तेन शक्यते ॥

434. A word is only a designation of an object, not an expression of (the essential nature of) such an object. It is not possible for words to deal with (i.e., to express the nature of) objects.

४३५. सम्बन्धिधर्मा संयोगः स्वशब्देनाभिधीयते ।
सम्बन्धः[३१२] समवायश्च सम्बन्धित्वेन गम्यते ।

435. (Two examples are given to illustrate the point) :—
It is a 'conjunction' which is an attribute of the conjoined which is named by the word for it(i.e. the word (samyoga'). Again, it is a relation which is implied in (the relation of) conjunction which is named 'samavāya' ('inseparable connection').[129]

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३०९. विवेकत्वं ख

310. The karika is numbered wrongly in the Banaras text.

३११. —क्षणः घ ३१२. —न्धस—घ

४३६. लक्षणादवतिष्ठन्ते पदार्था न तु वस्तुतः ।
उपकारात्स एवार्थः कथंश्चिदनुगम्यते ॥

436. Objects are known not in their intrinsic nature, but as they are desired. The same object is described in different ways according to the use to which it is put.

४३७. वाक्यार्थे[३१३]योऽभिसम्बन्धो न तस्यात्मा क्वचित्स्थितः ।
व्यवहारेपदार्थानां तमात्मानं प्रचक्षते ॥

437. The set-of-relationship (of the word-meanings) which resides in the meaning of the sentence is not localised in any part (of the sentence). But in discussions (i.e., in every-day language) men talk of the meaning of the sentenee as having the nature of word-meanings.

४३८. पदार्थे समुदाये वा समाप्तो नैव वा क्वचित् ।
पदार्थरूपभेदेन तस्यात्मा प्रविभज्यते ॥

438. It (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) is not really localised anywhere in the individual word-meanings or in the aggregate. (Only), it is apparently divided into the word-meanings.

४३९. अन्वाख्यानाय यो भेदः प्रतिपत्तिनिबन्धनम् ।
साकांक्षावयवं भेदे तेनान्यदुपवर्ण्यते ॥

439. Through that analysis (of the sentence) undertaken to explain it as a means of understanding it, there is presented another meaning (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) the parts of which, when analysed show expectancy for one another.

४४०. अनेकशक्तेरेकस्य प्रविभागोऽनुगम्यते ।
एकार्थत्वं हि वाक्यस्य मात्रयापि प्रतीयते ॥

440. It is the single (sentence-meaning) possessing several meaning-capacities that is considered as divided (on the basis of these capacities). That the meaning of the sentence is a single (entity) is understood from, sentences of a small measure (i.e., having a single word, for instance).[130]

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३१३. —क्यार्थो —घ

४४१. सम्प्रत्ययार्थाद्बाह्योऽर्थः सन्नसन् वा विभज्यते ।
बाह्यीकृत्य विभागस्तु शक्त्यपोद्धारलक्षणः[314] ॥

441. It is a meaning which is external to the conceptual meaning that is analysed whether such (external-meaning) is real or not. The division of the meaning after it is thus externalised is characterised by the analysis of the component-faculties (i.e., the word-meanings).

४४२. बहुष्वपि तिङन्तेषु साकाङ्क्षेष्वेकवाक्यता ।
तिङन्तेभ्यो निघातस्य पर्युदासस्तथार्थवान् ॥

442. Even when there are several finite verbs (in it), a sentence is one, if they are mutually expectant. The prohibition of the dropping of accent in a finite verb preceded by other finite verbs is thus meaningful.[131]

४४३. एकतिङ यस्य[315] वाक्यं तु शास्त्रे नियतलक्षणम् ।
तस्य तिङग्रहणेनार्थो वाक्यभेदान्न विद्यते ॥

443. As regards him (i.e, Kātyāyana the author of the Vārttika) who has fixed the characteristic of a sentence as having (only) one finite verb, his stipulation of 'one finite verb' does not mean that the meaning of a sentence (which has several finite verbs) is divided since (there being several verbs) there are several sentences (as the opponent m ight wrongly argue).

४४४. तिङन्तान्तरयुक्तेषु[316] युक्तयुक्तेषु वा पुनः ।
मृगः पश्यत यातीति भेदाभेदौ न तिष्ठतः ॥

444. In the case of (sentences) where (the verb) is linked to another verb, or alternatively is linked to another word (which is) linked to the first verb, e.g., the sentence 'mṛgaḥ pas' yata yāti' the explanation that the sentence as (exclusively) one or several does not hold.[132]

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314. The following karika is found after this in manuscript च
प्रत्ययार्थात्मनियतश्शक्तयो न व्यवस्थितः ।
अन्यत्र च ततो रूपं न ह्यासामुपलभ्यते ॥

३१५. —क्यस्य घ

३१६. पुनरुक्तेषु ङ

४४५. इतिकर्तव्यताऽर्थस्य सामर्थ्याद्यस्य[३१७]काङ्क्ष्यते ।
अशब्दलक्षणाकाङ्क्षं समाप्तार्थं तदुच्यते ॥

445. (The question what makes a sentence complete is discussed :—That sentence in which there is expectancy for the means (of the action stated) because of the nature of the meaning of the sentence (but) which has no expectancy on the word-level is (also) described to be complete in meaning.[133]

४४६. तत्वान्वाख्यानमात्रे तु यावानर्थोऽनुषज्यते ।
विनापि तत्प्रयोगेण श्रुतेर्वाक्यं समाप्यते ॥

446. When a mere statement of a thing is made (in a sentence) and there is something connected with it, (even then) the sentence is complete verbally without that (something) being stated.

४४७. चङ्क्रम्यमाणोऽधीष्वत्र जपंश्चङ्क्रमणं कुरु ।
तादर्थ्यस्याविशेषेऽपि शब्दाद्भेदः प्रतीयते ॥

447. In the two sentences 'Recite while mving aboout'or 'Move about while reciting', although there is no difference in the significance of the two, a distinction (as to whether 'kram' (to move about) is primary or secondary) can be gathered from the verbal form.[134]

४४८. फलवन्तः क्रियाभेदाः क्रियान्तरनिबन्धनाः ।
असंख्याताः क्रमोद्देशैरेकाख्यात[३१८] निबन्धनाः ॥

448. (If usages differ when meaning remains the same, sometimes meaning also differs when usages do not differ) :—Actions which have (different) effects and are dependent on other (subsidiary) actions (which help their performance) are conveyed by the same verb-form, without inumerating them individually from the points of view of their methods or their effects.[135]

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३१७. —द्यत्र घ

३१८. —तनिदर्शनाः ङ

Manuscript ङ does note give the second half of this karika—obviously an omission by the scribe.

४४९. निवृत्तभेदा सर्वैव क्रियाऽख्यातेऽभिधीयते।
श्रुतेरशक्या भेदानां प्रविभागप्रकल्पना ॥

449. It is (in general and) as divorced from (particular) differences that all actions are expressed by verbs. It is impossible to distinguish the differen ces (between actions) merely based on their sententi al forms.

४५०. अश्वमेधेन यक्ष्यन्ते राजानः सत्रमासते।
ब्राह्मणा इति नाख्यातरूपाद्भेदः प्रतीयते ॥

450. In examples like 'as'vamedhena yakṣyante rājānaḥ' (kings will perform the asvamedha sacrifice) and satram āsate brāhmaṇāḥ' (Brahmins perform sacrifice), the difference (between the performing of sacrifice by one king and by another and between sacrifice by one Brahmin and by another) is not conveyed by the verb-forms used.

४५१. सकृच्छ्रुता सप्तदशस्वनावृत्तापि या क्रिया।
प्राजापत्येषु सामर्थ्यात्सा भेदं पतिपद्यते ॥

451. The verb mentioned once, without repetition, with reference to the 17 (sacrificial goats) for Prajapati, is divided (so as to apply to each of the 17) by virtue of its potential significance.[136]

देवदत्तादिषु भुजिः प्रत्येकमवतिष्ठते।
प्रतिस्वतन्त्रं वाक्यं वा भेदेन[319]प्रविभज्यते ॥

452. (In the sentence Devadatta yajñadattaviṣṇumitrā bhojyantām') either the action of 'eating' is concluded in (each of the subjects) Devadatta, etc. singly, or the sentence is split up (into three sentences) in terms of the (three) subjects).[137]

४५३. उच्चारणे तु वाक्यानामन्यद्रूपं निगृह्यते।
प्रतिपत्तौ तु भिन्नानामन्यद्रूपं प्रतीयते ॥

453. Sentences, when uttered are received in a certain form; and when understood are presented in a different form.

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319. The reading in the Banaras text is भेदो न प्रविभज्यते which does not seem to make sence. The manuscript ङ gives the sensible reading accepted in the text here.

४५४. एकं [३२०]ग्रहणकं वाक्यं समान्येनाभिधीयते।
कर्तरीति यथा तच्च पश्वादिषु विभज्यते॥

454. The sūtra Kartari' is a sentence which (at first) coveys a meaning in general. It then is particula rised into (statements about particular objects like) an animal, etc.[138]

४५५. यद्याकांक्षा निवर्त्तेत तद्रूतस्य सकृच्छ्रुतौ॥
नैवान्येनाभिसम्बन्धं तदुपेयात्कथञ्चन॥

455. (In fact such a comprehension of the meaning of a sentence at a subsequent reading is necessary) :—If the expectancy about a thing which causes it is satisfied by listening to it once, then it (i.e., the thing) cannot be connected with another thing) by any means.

४५६. एकरूपमनेकार्थं तस्मादुपनिबन्धनम्।
योनिर्विभागवाक्यानां तेभ्योऽनन्यादि वस्थितम्॥

456. Thus a sentence which is finally a unity, but has several meanings and is thus a substratum for, and the source of component sentences remains as it were non-different from them.

५५७. क्वचित्क्रिया व्यक्तिभागैरुपकारे प्रवर्तते।
समान्यभाग एवास्याः क्वचिदर्थस्य साधकः।

457. In some places a verb accomplishes its objective in terms of particulars, (subject, object etc.), while in some others it accomplishes it in general te rms.[139]

४५८. कालभिन्नाश्च भेदा ये ये चाप्युष्ट्रासिकादिषु।
प्रक्रमे जातिभागस्य शब्दात्मा तैर्न विद्यते॥

458. Those distinctions (in verbs) which are distinctions of tense and distinctions such as are caused by words like 'uṣṭrāsikā' do not cause the essential verbal word to be divided (in its signification) when it is used to denote its action meaning as a class.

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३२०. —हृणवाक्यं च घ

.321. This karika is missing in manuscript ङ, although the commentary is given there.

४५९. एकसंख्येषु भेदेषु भिन्ना जात्यादिभिः क्रियाः ।
भेदेन विनियुज्यन्ते तच्छब्दस्य सकृच्छ्रुतौ ॥

459. (The converse case to that stated in 452 is stated here, that is, the case of a sentence in which there is one noun form and several verbal forms) :—

When in a sentence the nominal form is mentioned only once and there are verbs different from each other by virtue of their class, etc., then the verbs are related to it separately provided there is numerical parity (between the verbs and the meanings of the noun).

४६०. अक्षादिषु यथाभिन्ना भञ्जिभक्षिदिविक्रियाः ।
प्रयोगकाला भेदेऽपि प्रतिभेदं पृथक् स्थिताः ॥

460. —just as to a word like akṣāḥ' verbs like bhanj' (break'), 'bhakṣ' (eat) and dīv' (gamble), different from each other are separately connected, even where there is no difference in the time of the utterance of the nominal word (so far as the verbs are concerned) i.e., although there is only a single utterance of the noun).[140]

४६१. अक्षाणां तन्त्रिणां तन्त्रमुपायास्तुल्यरूपता ।
एषां क्रमो[३२२]विभक्तानां तन्त्रबद्धा सकृच्छ्रुतिः ॥

461. (The same idea is discussed according to the principle of tantra) Words like akṣāḥ' which are capable of being used under a common form are used in that way. Their having the same form is the basis (of such use). These same words when separated from each other are used in succession; when used with a common form they are uttered only once.[141]

४६२. द्वावभ्युपायौ शब्दानां प्रयोगे समवस्थितौ ।
क्रमो वा यौगपद्यं वा यौ लोको नातिवर्तते ॥

462. There are two established methods in which different words are used. They are succession and union, (simultaneity and nobody bypasses these two.

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३२२. क्रमनिबन्धानां —घ.

४६३. क क्रमे[323] विभिद्यते रूपं यौगपद्ये न भिद्यते ।
ख क्रिया तु यौगपद्येऽपि क्रमरूपानुपातिनी ॥

463a. Words employed one after another have different forms; but words used in union have the same form.[142]

463b. But even when words are used in union, the verb follows the pattern of their successive use (i.e., as if the words are used in succession).

४६४. क भेदसंसर्गशक्ती द्वे शब्दाद्भिन्ने इव स्थिते ।
ख यौगपद्येऽप्यनेकेन प्रयोगे भिद्यते श्रुतिः ॥

464a. These two powers (of words), namely, the power to remain apart or to be in union appear as if they do not belong to words (but to something like 'time" out-side them) (while, in truth, they are powers inherent in words themselves).

464b. Even when several words are uttered under a common form the utterance is split severally (by the comprehending listener).

४६५. अभिन्नो भेदरूपेण य एकोऽर्थो विवक्षितः ।
तत्रावयवधर्मेण समुदायोऽनुगृह्यते ॥

465. (A different way of interpreting the word 'akṣāḥ' in the above-mentioned sentence is given) :—

When it is desired to describe a composite of several meanings (like the meaning of the word 'akṣāḥ') in terms of its components, then the relationships which the latter have (namely, being connected with the appropriate verbs from the verb-group, etc.) are associated with the composite meaning.[143]

४६६. भेदनिर्वचने त्वस्य प्रत्येकं वा समाप्यते ।
श्रुतिर्वचनभिन्ना वा वाक्यभेदेऽवतिष्ठते ॥

466. (Yet other ways of looking at the problem are stated):— On explaining words (like 'akṣāḥ') in terms of the components they lend themselves for being split for use in the individual sentences (formed from the composite utterance

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३२३. —मे विभज्यते —घ.

'akṣāḥ bhakṣyantām, bhojyantam, divyantam') . Or the word with its number altered, lends itself for use in the individual sentences.[144]

४६७. तत्रैकवचनान्तो वा सोऽक्षशब्दः प्रयुज्यते ।
प्रत्येकं वा बहुत्वेन प्रविभागो यथाश्रुति ॥

467a. (The two alternatives are stated in reverse order) :— There the word 'akṣa' is used in the singular number.[145]

467b. Or the word is used in its plural number in the individual sentences.[146]

४६८. द्विष्ठानि यानि वाक्यानि तेष्वप्येकत्वदर्शिनाम् ।
अनेकशक्तेरेकस्य स्वशक्तिः[३२३] प्रविभज्यते ॥

468. (The problem of the sentence with two meanings is approached from the point of view of the Akhaṇḍa-school) :—
According to those who uphold the sameness of the Word (ś'abda), the meaning-capacity of the single sentence is divided on the basis of the difference (in the aspects) of that capacity, in such sentences as have two meanings.[147]

४६९. अत्यन्तभिन्नयोर्वा स्यात्प्रयोगस्तन्त्रलक्षणः ।
उपायस्तत्र संसर्गः प्रतिपत्तृषु विद्यते ॥

469. (The upholders of the Bheda doctrine hold a different view on this):—
Or we have there the use of two entirely different statements, (the means of such use) being the employment of a common form; the coalesced form is split according to the understanding of the listener.

४७०. भेदेनावगतौ पूर्वः शब्दौ तुल्यश्रुती पुनः ।
तन्त्रेण प्रतिपत्तारः प्रयोक्त्रा प्रतिपादिताः ॥

470. (The same point as in 469) :—
Two words which have the same form and which were originally apprehended as different are used in such a way that the listeners are made to apprehend them by the speaker under a common form.

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३२३. सा शक्तिः —घ.

४७१. क. एकस्यापि विवक्षायामनुनिष्पद्यते परः ।
ख. विना[३२४]ऽभिसन्धिना शब्दः शक्तिरूपः[३२५]प्रकाशते ॥

471a. (In this stanza the view of a section of the Bheda school is considered):—
One of the two (words possible to be conveyed by a common form) is intended by the speaker; the other is conveyed incidentally.

471b. Without such intention on the part of the speaker the word will work with (both) meaning-capacities.

४७२. अनेकशक्तिरेकस्य युगपच्छ्रीयते[३२६] क्वचित् ।
अग्निः [३२७]प्रकाशदाहाभ्यामेकत्रापि नियुज्यते ॥

472. Sometimes several capacities of the same thing are made use of at the same time. Fire is used in the same place both for heat and for light.

४७३. आवृत्तिशक्तिभिन्नार्थे वाक्ये सकृदपि श्रुते ।
लिङ्गाद्वा तन्त्रधर्माद्वा विभागेनावतिष्ठते ॥

473. (The views of the Bheda and Abheda schools are again summarised) :—
On hearing but once a sentence which conveys several meanings, either through its being repeated or through the exercise of different powers (respectively according to the Bheda and Abheda views), it presents itself as being divided either through evidence got from other passages or through the principle that several capacities reside in the same form.

४७४ संप्रसारणसंज्ञायां लिङ्गाभ्यां वर्णवाक्ययोः ।
प्रविभागस्तत्र सूत्रे एकस्मिन्नेव कल्पते ॥

474. In the case of the term samprasāraṇa' the distinction (as to its application to) the letter or to the sentence on the evidence of other Sūtras is quite properly included in that one Sutra.[148]

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३२४. —नापि सम्बन्धिना —घ

३२५. प्रतीयते घ

३२६. श्रूयते घ

३२७. —ग्निप्रकाशदा —घ

४७५. तथा द्विर्वचनेऽचीति तन्त्रोपायादिलक्षणः ।
एकशेषेण निर्देशो भाष्य एवो[३२८]पवर्णित ॥

475. (An example how the Mahābhāṣya makes use of the principle of tantra is discussed) :—Similarly it is described in the Bhāṣya itself that in the aphorism (of Pāṇini) dvirvacane'ci' there is through the mentioning of a thing once (the conveying of its occurence twice) on the principle of tantra.[149]

४७६. प्रायेण संक्षेपरुचीनल्पविद्यापरिग्रहान् ।
संप्राप्य वैयाकरणान् संग्रहेऽस्तमुपागते ॥

476. (The next few stanzas trace the history of Sanskrit grammar) :—When the Samgraha falling in the hands of such grammarians as had a tendency to summarise and had only a limited knowledge, became almost forgotten,

४७७. कृतेऽथ पतञ्जलिना गुरुणा तीर्थदर्शिना ।
सर्वेषां न्यायबीजानां महाभाष्ये निबन्धिते ॥

४७८. अलब्धगाधे गांभीर्यादुत्तानइव सौष्ठवात् ।
तस्मिन्नकृतबुद्धीनां नौवावस्थितनिश्चयः ॥

477) —and Patanjali, the master who was learned in all Vedic
478a) lore composed the Mahābhāṣya, the source of all princi-
478b) ples, unfathomable because of its profundity, (and) clear because of its excellence of style, the uneducated could not comprehend its meaning.

४७९. वैजिसौभवहर्यक्षैः शुष्कतर्कानुसारिभिः ।
आर्षे विप्लाविते ग्रन्थे संग्रहप्रतिकञ्चुके ॥

479. And then, when that sacred text, which was a criticism of the Samgraha was submerged by Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa, the followers of dry logic,[150]

४८०. यः पतञ्जलिशिष्येभ्यो भ्रष्टो व्याकरणागमः ।
काले स दाक्षिणात्येषु ग्रंथमात्रे व्यवस्थितः ॥

480 —the science of grammar which (thus) slipped away from the isciples of Patanjali in course of time came to survive only in Southern versions.

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३२८. —व प्रकाशितः —घ.

४८१. पर्वतादागमं लब्ध्वा भाष्यबीजानुसारिभिः ।
स नीतो बहुशाखात्वं चन्द्राचार्यादिभिः पुनः ॥

481. And then the texts were procured from the mountain and the science of grammar once again made the multi-branched one (that it was) by the teacher Candra and others who were followers of the principles of the Mahābhāṣya.[151]

४८२. न्यायप्रस्थानमार्गांस्तानभ्यस्य स्वं च दर्शनम् ।
प्रणीतो गुरुणाऽस्माकमयमागमसंग्रहः ॥

482. This summary of the science (of grammar) was composed by my teacher after learning the various other systems and our own system.[152]

४८३. वर्त्मनामत्र केषांचिद्वस्तुमात्रमुदाहृतम् ।
काण्डे तृतीये न्यक्षेण भविष्यति विचारणा ।

483. Here (i.e., in Cantos I and II) only the bare essentials of a few systems are given. There will be a study in details in Canto III.

४८४. प्रज्ञाविवेकं लभते भिन्नैरागमदर्शनैः ।
कियद्वा शक्यमुन्नेतुं स्वतर्कमनुधावता ॥

484. Thought becomes clear by a study of different systems of thought. What points can possibly be contradicted by him who learns (only) his system.[153]

४८५. तत्तदुत्प्रेक्षमाणानां पुराणैरागमैर्विना ।
अनुपासितवृद्धानां विद्या नातिप्रसीदति ॥

485. The knowledge of people who imagine things to be such and such, without (relying on) the ancient science (in interpreting them) and who have not studied the older teachers, will not be very clear.

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NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION

1. The words 'artha' and 'prakriyā' are doubtless used in the stanza with a double reference, 'artha' being also the 'thing meant' and 'prakriyā' being also the grammatical formation of words.

2. Cf. Yaska, Nirukta 1.2. ṣaḍ bhāvavikārā bhavantīti Vārṣāyaṇiḥ; jāyate' sti vipariṇamate vardhate' pakṣīyate vinas'yatīti. This is in reference to the definition of the verb as having 'becoming' as its chief aspect (bhāvapradhānāḥ). Similarly in MBh. I. p. 258—lines 13-14.

3. Cf. MBh. I—p. 13—Line 22. mahatā devena naḥ sāmyam syādityadhyeyam vyākaraṇam.
Kaiyaṭa commenting on this line says: 'mahatā pareṇa brahmeṇa ityarthaḥ'.

4. Cf. MBh. Vol. I—p. 1—line 14-19
kāni punaḥ śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāni
rakṣohāgamalaghvasandehaḥ prayojanam.
....pradhānam ca
ṣadangeṣu vyākaraṇam; pradhāne
ca kṛto yatnaḥ phalavān bhavati.

5. This stanza discusses the scope of the function of grammar. Of the two aspects of speech, namely, the supreme Word-principle and its manifestation in the form of human speech which exists in such distinct forms as syllables, words and sentences, it is the second which is the concern of grammar.

6. Words are employed to state the behaviour of objects and not the fundamental truth about them.
(arthapravṛttitattvam vivakṣā na tu vastūnām svarūpena sattvamasattvam vā—Puṇyarāja),

See also VPII—434 and 436
Puṇyarāja also gives two alternate interpretations of the stanza as follows.

(i) Or the behaviour of objects is general before it is associated with words. It is words which give them a specific form by describing them. (yadvā arthapravṛtti-tattvam sāmānyam, tasya śabdā nibandhanamityarthaḥ) see also: VP I—119.

(ii) Or the actions of objects, ie. the six changes like birth (production) which are conveyed by the verbal forms, the fact of their being manifested in Time, similarly the nature of words and their validity—all these when understood from grammar are valid; otherwise not (yadvā arthānām pravṛtterākhyatopāttajanmādikriyāyāstattvam, sādhyatvam sādhanākānkṣārūpam kālābhivyaktihetutvam ca tathā śabdānām sa sādhurasya vyākaraṇāvagataḥ samskāro'vikalaḥ tadvikalastvapabhrams'a iti).

8. thing-classes (arthajātayaḥ).
Words signify thing-classes, and when they convey these, they are conceived differently either as a class or as an individual.

9. For translation the second line is read as
....................vyavasthā nityatā ucyate.
The combined reading vyavasthānityatā does not seem to make sense. cf. MBh. Vol. I. p. 7.
athavā nedameva nityalakṣaṇam dhruvam' kūṭastham avicāli anapāyopajanavikāri anutpattyavṛddhyavyapayogi yat tannityamiti. tadapi nityam yasmimstatvam na vihanyate—This,as the quotation shows, is a definition, a vyavasthā (a convention) about the idea of nityatā (eternity). See also VPI 29 using vyavasthā as an isolate and directly referring to its use in the previous stanza.

That use shows that the previous stanza has been discussing a certain vyavasthā (convention), and not using vyavasthā as an adjective forming part of a compound vyavasthānityatā.

10. The reading hastasparśādibandhena accepted in the Benares text does not seem to make sense. Nevertheless it is given as an alternate reading in the footnote in the text.

11. The interpretation of the second line differs from Puṇyarāja's. He takes 'eko nimittam śabdānām' as referring to 'dhvani' and 'aparo'rthe prayujyate' as referring to 'sphoṭa'. But cf. Karika 46 below which clearly states that sphoṭa is the cause (kāraṇam) (which is the same as nimittam), of śrutis which are the same as dhvanis. The production of speech-sounds is caused by the need for the sphoṭa to be revealed, ie., when the meaning-conveying principle is to function.

    However, the difference between Puṇyarāja and the translator in the interpretation of the stanza does not make any difference in the fundamental notions themselves about sphota and dhvani.

12. Causes such as the vocal chords. The alternative reading 'karaṇebhyah' given in the foot-note directly mentions this.

13. Puṇyarāja explains the three stages as follows :— tathā vyāvahāriko vaikharīrūpaḥ śabdaḥ kramagrāhyo'pi pratisamhṛtakrama ekabuddhi viṣayo bhūtva niravayavakramarūpeṇa buddhiviṣayo 'ntaḥ karaṇe bhūtvā' ntaḥkaranavṛttirūpakramarūpadhvanidharmāpattyā punarapi vyavahāramavatarati.

14. There are points of similarity and contrasts between words and the sense-faculties. The similarity between them is that both are instruments through which the nature of objects is understood. But there is the contrast between them that in the case of the word its form must be perceived before it conveys its meaning while in the case of the sense organ the knowledge of the faculty itself is not an essential pre-requisite for it to act as the instrument of the perception of the object.

15. It was stated above that the word 'agni' which is uttered in everyday life, say in the kitchen, to convey a thing-meant is not linked with grammatical operations. But this does not mean that utterance of the word is not necessary for grammatical operations to be linked with it. There is, for the word uttered in a grammatical situation, the capacity to be linked with a grammatical rule. In other words, the common point of utterance between the word used in the two situations, is still further qualified by association with grammatical operations in the grammatical situation. This is illustrated in the stanza.

16. The stanza is intended to illustrate the same point as in the previous verse; The structure of the idea must a third storey, so to speak. To explain:

uccāraṇa, the common point between utterance of a word in life and in grammar, is qualified in the case of grammar by its being linked with grammatical operations (62).

The common feature between an upamāna and an upameya is still further qualified, in the case of the upamāna, by other attributes (63).

In the same way, the attribute which qualifies an object is itself qualified by other attributes (ie, a third

link in the chain of relations). For instance, śuklam paṭam=white cloth (a case of 'white' being a qualifier). But in śuklataram rūpam, a colour which is whiter (clearer whiteness) the whiteness is qualified, and there it is mentioned as a dravya (svātantryeṇa).

That a word has its form as meaning is also necessary in grammar. This is explained in Karikas 66, and 67. A form does not become a meaningful base (prātipadika) unless it has a meaning. It is to prātipadikas that suffixes are prescribed to be added. Therefore meaningfulness of the form is a ncessary pre-condition before case-suffixes are added. The two specific case-suffixes mentioned here are nominative and genitive. Examples may be given in gaurbāhīka (nominative) and uño (pragrhyam) (genitive). The first does not mean that a cow is a Bāhīka (member of a particular tribe). It means the word gauḥ is used to refer to a bāhīka. The word gauḥ has to mean its own formif this nominative construction is to be possible. The second means that uño is known as pragṛhya in grammar. The genitive in uñ is possible only if it primarily has a meaning, namely its form.

17. Pāṇini I. 1. 68
Kāśika on it reads : śastre śabdasya svarūpam bodhanīyam. na bāhyo'rthaḥ.......angārādibhyaśca na ḍhak...... In grammar the meaning of the word is its form. Thus the word 'agni' in the sūtra "agnerḍhak" means the form *agni* and not the thing fire. The sūtra does not mean "add ḍhak to embers" cf. MBh. Vol. 1—p: 176—lines 25-28 and p. 177—lines 1 and 2. śabdenārthagaterarthasya sambhavāttadvācinaḥ samjñāpratiṣedhārtham svamrūpavacanam (Vārttika) śabdenoccaritenārtho gamyate gāmānaya dadhyasānetyartha ānīyate arthaśca bhūjyate arthasyāsambhavāt iha vyākaraṇe'rthe kārya-

syāsambhavaḥ "agnerḍhak" iti na śakyate 'ngārebhyaḥ paro ḍhak kartum.

Regarding the question whether a word is a genus or a particular see VPI 45 above and MBh. Vol. I-p. 6-8—where the ākṛtinityatva of words is discussed under the topic "nitye śabdārtha sambandhe". Ākṛti as conceived there refers both to words and things, and when considered as nitya (eternal) it means 'genus'. See also P. S. Subramonya Sastri—'Lectures on Patanjali's Mahabhasya' p. 56.

The two verses 68 and 69 state two different views on what is meant by the term "own form" or 'svam rūpam' in the sūtra 'svamrūpam etc.' They ask the question whether, for example, in the sutra "agner ḍhak", the word agni means a name or a named and a particular or a universal. If the word agni means the form agni in grammer, then it is both a name (samjñā) and a named or meaning (samjñī). It can also be a particular or an universal. According to stanza 68, agni in the sūtra means the word agni as a particular. But it does not mean that the enjoined grammatical operation takes place only on that particular instance of the word as given in the ūtra. That is obviously absurd. The grammatical operations take place with all instances of the word agni, that is with the genus. That is, the genus is brought into the situation by virtue of grammatical operations.

The view expressed in 69 is different from this. According to it, agni in the sūtra is the form-meaning of the word agni and occuring as it does in one instance, it is a particular. But any particular occurance is a particularisation of a genus. The prescribed grammatical operation takes place on each instance, or each particular, which is a specific occurance of the genus.

18. That is, in A's pronunciation of the word 'suta' the 'u' may be of the same length as in B's pronunciation of the word 'sūta' ; but it is only after the listener has understood the word via the prākṛtadhvani, that he can say that the length there belongs to the prākṛtadhvani.

19. Abhivyaktivādinaḥ are the Mīmāmsakas : Cf. Śāstradīpikā (Transl : D. Venkataramaiah) p. 196. A śabda (dhvani) that comes to light after the effort is made, need not be an effect exclusively; that it comes to light after the effort fits in with the view that śabda is revealed (abhivyangya).'

20. Those who hold this view, argue that if the object also were acted upon, then the object could equally well be perceived by another sense-organ.

21. The theory that cognition is essentially integral in its nature is cited here. In an act of knowledge, there is identity of the cogniser, cognition and the cognised. In the same way while an object is perceived, one feels that its perception is through its parts. However, in all these, apprehension of parts, or of subject—object difference in cognition is only apparent; it is only an aid to an integral perception. The same is true of the perception of syllables, words and sentences. Thus, there is a letter 'ga' in the sound-pattern which reveals the word 'gauḥ';

and listeners when they hear the sentence 'gām ānaya' will think that they are listening to the letter "ga" which reveals the word "gauḥ" and similarly think that they recognise the word "gauḥ" in the sentence. But this is an illusion. What we get here is a confusion of two different ga-letters.

Cf. VPII—89, 90 and 92.

22. There are two philosophies on the constitution of speech-units (syllables, words and sentences) and on the apprehension of their meanings. These are given the names akhaṇḍavāda and khaṇḍavāda. According to the first position, syllables, words, and sentences are integral units. They only appear to have parts. The comprehension of their meanings is also in an integral manner, and parts play their role in this only in a transitory way. While parts are comprehended, the final cognition of the speech-unit is in a flash, as an integral cognition. Thus the appearance of parts in a syllable, of syllables in a word, and of words in a sentence are less real than the final cognition of the syllable, word, and sentence respectively, and the cognition of parts merges in the integral perception which is the culminating point. What is said above about the perception of speech-units is true also of the perception of their meaning.

As opposed to this is the view of the Khaṇḍavādins, that is, those who hold that the part is the reality and the whole is only an addition of parts. The Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas, broadly speaking, hold this view. khaṇḍa = part.

23. See Note 17 above.
Cf. also MBh. Vol. I—p: 26—lines 1 and 2 athavā, ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātram nirdiśyate. raśruter—las' rutirbhavatīti ; this view, is the view of the jātiśabdavādins and Patañjali means the sound-genus when he uses the word sphoṭa.

24. The Benares commentary gives two reasons for the absence of difference between sphoṭa and dhvani namely, 'since

both sphoṭa and dhvani are placed in the same substratum namely space', or 'since it is the inner speech-principle which is revealed in the form of the sounds.'

25. It was stated above that the lengthening or shortening which takes place as a feature of individual diction is a secondary feature of sound. This stanza seeks to remove a possible misconception that the long or prolated vowels could thus be grouped as a secondary modification made by the speaker on the primary short-sound. The long and prolated sounds are like the short one, a kind of primary sound (prākṛtadhvani). As far as dictional changes are concerned, they are produced subsequent to the cessation of vibration; in other words through the momentum produced in the body of the sound already produced·

26. This stanza explains the process of the transformation of breath into speech-sounds, and the letters (i e. meaningful speech-sounds) being revealed through them. The breath which contains the potentiality for transformation into speech-sounds like ka, ca, etc., undergoes such transformation at the centres of speech production. Through these speech sounds are revealed the meaningful units like letters and words.

The breath dividing itself into various speech-sound might be usefully compared to molten metal flowing through various grooves in a machine and forming itself into various shapes according to the shape of the groove.

27. In this kārika the word 's'abda' is used to refer both to physical sound and to speech-sound. Hence it is translated with the common term 'sound'.

28. Ṣaḍja. Name of one of the 7 svaras or primary notes in music.

29. Cf. VP II—147.

30. kārye pravarttate—caitanyam nirvṛttikriyāprāptibhiśca kāryeṣu pravarttate

svarūpavibhāge tu saiva vāk bāhyavasturūpatayā nirvṛttivikriyāprāptiṣu *karmabhāvam* prapadyatityarthaḥ

31. The terms svamātrā and paramātrā are descriptive names of two kinds of cosmology. According to the theory of svamātrā, all manifestations are apparent externalisations of the inner soul. It remains inside, but looks as if it exists in the form of external objects. According to the other doctrine (paramātrā) the relation between the All-soul and the ceated world is something like that between a fire and a spark which flies away from it.

32. Cf. Theory of Speech and Language—p: 31, para 2.

33. Cf. catvāri śṛngā trayo'syapādā dve śīrṣe saptahastāso' asya; trithā baddho vṛsabho roravīti maho devo martyā āviveśa. (R. V. IV. 58.3 (Quoted in MBh. Vol. I—p. 3)

34. Cf. VPII—307a, 308—for interpretation of one sentence through the evidence from another sentence we may give the following as an example.

'aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti' (Place anointed candy). The sentence does not say with what substance the candy is to be anointed. This means that the meaning of the word 'aktāḥ' and through it that of the injunction is not definite. We decide with what material the candy is to be annointed from the evidence of another sentence: 'tejo vai ghṛtam' (ghee is splendour). From this, a praise of ghee the conclusion is reached that the candy is to be anointed with ghee.

35. paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī are the names given to speech at the three stages through which it evolves into utterance. At the first stage paśyantī, speech is the speech-principle in which the capacity for revelation is inherent, but not explict. At that stage, speech is un-differentiated principle; it has not yet started into a process. It is only identical with consciousness or perception in its intrinsic form. Paśyantī—the seeing, the perceiving one.

At the secónd stage, speech has already become a dynamic process, and is mental. It is linked to an object or an idea, and has already reached the stage of concretization on the level of the mind. But it has not yet been uttered. It is madhyamā, or intermediate, since it is between the stage of being a principle and being uttered.

The third stage is vaikharī, when speech is an uttered realization. It is articulate speech.

According to some thinkers, prior to paśyantī there is a stage callld parā, when speech is the supreme principle. In this view there are four stages. parā, . pasyantī, madhyamā, and vaikharī. (See R. V. IV 58.3 quoted in note 33 above).

36. See Pāṇini VIII 1. 28 and 22.
VIII 1. 28 says: 'A finite verb is unaccented when preceded by a word which is not a finite verb.
Eg. devadattaḥ pacati.
VIII. 1. 22 says: "yuṣmad" and "asmad" are substituted for the genitive and dative singular "te" and "me" respectively, (when these are preceded by a word); and they are unaccented. The 'ādi' in the kārikā refers to this substitution of "yuṣmad" and "asmad" See also the following references; Pāṇini VIII 1. 19

and 1.22 cf. MBh. Vol. III—p: 376—lines 10-13. sāmānavākye nighāta yuṣmadasmadādes 'aḥ (Vārttika) sāmānavakya iti prakṛtyā nighātayuṣmadasmadādes'a vaktavyah. kim prayojanam. nanavakye ma bhūvanniti ayam dando harānena odanam paca tava bhaviṣyati mama bhaviṣyati. See also note 37 below.

37. Pāṇini VIII. 1. 19.
All the syllables of a vocative are unaccented when a word precedes it and it does not stand at the beginning of a hemistich. Eg. vrajāni devadatta.

But the condition for a vocative being unaccented is that it should be in the same sentence as the preceding word which causes the dropping of the accent (samanavākya). Now the vocative is not included as forming part of the sentence as defined by the Vārttikakāra. Hence in our example it is not in the same sentence as the preceding word. Therefore the rule regarding the dropping of the accent seems to be violated. This stanza answers this objection. The vocative is included as forming part of the sentence, since it is considered as belonging to the category of adverbs. Hence the definition of the sentence 'ākhyātam sāvyayakārakaviśeṣanamekatiṇ (Vārttika on Pāṅini II. 1. 1) includeds the vocative also as the kind of word which can exist in a sentence consistent with the definition. See also note 36 above.

The argument in this context may be briefiy stated as follows. Kāyāyana, the author of the Vārttika on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyi has given a definition of a sentence as "a verb accompanied by indeclinables, nominal case forms and qualifying and modifying words, and a sentence will have only one principal verb" (ākhyātam sāvvavakārakaviśesa nam ekatin).

The Mīmāmsakas' definition of the sentence is given in VPII-4. It may be noted that in Kātyāyana's definition and the Mīmāmsaka's definition, the verb is the principal part of the sentence. Does this mean that the two definitions are basically identical ? No. The application of these definitions bring out different results. For example, Kātyāyanaś definition does not come as a violation of Pāṇini's rule on accentuation of verbs, where as the Mīmmāsaka definition causes a violation. How is this ? Pāṇini VIII 1.28 says that a finite verb in a sentence will be unaccented provided a word which is not a finite verb precedes it and the two are in the same sentence (sāmānavākya). Now according to Kātyayanat a sentence can have only one finite verb (ekatiṇ). According to this definition s sentence like yam daṇdo harānena' 'this stick, with this take) is really two sentences, since after 'danḍa' there is the verb 'asti' understood. Hence the verb 'hara' is accented, since 'ayam danḍo hara anena' are two sentences, it having two finite verbs, there is consequently no samānavākyatva.

In the Mimamsaka definition, however, the verb 'hara' will be accented since there is sāmānavākyata (the state of being in the same sentence). To the Mīmāmsaka, a collection of words having expectancy for one another, which has a verb as its principal member, and which has a common purpose is a sentence. The piece 'ayam daṇḍo harānena' satisfies all these conditions, above all the primary condition of having a common purpose. The whole piece is intended as an instruction to perform sacrifice. Since then, according to the Mīmāmsaka's conception of the sentence, the verb hara' has words which are not finite verbs preceding it *in the same sentence* it should be unaccented, which is wrong.

38. Two arguments are given in this stanza in favour of the contention that the word is a complex whole and parts of in are not real. One is that the word vṛsabha, udaka and yāvaka are not found to possess meaningful parts. Another is that assumptions of the kind that a word is formed whenever there is a combination of roots and suffixes, and nowhere where there is none such, are only pragmatic assumptions. They do not prove that words are composed of real parts like roots and suffixes.

39. Cf. MBh. Vol. I p. 362.
ime tarhyekārthībhāvaviśeṣah samkhyāviśeṣo vyaktābhidhānamupasarjanaviśeṣam cayoge (lines 12-13). Vyaktābhidhānam bhavati vākye brāhmaṇasya kambalastiṣṭhatīti. Samāse punaravyaktam brāhmanakambalastiṣṭhatīti. In the context the difference between a sentence and a compound is discussed. In the latter there is a fusion of the meanings of the components".

40. This is a variety of the akhaṇḍa view. According to it speech and meaning are aspects of the same reality, namely, the inner consciousness.

41. If the padavādi says that the evidence for the existence of real units of word-meanings in the sentence is that they are perceived then they can be proved to be non-existent if the evidence be proved non-existent. That is what the stanza seeks to do. The mind perceives word-meanings in a sentence in a series according to the padavādi; that means the perception of a preceding word-meaning has to terminate when the mind passes on to the next word-meaning. The meaning of this statement is that the evidence for the existence of the individual word-meaning does not exist. Consequently the doctrine that the meaning of a sentence is formed from the meaning of words also stands discredited.

42. —in different forms like rāja, rājñā, rājñi, etc. This shows that there is no fixed forms of the word. Different forms convey the same meaning.

43. The word rāja in a compound like "rājapuruṣa" has the same form as rāja, the Imperative second person singular of the verb rāj—to shine. Hence an expression like 'he rājapuruṣa'—you king's servant' can also convey the meaning Oh ! 'Man, you shine' 'brājasva puruṣa').

44. Cf. the English 'blackbird'—just as the idea 'black' plays no part in the scheme of the meaning of the word, similarly the idea of horse has no part, in the semantic realisation of the word 'aśvakarṇa'. 'Aśvakarna' is the name of a tree. Even though originally the tree got that name from its leaves being shaped as the ears of a horse (see Monier Villiams), every time the word is uttered, the listener's mind does not picture the ear of a horse in understanding the meaning of the word.

45. rūḍhi—words are those whose meanings are not derived etymologically, but are conventionally fixed. "taila-pāyikā", does not mean "a woman who drinks oil" as the explanation of the word from the component words (taila-oil, pāyika—a woman who drinks) may lead one to believe. The word means a cockroach.

46. —cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein 'Tractus Logico—Philosophicus'—p.: 189. 'My propositions are elucidatory in this way. He who understands them finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it He must surmount these propositions; then he sees them rightly.

47. In this kārika the view known as the abhihitānvayavāda on what constitutes the meaning of a sentence is given. In this view, words individually convey in the sentence that meaning they convey as isolates. This meaning of the word as isolate is a thing-meant. In the sentence, however, the words convey an added element through their mutual relationship. This additional element is the meaning of the sentence (abhihitānām anvayaḥ). In other words-words convey a thing-meant; sentence conveys a relationship. See also D. M. Datta "The Six Ways Of Knowing". (London 1932) pp. 289-293.

48. This discusses another view known as anvitābhidhāna, this also falling within the main subdivision of the view that a sentence is an aggregate of words, and the meaning of a sentence is an aggregate of word-meanings (samghātapakṣa).

In this view the relationship of words among themselves in the structure of the sentence takes place first; through this relationship then, both the meaning of the sentence, and the meaning of the word are formed. In other words, the syntatical relationship of words not only prOduces the sentence and its meaning, they also invest a word with its meaning, which is derived from its syntactical relationship with other words in forming the sentence (anvivitānām abhidhānaḥ).

To restate the difference between the abhihitānvaya and the anvitābhidhāna positions in the first, significant words enter into a syntactical relationship leading to the formation of the meaning of the sentence; in the second, words become significant through their syntactical relationship with each other (1) abhihitanam anvayaḥ—syntactical relationship of the significant and (2) anvitānām abhidhāna—signification by the syntactically related, through such relationship.

49. Words are the tangible facts in what is known as the sentence. The interconnection of words is a factor to be inferred from the result that the association of words conveys a meaning which is more than the meanings of the words.

49a. The reference is to the well-known statement padaprakṛtiḥ samhitā occuring in the Ṛgveda Pratiśākhya. This is capable of a double interpretation depending on how the compound padaprakṛtiḥ is broken. It can be broken as padānām prakṛtiā or pada eva prakrtiḥ. According to the former, the samhitā (the connected utterance, or the sentence) is the original, and the pada-text or the word is derived from it; according to the second, the pada-text or the word is the original and the the samhitā (the sentence) is built from it.

50. In other words, the same meaning as is conveyed by a word can be considered as being conveyed by the collection of the letters which form the word.

51. This is serious as it will result in the non-performance of the sacrifice which means the violation of injunction 'yajeta'.

52. This would be impossible if the total meaning of the sentence were conveyed in one instalment without reference to the meaning of the words. In such cases the listener's familiarity or otherwise with the meaning of any word or words would be a matter of no significance.

53. The reference is to the sentence "śvetam chāgam ālabheta (sacrifice a white goat).

54. The essential difference between śruti direct, statment and vākya (sentence) is that śruti conveys the meaning

of a sentence right from listening, while to get its meaning from a syntactical connection, the sentence has quite obviously to be interpreted with reference to the relationship between the component words.

55. The idea is that the meaning of a phrase, or a clause or a word in the sentence is the meaning of the total sentence viewed in terms of analysis.

56. The example is given to show that perception of parts in integral cognitions is commonly experienced seen.

57. The translation takes a different line of interpretation from Puṇyarāja's. Puṇyarāja interprets the stanza as follows: Just as two cognitions, for instance, the cognition of 'blue' and the cognition of 'yellow' are alike in that they are both cognitions, and at the same time different when viewed from the angle of the objects perceived......... (i.e, since one is a cognition of 'blue' and the other a cognition of 'yellow') etc.

58. See Pāṇini I. 2. 27.

59. See Pāṇini III. 1. 33.

60. See Pāṇini I. 2. 27.

61. Thus the word ghaṭa means not 'roundness' and 'being made of clay', nor 'roundness' or 'being made of clay'. It means "roundness", "being made of clay", etc., without any such inter-relation of combination or alternation.

62. The idea which the mind forms on hearing a word is its meaning; and this idea is linked up with an external object and thus we get the word-meaning-object triangle.

63. The meaning of individual words find unity in the meaning of the sentence itself as revealed by a process

above logical thinking —a sort of integral process functioning and presenting the meaning in a flash.

64. The word 'gauḥ' means 'a cow' but the idea of a bell which hangs from the cow's neck or a flea which rests the cow's head is not included in the limit of the reference of the word.

65. Nuṭ(n) is an āgama and is found in words like kartṛṇām and gurūṇām. It is not a significant element in words because we can find genitive forms like bhavatām without it. Similarly śap, the conjugational sign a, is not found in examples like 'atti' cf. on Panini III. 1. 67.

bhāvakarmakartāraḥ sārvadhātukārthāścedekadvibahuṣu niyamānupapattiratadarthatvāt (Vārttika) vikaraṇārthā iti cetkṛtābhihite vikaraṇābhāva (Vārttika) Also See MBh. Vol. II—p. 57—lines 23, 27.

66. In other words if a verb is to get 'being' in a sentence it must first, be associated with prefixes. Why ? Because for an action to be accomplished, nominal agents, or instruments, are necessary and a verb is the name of an action.

67. Cf. MBh. Vol. I—p. 434—lines 9 and 10—kaḥ punaścena kṛtorthaḥ, samuccayo'nvācayaḥ itaretarayogaḥ samāhāra iti.

68. See Pāṇini I. 4. 57 and MBh. Vol. I-p: 341 line 1-9.

68a. The first part of the kārika explains what is implied in a word like rājapuruṣaḥ, meaning the king's servant. A man is a king's servant since the king controls him. But the verb (bibharti-controls, governs) is itself not present there. It was withdrawn after effecting the relationship of governor and governed, or controller and controlled

between the king and the servant. See also note 223 under Sanskrit text.

68b. The discussion is about the expression "mātuḥ smaraṇam" Why is the word mātuḥ in the genitive ? It is a śeṣā-ṣaṣṭhi, and conveys the idea of the accusative. mātuḥ smarati means mātaram smarati. If the genitive is already there in the expression, why then is a special injuction on ṣaṣṭhi in the sūtra prātipadyena adhīgartha etc. as applying to expressions like mātuḥ smaraṇaṃ. The answer to this is that it is an injunction of restriction (niyama). The injunction means that ṣaṣṭhī alone be used, and let there not be a compound like mātṛsmaraṇaṃ. The counter example referred to is karmaṇiti kim māturguṇaiḥ smaraṇam ?" That is, if mātuḥ smaraṇam means mātaram smarati it means mātaram guṇaih smarati and not mātuḥ guṇān smarati. (not that 'one remembers the qualities of the mother, but that "one remembers the mother through her qualities). Ultimately thus mātuḥ smaraṇam means mātuḥ guṇaiḥ smaraṇam.

69. See Pāṇini—I. 4-91.

70. The view that individual letters are not meaningful is exemplified. Example: the form 'iṣkartāra' which is 'niṣkartāra' minus 'n' conveys the meaning of the latter. Assuming that the two are not two different words, having the same meaning, the interpretation of this is that a part of a word can stand for the whole which means the missing syllable is not significant from the point of view of meaning.

71. 'Udvami' is used as an abbreviated form of udvamati= to vomit and 'kari' is used for representing 'karomi' and 'karosi'.

72. Grammatical rules are not everything. They do not deal with Reality in its ultimate aspects. Their concern is with the manifested world of things and names.

73. The argument in the stanzas 241-247 is that the meaning of the sentence 'vṛkṣo nāsti' (there is no tree) is a total and undivided one and it cannot be built up from the meanings of the components, since according to the doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence and the meaning of the sentence, such components or their meaning do not exist.

The author examines possible ways in which the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence through analysis is possible. First, can the meaning of the single word vṛkṣa be negated by the particle "na". That is, can it effect the negation of the object, namely, tree. The answer is no. The object cannot be negated if it exists. That would mean making an existent into a non-existent and is impossible.

Next can *the existence of the tree* be negated by the particle 'na'. No, because such a concept is non-verbal in character (since it is a concept, a buddhi). Therefore its negation by the particle 'na' is not possible. A concept has to be verbal if it is to be negated by the particle "na".

Or again a third alternative is considered. Can we say that particle 'na' states that the *concept of the existence of the tree is false*. This way of looking at the sentence is also wrong. This gives 'na' a function which it normally does not have. Its normal function is to state a non-existence, rather than to falsify a concept of existence.

Again, can it be said that the particle 'na' functions without any reference to a substratum. In that case,

'na' should be stated first in the sentcnce and not as we have in the sentence under examination.

Or can it be argued that the word 'vṛkṣa' is used to limit the substratum of the operation of 'na' to 'vṛkṣa' the tree)—This also is wrong, because it would convert a direct statement (i.e. a statement of a positive fact) into a statement laying down a restriction, or one which indicates a irestriction. Again if the word 'vṛkṣa' is given to limit an already understood substratum, then it is a repetition. Thus considered in all possible ways the recognition of word-meanings in the sentence is impossible.

In the next kārika another example is given to illustrate the point that the sentence conveys a meaning which is different from the word-meanings i.e, that the recognition of word meanings in the ultimate analysis is wrong. The reference is to the sentence. udahāri bhagini yātvam śirasā anaḍvāham vahasi sā tvam prācīnam kumbham abhidhāvantam adrākṣīḥ
The ultimate meaning of the sentence is different from the meanings of the word-meanings.

74. The question discussed in this connection is whether or not the identity of a word changes with each different meaning it has. A word may be entered in the dictionary several times, each time it having a different meaning. There are at least two ways of constructing this position. It can be argued that each time the word has a different meaning it is a different entity; or that it is only the same word, with different meanings. In the text both views are discussed.

75. A hymn when used or repeated becomes logically different. And these latter hymns which get their entity from the repetition of the already existent hymns of the Veda are

also Vedic. Indeed, those are the really meaningful hymns and the stated ones are only pointers to them. In other words the significance of a hymn is derived from its use. Thus if the sāmidheni hymn is repeated, we have as many different hymns as there are numbers of repetitions.

76. According to Paṇini V. 4.50, the affix "cvi" comes after a word when the agent has attained to the new state expressed by the word, what the thing previously was not and when the roots kṛ (to make), bhū (to be) are conjoined with it'. (C. S. Vasu). Thus we get "aśuklaḥ śuklaḥ sampadyate tam karoti=śuklīkaroti.

In the same way there can be a form 'gorbhavati' from 'agor gaursampadyate go'bhavat (some one who is not a cow has attained to the state of a cow, he became a cow). Now, some one like a Bāhīka can become a cow only when cow-ness is attributed to him. In other words the meaning of the word 'gauḥ' is secondary (gauṇa) in that context.

In 'śuklībhavati', on the other hand, something which is not white can become white in a real sense (uttarāvasthā vastusatyaiva-Puṇyarāja). Therefore the meaning of the word 'śukla' is not secondary.

The grammatical significance of 'gauḥ' in the example quoted above being considered as conveying a secondary meaning is that it will not have the designation of 'pragṛhya' (as required by Panini I. 1. 15 in association with I. 4-61 which respectively say that a nipāta which ends in the vowel 'o' will be known as 'pragṛhya' and 'ūrī' and 'ḍāc' when in association with verbs will be known as gatis). This is because between primary and secondary meanings of a word it is with reference to the primary meaning that grammatical

operations apply to the word. Thus the MBh. evamtarhi gauṇamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyaya iti-Vol. I, p. 70.

A question might be asked here. If grammatical operations take place only on such words as are used as conveying their primary meaning then how do the sūtras VI 1.90 and VI 1.93 operate in regard to words like "go" as is evident in the resultant forms in sentence like 'gaurbāhikastiṣṭhati' and 'gām bāhīkamānaya' respectively when obviously the word is used in its secondary sense.

The answer to this question is that the statement about grammatical operations not taking place in regard to words which convey a secondary meaning applies only where words are concerned as distinct from prātipadikas or bases. The rule about vṛddhi in VII. 1.90 applies to prātipadikas, for instance to 'go', which with the change of the vowel 'o' into 'au' becomes 'gauḥ' in the sentence 'gaurbāhīkastiṣṭhati' : similar is the 'a' in accordance to VI. 1.93 in such examples like 'gām bāhīkamānaya'.

In verse 280 another objection is answered. This concerns the expressions mahābhūtaścandramāḥ, śuklībhavati patah. Mahābhūtaścandramāḥ means the moon has become full, and it refers to the fullmoon. Now here the full moon is a fact on full moon day and no new condition has emerged. There is no astitapūrvāvasthā upacaritottarāvasthā. There is no superimposition of a new state on an existing condition, which superimposition is necessary for the use of the suffix 'cvi'. Similarly the cloth is white, and the expression śuklībhavati paṭah (the cloth becomes white) does not add any new element

of meaning. How then is 'cvi' used here and how is there any secondary meaning ? The answer is given in verse 280. True, no new condition is added to the meaning, but it is assumed by the speaker that a new condition is superimposed and the use is based on that. cf. MBh. Vol. I—p. 71—lines 14-21.

77. Pāṇini VII. 3.82 Therefore no change of s into ṣ in expressions like agnisomau māṇavakau.

78. Pāṇini VI. 1.153.

Thus suṭ comes in hariścandro māṇavakaḥ

79. Such as a defect in vision, etc., causing the vision of a duplicate moon.

80. The four cases stated above are explained and illustrated in 306, 307a 307b, 308, 309a, 309b and 310, 311, 312, 313.

80a. The discussion here is about the significance of a svarita accent as occuring in short vowels, as well as in long and prolonged vowels. A svarita is a combination of udātta and anudātta accents. This causes no difficulty where long and prolonged vowels are concerned, since these latter have in them definable vowel limits and therefore they can hold an udātta svara and an anudātta vowel. But in the short vowel, how can one have limitable parts, one of which is udātta and the other is anudatta ? The answer to this is given by the grammatical diction "tasyādita udāttamardha hrasvam". That is, the first half of a short vowel will be udātta.

In the kārikas under discussion, the meaning of the term hrasva in the above-given dictum is discussed. Hrasva does not mean here a short vowel, which is the term's

primary meaning. It means here a mātra. Further hrasva is representative of hrasva, dīrgha and pluta (short, long, and prolonged vowels).

81. See Technique of Semantics by J. R. Firth, Transactions of the Philological Society, London 1934.

82. The reference is to one-word-sentences such as "vṛkṣaḥ". The word implies the verb tiṣṭhati (one of the possible verbs). Thus vṛkṣaḥ means 'here is a tree'.

83. Eg. (Puṇyarāja) varṣati = (devo)
varṣati (jalam).

84. More examples to prove the point that an uttered piece can convey more than what is warranted by its form alone. In other words, it also conveys the meaning of some word or words implied in it. For example in the expression edhebhyo vrajati (He goes for fuel), the expression means edhāharaṇāya vrjati. In this, āhraṇa (bringing) is a subsidiary action to the main action of going. The uttered form edha brings this also to the context. Sthāni means the unuttered verb. Similarly niṣkauśāmbi means niṣkrāntakauśāmbi. (Gone out of Kauśāmbi).

On stanza 328b, see Panini II. 3-27.

Regarding the function of upasargas (stanza 329 a) see MBh. Vol. I—p. 365—lines 17-19 in a slightly different context. upasargaśca punarevamātmakaḥ yatra kaścitkriyāvācī śabdaḥ prayujyate tatra kriyāviśeṣamāhuḥ'.

85. They: the utterance 'vṛkṣa' and the utterance 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati. It was stated earlier that the piece 'vṛkṣaḥ' can convey the meaning of 'vṛkṣastiṣṭhati'. Then why should the latter be used at all ? Why not always use

"vṛkṣa" for "vṛkṣastiṣthati". That question is answered in the stanza.

86. Thus the way one student analyses a sentence as an aid to his understanding of the meaning of the sentence will be different from that adopted by another student. And these are all nothing more than devices.

87. Puṇyarāja constructs the third line as 'tasya sambandhī arthaḥ' (the meaning connected to it, that is, its meaning). This is, of course, possible. But it seems it is better to interpret the line as 'its meaning which is connected to the meaning of another word which is not uttered, but which can be inferred. 'sambandhī' correlating the word 'artha' with the word 'arthāntarasya' understood. (Puṇyarāja, in fact, uses the latter word in this connection). However, the general idea of the stanza, is the same which ever way it is interpreted.

88. The reference here is to the definitions of noun and verb. Nouns have existence (sattva) as their meaning; verbs mean becoming (bhāva). The contradiction here is that the one śabda (eg. dvāram), if it brings the verb also into the context, will be discharging both nominal and verbal functions.
cf. Yaska Nirukta I. 1 on nouns and verbs.

89. cf. Yāska Nirukta I. i.
Indriyanityam vacanam audumabarāyaṇaḥ.
Indriya is here rendered as *buddhi*

Also: Nirukta I. 2 tatra catuṣṭvam nopapadyate.........
'śāstrakriyāyogācca vyāptimatvācca tu

The meaning of the word arthayogam is taken in the translation in a different way from Puṇyarāja's. He

interpret it as: 'tasyaiva arthena pratibhālakṣaṇena yogam sambandham dṛṣtvā......'

The translation interprets 'vākyasya arthayogam' as the connection of artha (word-meaning) to the sentence; and this connection is laukikam, ie. something that is ascribed to it as different from being a fundamental fact. cf. 344 below

'na loke pratipatṛṇām
arthayogātprasiddhayaḥ; which also Puṇyarāja interprets in a different way. He takes artha as 'a thing in reality'.

90. Cf. Nirukta quoted above:
vyaptimatvāt tu....................aṇīyastvācca

91. An exception which is implied in a statement strictly forms part of the statement of the rule itself, and therefore it can be considered as being verbally made (śabdavat) in the rule itself; but since there is no distinct statement of it, apparently it is not verbally made (aśabdmiva). As the next stanza says, the śruti, ie, the statement about Brahmanas and dadhi (sour-milk) is made including the exception of the Māṭharas. And the further statement connecting Māṭharas with takra (butter-milk) makes a re-statement of this fact.

92. According to this it is the word which has become an object of sense-perception, ie. an object of the ear which conveys the meaning,
cf. V. P. I. 56.

93. According to the dictum 'caturthaḥ, anajādau, ca lopah pūrvapadasya ca' etc. quoted by Puṇyarāja. See Mahābhāṣya Vol. 2 p. 425 (on Pāṇini V. 3.83. thājādāvūrdhvam dvitīyādacaḥ) caturthāt—caturthāllopo vaktavyaḥ, bṛhaspatidattakaḥ bṛhaspatikaḥ. Prajāpatidattakaḥ prajāpatikaḥ. anajadauca, anajādau ca lopo vaktvāvyaḥ. devadattakaḥ devakaḥ yajñadattakaḥ

yajñakaḥ, lopah pūrvapadasya ca. purvapadasya ca lopo vaktavyaḥ, devadattakaḥ dattakaḥ. yajñadattakaḥ dattakaḥ. and so on.

94. Pāṇini VII. 4. 3.

95. Cf. VPI 56 and Pāṇini II. 1. 57.

96. Long technical terms such as samkhyā (according to one view) (MBh. Vol. I-page 81—lines 26-29) upasarjanam (MBh. Vol. I p. 215—lines 7-11). kāraka (MBh. I p. 324—lines 7-9), and karmapravacanīya (MBh. Vol. I p. 346—lines 15-18). These are called long technical terms because they are longer than a samjñā ought to be and are explainable through their component elements. *Nimitta*: Puṇyarāja explains 'nimitta' as the component element of the word. In a long technical term which is interpreted in terms of this component element, they, obviously, form the causal factors in the understanding of the meaning of the term. Patañjali explains a nimitta as some thing known and a nimittī as something unknown. (nirjñāto'rtho nimittam, anirjñāto' rtho nimittī. MBh. Vol. II p. 1 lines 16 and 17.)

97. It is on repetition that the meaning of such a technical term is conveyed through its elements. In the case of a technical term which is not a product of smaller units, such a secondary stage is not necessary, to explain its meaning. To still further explain the process of understanding the meaning of a long technical term with reference to an example, let us take the term kāraka; One gets the explanation of the term 'karoti kārakam' on repetition. (MBh. Vol. I p. 324 line 9) Indeed the purpose of coining such long terms is that such terms must be understood as being expressive of their significance (tatra mahatyā samjñayāḥ karaṇa etatprayojanam anvarthasamjñā yathā vijñāyeta. Karoti kārakamiti MBh. same as above—lines 8 and 9.

97a. The Vākyapadīya also discusses in this connection the use of proper names and technical terms in the grammatical texts. The term, samjñā, is applied mostly to denote technical terms in the works of Pāṇini and other grammarians although in these there are places where the term is used to refer to ordinary proper names. The use of the term samjñā in such a context as the 'samjñā-prakaraṇa' is to mean a technical term. Such terms, for instance, as kartā (subject), karma (object) are examples of samjñas.

Technical terms are used in Sanskrit grammar broadly in four ways. They are: (1) the use ofa technical term in a non-technical sense (2) The use of a technical term in a technical sense (3) the use of a term both in the technical and non-technical sense in the same discussion (4) the use of a technical term in a non-technical sense, but definitely intended to include the technical sense also. Let us take some examples. In the sūtra 'kartari karmavyatihāre' the word karma is used not in the technical sense which it has in the grammatical system, but in the sense of the word in ordinary usage. This latter meaning is 'action'. But there are other sūtras where this word 'karma' is used in its technical sense; viz. 'object'. For the word being used in its grammatical sense as in the subject-predicate-object group the sūtra 'karmani a i' provides an example. . To take two other examples, the term 'karaṇam' is used in a non-technical sense in the sūtra 'śabdavair...........karaṇe' and in its technical sense in the sūtra 'kartṛkaraṇayostṛtīyā'. Now to illustrate the use in the same context of a word, both in its technical and non-technical sense; Pāṇini uses the word 'samkhyā' (number) in both senses in his discussion on numbers. Thus in the sūtra 'bahugaṇavaduḍati samkhyā' he defines the term samkhyā (number) in its technical sense. The sūtra means that words like 'bahu' and 'gaṇa' will be known as samkhyā (numbers), and they are mentioned here as samkhyās (numbers) in the grammatical sense. In other words when the sūtra

lays down that the word 'bahu' is a saṁkhyā, it does not mean that it is a saṁkhyā in that it will have a numerical value when it is used in the context. It only means that the word (bahu) will be technically known as a saṁkhyā thus bringing it under the operation of the rules which particularly refer to saṁkhyās. In the scope of this same sūtra are also included saṁkhyās (numbers) in the ordinary sense, like one which are referred to in a later sūtra, namely 'saṁkhyāyā atiś adantayaḥ'.

We will now illustrate the fourth kind of the use of technical terms. In this group, we have the use of words in their non-technical sense. The scope of the non-technical meaning of the word includes the possibility of its interpretation as a technical term. The sūtra 'ekaśruti dūrātsambuddhau' provides an illustration. The word 'sambuddhi' means 'calling' in its non-technical sense; and in its technical sense it is the name for vocative singular. As used in the sūtra quoted above, it means 'calling in its non-technical sense, But the technical sense of the word has also relevance in the sūtra since 'sambuddhi' in that sense is also a word of 'calling'.

98. Pāṇini I. 1.23 and VI.1.22. See also MBh. Vol. I athavā ācāryapravṛttirjñāpayati bhavatyekādikāyāḥ saṁkhyāyāḥ saṁkhyāpradeśeṣu saṁkhyāsampratyaya iti, yadayam saṁkhyāyāḥ atiśadantayaḥ kan iti tisadantāyāḥ pratiṣedham śāsti.

99. Pāṇini I. 2.33 and II. 3.49.
See also MBh. Vol. I p. 20—lines 1-4.

100. Cf. MBh. Vol. I. p. 41—lines 10-16.

101. Service done to Brahmins while performing sacrifice.

102. Cf. MBh. Vol. I p. 41, lines 10-16.
na cocyate pratyekamiti pratyekam ca bhuji samāpyate.

103. The employment of the same lamp by several students to read is an example of the operation of the principle of tantra—or the principle by which something discharges its func tion on a group-basis.

104. Pāṇini I. 1.1.
See MBh. Vol. I—pp. 37-41.
atha samjñeti prakṛtyā vṛddhyādayaḥ śabdāḥ paṭhitavyāh (p. 37 l. 26) yathā laukikavaidikeṣu (p. 38 l.14. Vārttika) lingena vā (p.39 l-1 Vārttika); pratyekam vṛddhi-guṇasamjñe bhavata iti vaktavyam. kim prayojanam. samudāye mā bhūtāmiti (p. 41 l. 5-6); pratyavayavam ca vākyaparisamāpteḥ (p. 41 l. 10 Vārttika).

105. See MBh. above p. 41—(lines—11.14).

106. This is because the fact of Vṛṣala-ness is satisfied by one of them.

107. See Pāṇini VIII 4.2 MBh Vol. III (p. 453)
A non-technical illustration: MBh. above (l. 16-17) gargaiḥ saha na bhoktavyamiti pratyekam ca na bhoktavyam samuditaiśca.

108. When the sentence is given in the form 'devadatta—yajnadatta—viṣṇumitrāh bhojyantām'.

109. vīpsā cf. Pāṇini VIII. 1.4.

110. See stanza 416 for a similar use of the word 'abhidhīyate' Just as words are not recognised in the sentence when the listener comprehends the sentence, so is the case of c lauses in a mahāvākya.

111. That is, according to the Anvitābhidhāna view of the Padavādi Mīmāmsakas (See VPII 44). According to them, then, the meaning of the sentence is realised

in parts at the focal points of the words. The Mīmāṁsakas, therefore, uphold the notion of pratyekam parisamāpti "culmination of the meaning of the sentence in the component parts individually)" in interpreting the meaning of the sentence, its nature and realisation.

112. The original meaning of the word is an unqualified meaning and the meaning which the word gets from its connection with other words in the sentence is a qualified meaning. Thus the word 'gauḥ' which as an isolate means 'the animal with dew laps, etc.' means the same thing qualified by the act of 'bringing' while used in the sentence 'gām ānaya' (bring the cow).

113. pratyekam tu samaptārthaḥ sahabhūteṣu vartate VPII—117.

114. Cf. MBh. Vol. I. p. 220—10-24
samghātasyaikārthyāt subabhāvo varṇāt.
This occurs in the context of the discussion whether individual letters in a word are meaningful or not. The notion stated in 403 is not accepted by Patañjali himself and Bhartṛhari follows him in that. The Vākyapadīya states the view not necessarily approving of it, though it does not make a statement of its disapproval.

115. Cf. MBh. Vol. I (p. 219 1.26 and 200 I-1-2.)
bahavo hi śabdā ekārthā bhavanti. tadyathā. indraḥ śakraḥ puruhūtaḥ purandaraḥ......ekaśca śabdo bahvarthāh. tadyathā. akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣā iti.

116. Cf. MBh. Vol. II (p. 386—lines 4 and 5)
evam yośāvāmnāye'syavāmaśabdaḥ paṭhyate sośya padārthaḥ.

117. See also above in the text the discussion on sāmidheni hymn VP-II 257-261.

118. See Note 115 above.

119. The text is wrongly printed in the Banares text. Puṇyarāja interprets it 'prayogādabhisandhānamanyat-padeṣu na vidyate.
cf. VP I. 6.
The Nānās'abdavādin is speaking here. Since according to him, all so-called instances of the same word are really different words, there is no question of the same word having several meanings thus necessitating the special aiming of the word at the meaning which is to be conveyed, as the Ekaśabdavādin holds.

120. Cf. VPII 325b 326a 326b.

121. Cf. VP I-86, where however, the understanding of parts which are unreal is stated to be caused by the incapacity of the speaker.

122. According to the anvitābhidhāna-view, thus, the synthesis between the various word-meanings constitutes the meaning of the sentence and that synthesis is not something built up word by word but something which already exists in the very first word.

123. Cf. MBh. Vol. III (p. 57—line 14).
(see also lines 15-28 and page 58—lines 1-7).
siddham tu dharmopadeśane'navayavavijñānāt (p. 57 line 14).

124. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa: Sphoṭavada p. 14.
evam ghaṭamānaya 'ityādau samsargarupo vākyārthaḥ samudāyas'akyaḥ.

125. The argument is continued from the previous stanza. Reality is expressed in the forms of statements and statements, either positive or negative are in the form of sentences. It follows from this that only sentences and not words can convey reality, which has the form of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore it is wrong to con-

ceive that the meaning of a sentence is conveyed from the words composing it. Even when we mention the name of a single object it takes the form of a sentence.

cf. VPII 325 b, 326 a, 327a, 328a and 335.
125a MBh. Vol. I (p. 367 lines 10-16).

126. They are not final truths in the ultimate analysis.

127. The term 'karaṇa' in line 2 does not mean instrument, it means 'action', the word being used as the noun form of the root kṛ = to do. Puṇyarāja explains it as follows: In the sentence 'pacikriyām karomi' (I do cooking) 'cooking' is a noun and is used as an accessory to the action of 'doing' and therefore is a sādhana. In the sentence 'pacāmi' (I cook), the verb is 'cook' and hence its meaning is the sādhya, the thing to be accomplished, the objective.

128. The same point is made that objects, that is the referents of words have several and sometimes conflicting possibilities and that it is the use of the word with a specific intention by the speaker which specifies a particular aspect of a meaning as operative in a certain context (Sec VP. 434) cf. Tractus Logico-Philosophicus p. 35 'Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs'.

129. In other words since 'conjunction' is an attribute of the conjoined a description of the conjoined objects is necessary to describe the character of 'conjunction'. This means that the mere word 'samyoga' does not describe the nature of the relation it names. Similarly the relationship known as 'samavāya' is expressed by implication in the relation samyoga.

130. mātrayā-yadā tasya mātrayā niyatasamkhyākena *alpīyasā śabdena* yogo 'bhiṣambandho dṛśyate—Puṇyarāja. Example: igyaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam Pāṇini I. 1.45. The

sûtra means that the substitutes i, u, ṛ, and ḷ which come in the places of y, v, r and l will be known as samprasāraṇas Eg. yaj—iṣṭam, vap = uptam

Or, alternatively, the sentence 'igyaṇaḥ' meaning the substitution of ik (i, u, ṛ, ḷ) for yaṇ (y, v, r, l) will be known by the name samprasāraṇam.

Now the point of quoting this example is to present an argument in favour of the akhaṇḍa-position that sentences convey their meaning as indivisible units. The sentence of which the name is samprasāraṇam, that is which is constituted by the single word 'samprasāraṇaṃ' conveys the meaning of substitution of 'ik' for 'yaṇ'. Being a single-word-sentence, it cannot be argued by any one that the sentence conveys its meaning through its component parts.

Cf. MBh. Vol. I p. 111 and p. 112.

131. Pāṇini VIII. 1.23 also VPII 2-6.

132. Mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti (see, there goes a deer)
The sentence mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti is such that it can neither be exclusively interpreted as a single sentence, nor as a combination of more sentences than one. In the view that it is a composite of two sentences, the two component sentences are mṛgaḥ yāti (the deer runs) and (etam mṛgaṃ) paśyata (you see the deer).

Another school of thinking considers that mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti is one sentence. Since the verbs are interconnected (yuktayukta).

133. Eg. vrīhayo bahavo 'vahanyantām (Let lots of cultivated rice be threshed) Here, there is a logical incompleteness, since the agent, instruments, etc., of the action of threshing are not mentioned; but there is no

incompleteness in utterance. Hence the sentence is considered as having a complete meaning.

134. In this connection it is stated that there need not be complete parity between the manner of the use of words in sentences and the meanings they convey. Thus, in the two sentences 'caṇkramyamāṇo' dhīṣva' (Recite while moving about) and 'japamścaṇkrmaṇam' kuru' (Move about while reciting), the word 'caṅkramyamāṇa' is secondary in the first sentence and primary in the second, being a subsidiary verb in the ıormer and a principal one in the latter. Similarly with the word jap (or adhīṣva) also there is a difference in the manner of their use. But despite this distinction in the nature of the use of the words, there is no difference in the meaning that they convey since the meaning of the sentence in either case is an injunction to perform the act of reciting.

Puṇyarāja also gives an alternative explanation of the examples. According to this explanation it is only the word 'cankramyamāṇa' whose nature and use is studied here. There is no difference in the function of the word in the two sentences. In both it serves the purpose of being an action subsidiary to recital. But there is a distinction in the nature o. their usage. In the first sentence it is used as an auxiliary verb while in the second sense, as a principal verb.

135. 1. The method which must consist in the order in which the subsidiary actions are to be performed, thus gradually building up the main action.
2. The effect ie, whatever is stipulated as the fruit of the action—heaven, children, and so on.

136. The passage referred to is saptadaśa prājāpatyān ekavarṇān ajāmstu uparānālabheta (He should sacrifice for Prajāpati, 17 hornless he-goats all of one colour).

137. This stanza cites and explains another example for the point stated in kārika 451 that the same verb can be applicable to several sentences. The verb bhuj = to eat in the sentence 'devadatta yajñadattaviṣṇumitrā bhojyantām' (Devadatta, Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are to be fed) refers individually to the three subjects combined in the compound 'devadattayajñadattaviṣṇu-mitrāh'. That is, the meaning of the sentence pertains to the three individuals individually.

138. Pānini III. 4.67 (kartari kṛt) which says: the kṛt-suffix occurs in the sense of the agent (e.g, pācakaḥ). This is a general statement which means that the sūtra has a general meaning. This meaning is later on particularised in specific examples, like—paśu (an animal).

139. Eg. 'devadattaḥ pacati', 'yajñadattaḥ pacati.' In these sentences the action is particularised by the individual subject and other particular factors. Thus we can paraphrase the verb in the sentence (1) as devedatta-kartṛkapacatikriyā (the action of cooking with Deva-datta as its agent). In sentences like 'pacate', yajate', etc. on the other hand, the verb has a general signi-fication.

Even when verbal forms show distinction of tense, as for instance in pacati, apākṣīt, pakṣyati (cooks, cooked, will cook respectively), or distinctions caused by the nouns associated with them, as for instance in 'ustrāsikā āsyante' (there is the sitting like the sitting of camels), or 'ḥataśāyikā śayyante' (There is the lying like the lying of the dead), the verb fundamentally conveys the verbal idea in general when used to do so (see next stanza). cf. MBh. I. (p. 256 lines 19 & 20) katham punarjñāyate bhāvavacanāḥ pacādaya iti. yadeṣām bhavatinā sāmānādhikaraṇyam, bhavati pacati, bhavati pakṣyati, bhavatyapākṣīditi and Vol. II p. 57 lines 3. and 4.

tiṅabhihite cāpi tadā bhāva bahuvacanaṃ śrūyate. tadyathā. uṣṭrāsikā āsyante. hataśāyikā śayyanta iti. *Uṣṭrāsikā āsyante* (*There is the sitting like the sitting of camels*); *hataśāyikā sayyante* (*there is the lying like the lying of the dead*);

In both cases the verb is used in the impersonal passive (bhāve) and conveys the verbal idea in general as its meaning. Nevertheless the verb is used in the plural, as an exception to the general rule that when they are used in the impersonal passive, verbs will be in the singular. Thus in these two sentences the verb shows the plural number of the noun (sādhanam) with which it is linked. Camels have various ways of sitting and a plurality is inherent in the meaning of the noun form 'uṣṭrāsikā' itself. Thus plurality also appears in the verb 'āsyante'. Similarly the dead lie in many ways, and the plurality thus inherent in the very meaning of the noun, hataśāyikā' appears also in the verbal form form "śayyante". cf. Nageśabhaṭṭa's Mahābhasya-pradīpodyota (Biblio : Indica. No. 1231) Vol. 4— pages 332 and 336. Foot-note).
uṣṭrāṇām hi āsikāḥ svarūpata eva vilakṣaṇā hi; hataśca nānāprakāram śerate, uttāna avatānaḥ vikīrnakeśaḥ viśra stavastraḥ ityādi. tatsādṛśyādākhyātavācyasyāpi bhāvasya svarūpagatabhedāvabhāsādbahuvacanam bhavatyeva.

140. akṣaḥ (1) a certain kind of seed,
(2) the pole of cart,
(3) seed of a plant used in dice.

The sentence in question is "akṣāḥ bhakṣyantām bhojyantāṃ dīvyantām")Let akṣās be eaten, bent or thrown). This kind of composite utterance is not usual in actual life. But like the sentence śveto dhāvati' it can be quoted for illustration.

141. When the word akṣāḥ is used as stated in the previous stanza, it is a common form under which three different

words, akṣāḥ, akṣāḥ, akṣāḥ are uttered. cf. The explanation of the word 's'veto' in 'śveto dhāvati' according to the principle of tantra (See V. P. II. 111).

142. Thus the words 'akṣa' and 'yakṣa' for instance have necessarily to be used one after the other, because they do not possess a common form under which they can be uttered in union. But in the word 'akṣāh', we have according to one view three different words,'akṣāh' 'akṣāḥ' and 'akṣāḥ' uttered in union. This is because they have a common form and they are different words because they have different meanings.

143. That is, this view, instead of considering that 'aksāh' is a composite of three different words considers its meaning as a composite of three different meanings, the word itself being a single entity.

144. Thus the word 'akṣāḥ' is a composite of the three words akṣāh, akṣāh and akṣāh and from the composite utterance "akṣāḥ bhakṣyantām bhojyantām dīvyantām" we get 'akṣo bhakṣyatām, 'akṣo bhojyatām' and 'akṣo dīvyatām, using the word akṣa in the singular we must connect the plural noun with the verb as akṣāḥ bhakṣyantām etc.

145. See note on 466.

146. See Note on 466.

147. Examples of such sentences:
śveto dhāvati (VP II 113) and igyaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam (Pāṇini I. 1.45).

See note 130 above.
cf. MBh. Vol. I—(page. 111-112).
vibhaktiviśeṣanirdeśastu jñāpakaḥ ubhayasamjñātvasya.

148. See Notes 130 and 147 above. The reference is to the sūtra igyaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam.

The term liṅga=jñāpaka of Mahābhāsya (See quotation under 147 above).

149. The sūtra referred to is Pāṇini I. 1.59. The Kāśika paraphrases the sutra as: *dvirvacananimitte'ci* ajādeśaḥ sthānivadbhavati *dvirvacana* eva kartavye—That is, when followed by an affix having an initial vowel, which causes re-duplication, the substitute which takes the plac place of a vowel is like the original vowel only for the purpose of re-duplication Eg. papatuḥ.

(The formation of this form in the 3rd person dual number from the root pā = to drink will illustrate this sūtra. To form this, the affix 'atus' is added to the root. So we get pā = atus = p+zero + atus according to Pāṇini VI. 4.64 which states that the ā of the root is elided before ārthadhātuka affixes beginning with a with a vowel and which are kit or ṅit and before it. (कित्, ङित् or before it).

The next stage is the re-duplication of the root according to Pāṇini VI 1.8 which states that a root consisting of a single vowel is re-duplicated before the terminations of the perfect. Now, since what remains of the root after the elision of ā is only p, the provision according to VI 1.8 of the root consisting of a single vowel does not exist. To remove that difficulty we have the operation of the rule under discussion (ie I. 1.59). According to this rule, the zero which comes in the place of the ā in the root pā (ie, in the setting p + zero + atus), must be treated like the ā itsef. That is, for the purpose of the operation of re-duplicationwe should consider that the ā is still there). Hence it may be considered that the root which is to be re-duplicated is pā—thus satisfying the condition for VI. 1.8).

Now the point of the Vākyapadiya referring to

Patañjali's discussion of this sūtra is to quote a remark which is made in that connection in the Mahābhāṣya regarding the employment of principle of ekaśeṣa or tantra in the use of words or word-combination. To explain, if a single use of a word is intended to convey its occurence more than once, then the word is used according to the principle of ekaśeṣa or tantra. In the sūtra in question namely, dvirvacane'ci, the word dvirvacane (re-duplication) is used to stand for the occurence of the word twice in the sutra. It will be noted that the paraphrasing of the sūtra by the Kāśika, given above, contains the word dvirvacane mentioned twice. See *underlined.* According to the Mahābhāṣya the single mention of dvirvacane in the sūtra is a combination of two instances of its occurance and therefore can stand for both.

See MBh—Vol. I. (p. 156 lines 17 and 18). katham punarekena yatnena unbhayam labhyam ekaśeṣanirdeśo'yam dvirvacanam ca dvirvacanam ca dvirvacanam.

150. S. K. Belwalker suggests the possibility that Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa are traditional elaborators of the Pāṇinian system sometime between 470 A. D.—650 A. D. See Systems of Sanskrit Grammar p. 35 footnote 1. But this obviously is impossible as the three authors must have lived before Candra's time if Bhartṛharis' account is to be relied upon as Belwalker himself does on p. 41 of his work.

151. The mountain referred is Trikūṭa. The legend is that on Trikūṭa was found the text of the science of grammar composed by Rāvaṇa. A certain Brahmarakṣas took it away and gave it to teachers like Candra and Vasurātaguru. They then developed it into a science with

many branches. On Candra and Vasurāta see Systems of Sanskrit Grammar pp. 57-62.

152. The teacher referred to is Vasurāta mentioned in 151 above. According to Puṇyarāja, the statement 'this was composed by our teacher' only means 'composed through the blessings of the teacher'.

153. Cf. Tractus Logico Philosophicus p. 77
'The object of Philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts..............

'The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions" but to make propositions clear.'

GENERAL INDEX

(For the Translation and Notes)

(*Note* : References are to page and verse or page and note or page and foot-note line (fn. l.). The arrangement is according to the English alphabet.)

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ERRATA

Page	*Verse—line etc.*	*For*	*Read*
3	14	वाङ् मलानां	वाङ्मळानां
3	17	छन्दोमयीतनुं	छन्दोमयीं तनुम्
3	17	छन्दस्यच्छन्दसां	छन्दस्यश्छन्दसां
6	32	भेदाद्भिन्नासु	भेदाद् भिन्नासु
8	39	ये	यो
9	foot note line 9	Karıka	Kārikā
12	56	तेऽर्थानां अगृ–	तेऽर्थानामगृ—
14	69	संज्ञिनां	मंज्ञिनी
15	72	कञ्चन	किञ्चन
15	70—translation line2	ar	are
17	77	शब्दस्यूर्ध्वं	शब्दस्योर्ध्वं
21	95	व्यतिरि —	व्यक्तिरि—
21	96	—मिह	—मिह[88]
22	101	Speechsounds	Speech-sound
24	107	भेदोऽहि	भेदो हि
26	foot-note	Karika	Kārikā
27	foot-note	Karika	Kārikā
26	119 trans. l. 1	ṣadja[38]	ṣadja[28]
28	122	भावनात्	भावनाम्
28	121 trans. l. 3	past[82]	past[29]
30	132	इष्यते	अश्नुते
32	141	–ऽदृष्टस्फलानार्थान्	–ऽदृष्टफलानर्थान्
32	141	वस्तुम्	वक्तुम्
32	142	शिष्टानां इदं	शिष्टानामिदं
37	foot note line 5	sine	since
44	31. क.	प्रकाशते	प्रकाश्यते
50	58a trans. l. 2	ways[49]	ways[49a]
55	78	विशेषोऽतिदिश्यते	विशेषोत्राऽतिदिश्यते
56	83	विद्यते	भिद्यते
56	foot note line 2	भिद्य–	विद्य–
59	93 trans. l. 2	respects	respects[57]
61	105 translation line 1	without their giving up	without giving up
67	127	अभिजलपत्व	अभिजन्यत्व
67	127 foot note line 1	जन्य	–जल्प–

Page	*Verse—line etc.*	*For*	*Read*
74	162 translation line 2	horn	hair
79	185	265	285
84	204 tra : line 1	104	204
91	235	व्यवस्थि:	व्यवस्थित:
	335b trans. l. 2	(of things) [77]	(of thing) [72]
98	translation line 2	primary).	primary.
98	268 translation line 3	example :	example :)
98	268 translation line 6	context;	context.
105	301 trans. l. 4	one) [80]	one).
105	302	तथाशब्दोऽपि	तथा शब्दोऽपि
105	303 trans. l. 3	word from remaing the same	to be omitted
106	translation line 1	operatie	operate
106	305 trans. l. 4	meaning	meaning [80]
106	307b trans. l. 2	stated	stated [80a]
109	321	प्रतीयते	प्रवर्तते
110	translation line 1	set	set
113	335 trans. l. 5	of the latter group basis 102	of the latter [87] group basis 103
116	346	यदुक्त	यत्त्यक्त
116	347 tra : line 2	Māṭharas	Māṭhara
123	374 trans. l. 1	bhuj group basis [102]	bhuj [102] group-basis [103]
123	378	शातादाने	शतादाने
123	378	शातकर्मके	शतकर्मके
125	383 tra : line 2	aṅ	aṭ
127	396 trans. l. 6	added [115]	added
129	406	–त्सतु तत्रा	–त्स तु तत्र
130	407 tra : line 4	Words-with-one-meaning	Words with one meaning
130	410	–रूपायो	–रुपायो
131	line 1	The nature	(The nature
133	421 trans. l. 5	word-meaning	word meaning
134	428	–भिसन्धसु	–भिसन्धत्त
136	436	कथंश्चिद्	कथञ्चिद्
136	437	व्यवहारेपदार्थानां	व्यवहारे पदार्थानां
137	442	साकाङक्षे	साकाङ्क्षे
138	445 tra : line 2	discussed :—	discussed :)

Page	*Verse—line etc.*	*For*	*Read*
138	447	–ऽथीष्वत्र	–ऽथीष्वात्र
138	447 tran. l. 1	mving aboout	moving about
138	448 tran: line 6	inumerating	enumerating
140	456	–ऽनन्यादि वस्थितम्	–ऽनन्यदिव स्थितम्
140	458	विद्यते	भिद्यते
141	460	यथाभिन्ना	यथा भिन्ना
141	460	प्रयोगकाला भेदेऽपि	प्रयोगकालाभेदेऽपि
144	472	युगपच्छीयते	युगपच्छ्रीयते
144	474 tra : l. 1	(as to its application to)	(as to its application) to
145	475	एकर्शेषेण	एकशेषेण
145	478	नौवावस्थित–	नैवावास्थित–
145	479	वैजि	बैजि
145	480 tra : l. 2	isciples	disciples
146	484	प्रज्ञाविवेकं	प्रज्ञा विवेकं
147	Note : No : 3—line 4	brahmeṇa	brahmaṇā
147	last line but one	Svarūpena	Svarūpeṇ
150	Note : 16—2	must a	must have a
152	para : 2 line 13	ūtra	Sūtra
153	Note : 21	There is wrong spacing in the middle of the Para. The lines read together.	
158	line 2	sāmānavākye	samānavākye
158	,, 3	sāmānavākya	samānavākya
159	line 9	Mimmāmsaka	Mīmāmsaka
159	line 13	Kātyayanat	Kātyāyana
170	Para 3—line 3	patah	paṭaḥ
174	Note : 91—l. 6	aśabdmiva	aśabdamiva
174	,, 91—l. 7	Brahmanas	Brāhmaṇas
174	,, 91—l. 8, 9	Māṭharas	Māṭhara
180	,, 119—l. 1	Banaras	Benares

Note : A few more misprints especially regarding diacritical marks in words such as Karika for Kārikā have unfortunately crept in, but have not been here indicated.